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RÉSUMÉ 
La recherche en gouvernance d'entreprise traitant du rôle des conseils 
d'administration s'est principalement intéressée à sa dimension fiduciaire tout en 
reléguant la dimension stratégique de ce rôle à un niveau secondaire. Cette 
préoccupation, axée principalement sur la fonction de contrôle et de surveillance 
attribuée aux conseils d'administration , est largement due à la domination de la théorie 
de l'agence qui met un accent particulier sur la réduction des coûts d'agence comme 
étant l'extrant principal de tout système de gouvernance efficace. 
Cependant, et malgré son apport considérable en termes de définition du 
problème et des enjeux fondamentaux de la gouvernance qui découlent, notamment, de 
la séparation entre la propriété et le contrôle, force est de constater qu'au niveau 
normatif, les théoriciens de l'agence proposent des solutions limitées et généralement 
basées sur une vision unidimensionnelle, simpliste et largement instrumentale appliquée 
à un concept complexe et multidimensionnel comme celui portant sur le rôle que les 
conseils d'administration doivent remplir de nos jours. 
Corollairement, la présente étude vise à investiguer, comment la gouvernance 
d'entreprise doit être étendue, notamment en intégrant la perspective de la gouvernance 
créatrice de valeur (Allaire et Firsirotu, 2003; 2004; 2009) et la perspective basée sur les 
ressources, de manière à ce que les conseils d'administration puissent jouer un rôle plus 
stratégique dans les processus de création de valeur de l'entreprise au lieu de se 
confiner à un rôle de surveillance, de mécanisme disciplinaire ou d'instrument 
informationnel comme le présuppose la perspective traditionnelle de la théorie de 
l'agence. La présente thèse porte essentiellement sur le rôle des conseils 
d'administration et leur contribution à la performance de l'entreprise dans des contextes 
de prise de décision sensiblement critiques comme ceux que supposent les opérations 
de fusions et acquisitions. 
En utilisant les régressions logistiques et les régressions multiples classiques , 
nous avons tenté de déterminer les attributs susceptibles de prédire d'une manière 
significative les acquisitions à succès, ainsi que les attributs qui affecteraient 
positivement ou négativement la performance découlant des opérations de fusions et 
d'acquisitions. 
Nos résultats démontrent que la légitimité des conseils d'administration 
lorsqu'e lle est basée sur des processus de sélection et de nomination de qualité est 
positivement reliée à la probabilité d'accomplir des acquisitions réussies . Par ailleurs, 
nos résultats démontrent également que l'indépendance des conseils, lorsqu'elle est 
estimée par la proportion des membres indépendants externes, est plutôt négativement 
reliée à la probabi lité de réaliser des acquisitions réussies. En ce qui concerne, la 
crédibilité du conseil , celle-ci est positivement reliée à la probabilité de procéder à des 
acquisitions réussies lorsqu'elle est basée sur une grande diversité des profils 
professionnels des administrateurs composant le conseil d'aministration et lorsque ces 
Xll 
derniers possèdent collectivement une expenence moyenne supeneure à celle des 
managers, en ce qui a trait aux industries dans lesquelles l'entreprise acquéreuse opère. 
Nos résultats démontrent également que les capacités stratégiques des conseils 
d'administration , caractérisées par une distance fonctionnelle , un niveau d'éducation 
similaire et une distance d'âge élevés entre les membres du conseil et le CEO, sont 
positivement reliées à la probabilité de réaliser des acquisitions réussies. 
Finalement, la diversité des profils professionnels des administrateurs composant 
le conseil d'administration, le niveau d'expérience spécifique à l'industrie de l'acquéreur 
et la similarité des niveaux d'éducation entre le CEO et les membres du conseil sont 
tous positivement reliés à l'amélioration du rendement sur les actifs (ROA) dans le cas 
des acquisitions réussies. 
Mots clés : gouvernance d'entreprise, conseil d'administration, crédibilité, légitimité , 
capacités stratégiques, fusions et acquisitions, théorie de l'agence, théorie de 
l'intendance, théorie institutionnelle, l'approche basée sur les ressources , gouvernance 
créatrice de valeur. 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate Governance research has generally focused on the board of directors' 
fiduciary function and relegated its strategie role to a second arder aspect of board 
duties. This reliance on the monitoring function of the board is largely attributable to the 
domination of the agency theory and its emphasis on the agency cost reduction as the 
main output of corporate governance systems. However, and despite of its strong and 
weil articulated theoretical framework in outlining the governance problem that stems 
from the separation of ownership and control , agency theory has provided a limited 
unitary, simplistic and instrumental conception of a complex and multifaceted role that 
the board are actually called to play. 
The present study investigated how corporate governance should be extended , 
using the Value creating Governance Perspective (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003; 2004 ; 
2009) and the RBV perspective in arder for boards to play a more strategie role in the 
firm's value creation processes, rather than sticking to monitoring and disciplining 
function rooted in the traditional agency perspective. This dissertation proposes to study 
the role of board of directors in the most sensitive area of Merger and Acquisition 
decisions to assess their contribution to firm performance. 
Through Logistic and OLS regressions , we assessed which governance 
attributes predicted better successful acquisitions and which ones, have a significant 
impact on post- acquisition performance. We found that Board Legitimacy based on the 
quality of Directors' selection and nomination processes, along with Board Credibility 
based on Director's occupational backgrounds diversity and firm industry specifie 
experiences are positively associated with the probability of making successful 
acquisitions. We also found that strategy processes and dialogue between the Board 
and management operationalized through Board Strategie Capabilities are positively 
related with the probability of making successful acquisition for firms with higher Board-
CEO functional distance, higher Board-CEO educational level similarity and higher 
Board-CEO age distance. We finally found that Directors' occupational diversity, lndustry 
specifie experiences and Board-CEO educational level similarity were positively related 
with the improvements in the acquirers' ROA in the case of successful acquisition. 
Key words: Corporate governance, Board of directors, Strategie Capabilities, Mergers, 
Acquisitions, Ressource Based View, Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, lnstitutional 
Theory, Cred ibility, Legitimacy, Value Creating Governance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The corporate governance debate has tended to focus on how boards could 
be made to serve better the interest of shareholders . This shareholder perspective , 
rooted in the agency theory tradition, considers that fi rm stockholders are the 
ultimate risk bearers, and should be considered , therefore, as the only principals (i.e. 
owners) for which managers (i.e. agents) are accountable. From its part, Stakeholder 
theory considers that the firm belong to ali its stakeholders and managers should be 
accountable to its key employees , clients, suppliers, and the community in general. 
Since 1983, more than thirty American States have adopted what became commonly 
called the corporate constituency statutes or stakeholders status (Orts, 1992) that 
allow the board of directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than 
shareholders, including employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and the 
community in making-decision, facilitating therefore the birth of various anti-
takeovers mechanisms (Springer, 1999; Allaire and Firs irotu , 2005; 2009) . ln 
Canada, although the CBCA considers under section 122, that directors should "act 
honestly and in good faith for the best interests of the corporation ", it seems that in 
practice and under the shareholder primacy madel th is duty means acting in the 
interests of Shareholders (Andrew Kitching aw and Government Division , 2008) . 
Allaire and Firsirotu (2009: p 141 ) noted th at: "This position is surprising in view of 
the rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada. ln two recent judgments, the Supreme 
Court clearly established that boards of directors have a responsibility to the 
company and its stakeholders, not sole/y to shareholders (Peoples Oepartment 
Stores v. Wise, October 2004; BCE, Bell Canada, June 2008)". 
However, the debate on whether management should maximize shareholders 
value or maximize those of the firm stakeholders, in addition to have confined 
2 
corporate governance to focus on the accountability aspects, has contributed to 
minimize the interest on investigating the board strategie contribution in the firm 
value creation processes, no matter which party will benefit from the economie value 
generated at the end of these processes. 
Hence, agency theory emphasized the implications of the separation of 
ownership and control in modern organizations (Berle and Means, 1932) and was 
rather interested to find efficient mechanisms which could help to overcome the 
negative effects of managerial control over the firm resources, particularly, through 
the use of internai and external corporate governance mechanisms. Consequently, 
Board of directors , as an internai governance mechanism, is supposed to represent 
the principals and its main function consists , according to the agency theorists, in 
monitoring managers and preventing them from undertaking value destroying actions 
and self serving behaviour. ln addition , the board of directors is supposed to play a 
disciplinary role through its ability to terminate managers' contracts and its authority 
to replace them when it's necessary. 
Furthermore, agency theorists consider the board of directors as an 
information instrument designed to reduce information asymmetry and to mitigate 
agency costs, which provided the foundations for what has been called fiduciary 
corporate governance (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003) . 
Accordignly, the Fiduciary model is consistent with the monitoring and 
disciplin ing role of the board of directors and its proponents consider directors' 
independence, along with the separation of the CEO and chairman functions and the 
management compensation as its cornerstones (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003) . The 
Sarbanes- Oxley Act passed in 2002 and its equivalent bills passed in Canada (Bill 
198), along with the Saucier Report (2001) and the TSE (2001) guidel ines of good 
corporate governance practices, were largely based on the fiduciary conception of 
corporate governance and its instrumental view of the board role , along with the 
overestimation of directors' independence and managerial compensation as the 
main attributes of good corporate governance. 
3 
However, the concept of directors' independence, underlying the fiduciary 
madel, was not carefully defined neither by the agency theorists (Johnson et al , 
1996) nor by the regulators , which contributed to the exacerbation of the information 
asymmetry problem, given that outsiders, in addition to their poor knowledge of firm 
businesses and activities, tend to become heavily dependent on management for 
internai and strategie information. 
lndeed, defining independence as the absence of material relationship 
between the directors and the firm in which they serve, while could prevent conflict of 
interests and ensure objective and more diligent monitoring, it could not ensure that 
directors are competent and that they possess the required knowledge, expertise 
and information to contribute actively and positively in the firm strategie decision 
making (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Although , ali the guidelines and the recent 
reports , such as the SCB (2003) , outlined that board of directors is the firm ultimate 
decision taker, and is responsible for setting strategie orientation and ensuring its 
implementation, none had provided useful guidelines on how directors could be 
empowered and board processes enabled to fulfill this critical role . 
As an alternative control mechanism on management, the free , 
unconstrained market for corporate control (what has been called The Shareholders ' 
Rights Governance) is supposed to ensure that managerial incompetence or value 
destroying actions would quickly lead to a takeover of the company and the 
replacement of management and the board (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003) . However, 
the market for corporate control , being a last recourse mechanism (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), may not necessari ly impede managers' deviation from pursu ing value 
creation objectives and will intervene only when value destruction becomes manifest. 
Furthermore, management entrenchment and anti-takeover provisions, rather 
prevalent throughout the corporate world, including in the United States, make it 
difficult for the market for corporate control to play its correcting role , let alone a 
preventive one (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003) . 
The wave of LBO acquisitions during the 1980s was a direct application of 
the shareholders' rights principle. Hostile takeovers of companies by financial 
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operators -who claimed management and boards were mismanaging corporations , 
were failing to maximize free cash flows and were wasting company resources in 
unproductive activities- were the norm. This systematic aggression of corporations 
led to the enactment of laws to curb LBO operators in severa! key U.S. states. 
Following the notorious scandais of the early 2000's, such as those of Enron , 
WorldCom and Tyco, among others, regulators strengthened the fiduciary role of the 
board of directors and provided new monitoring empowerments for directors. 
Although nocessary, these new dispositions reinforced only the mechanisms by 
which agency costs could be reduced , but neglected how economie value was 
generated and how the board of directors could play a more dynamic role in the 
firm 's value generating processes. 
On the other hand, empirical evidence has reported mixed results on the 
impact of fiduciary attributes of corporate governance- such us board composition, 
equity based compensation , board size , debt leve! and ownership concentration- on 
firm performance. 
Relying on the hypothesis that outside directors are more independent from 
management than insiders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
Board composition function and its effect on firm performance were extensively 
investigated under the agency perspective, particularly in the case of studies relying 
on the outsiders/insiders proportion as a proxy for board effectiveness. However, 
empirical evidence of the impact of board composition on governance effectiveness 
or firm perfo ance is highly mixed and generally inconclusive (Daily, 1995; Johnson 
et al , 1996; Dalton et al , 1998). Thus, while Daily (1995) concluded that there is no 
systematic relationship between board composition and its ability to fulfill efficiently 
its service , resource and control functions , Johnson et al (1996) identified studies 
th at reported (1) a positive relationship between the proportion of inside board 
members and firm performance (Vance, 1983; Cochran et al, 1985; Kesner, 1987) , 
(2) a positive relationship between the proportion of outside board members and firm 
performance (Hill and Snell , 1988; Pearce and Zahra , 1992) , and (3) a non 
significant relationship between the proportion of inside board members and 
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performance (Molz, 1988). Allaire and Firsirotu (2003) found, also, a non significant 
relationship (with a relatively negative tendency) between board composition and 
firm performance for Canadian firms. 
Furthermore, in a recent Meta-Analytic review of the impact of board 
composition as a governance mechanism, Deutsch (2005) have identified three 
streams of research : (1) studies examining the relationship between board 
composition and firm general performance (Dalton et al , 1998; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) reporting mixed and inconsistent 
evidence; (2) studies using meta-analytic reviews to assess the impact of board 
composition on firm financial performance (Dalton et al , 1998; Rhoades et al , 2000) 
concluding with weak and small positive relationships; (3) studies relying on the 
assumption that the accurate evaluation of the impact of board composition should 
be examined by considering discrete critical decisions, rather than financial 
performance, as dependent variables (Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 
1996) given that board monitoring, while may have a direct effect on firms ' critical 
decisions, it has only an indirect one on firm financial performance. Evidence from 
the third stream is also inconclusive. 
lndeed, and while Bhagat and Black (1999) reported that there is no clear 
evidence on the impact of board composition on firms ' critical decisions, Deutsch 
(2005: pp 440-441) concluded that "Whereas the former stream (i.e. the one linking 
board composition to firm performance*) has reached a dead end (Dalton et al. , 
1998), this study's results suggest that the latter stream (i.e. the one linking board 
composition to firms ' critical decisions*) warrants further exploration. Specifically, 
systematic relationships were found between board composition and firms ' critical 
decisions in which the underlying issues include CEO's compensation scheme, the 
levet of firms ' risk, and corporate control issues in which shareholders and 
managers' interests potentially diverge. The systematic relationships found, 
however, provide on/y little support to the predictions based on positivist agency 
theory. ft is therefore hoped that the results presented here will stimulate new 
directions in research on the effect of outside directors' representation on corporate 
boards on firms ' critical decisions". (*not in the original text) . 
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Nevertheless, ali the studies reported above have used the proportion of 
outsiders as a proxy for board independence (i.e. effectiveness) , discarding the fact 
that the theoretical positive effect expected from the presence on the board of a 
large majority constituted by outside members, is likely to be reversed by an 
exacerbated information asymmetry when these directors are lacking specifie 
information, expertise and knowledge about the company and its businesses (Walsh 
and Seward , 1990; Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003; Van den Bergh and Levrau , 2004) . 
lndeed, severe information asymmetries suffered by the so called independent 
directors will imply, therefore, a passive implication of the board in the firm decision 
making processes, in addition to an awkward accomplishment of its decision control 
role , as prescribed and expected by agency theory. 
Consequently, the concept of independence, as defined by the current rules 
and as used in the previous research , should be reconsidered in arder to avoid the 
potential counter effects that stem from boards composed by a majority of outsiders. 
lndeed, composite measures accounting for information asymmetries, along with 
material independence, power issues and board financial involvement, could capture 
better the real degree of board independence than the mere outsider/insider 
classification , generally used in corporate governance research . 
As for equity based compensation , empirical evidence on the relationship 
between performance and equity ownership (i.e. lnsider ownership) is also mixed . 
Wh ile Demsetz and Lehn ( 1985) and Loderer and Sheehan ( 1989) fou nd no 
relationship between the level of executive equity ownership and firm performance, 
other researchers reported , at best, a weak positive, but instable association (Marck 
et al , 1988; McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Loderer and Martin , 1997; 
Core and Larcker, 2002). Furthermore, several researchers identified a non-l inear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance (Marck et al , 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) and argued that high 
managerial ownership could induce managers to exert insufficient effort, maximize 
private benefits and adopt entrenchment behaviour (Marck et al , 1988, Short and 
Keasey, 1999). 
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The management entrenchment hypothesis suggests, therefore, that 
managers with high stockholdings would seek to design control systems that 
enhance their private interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Edlin and Stigl itz, 1995; 
Bebchuk et al , 2004 ) and decrease (or neutral ize) the effectiveness of the other 
governance mechanisms, including the shareholder participation in policy making 
processes and board monitoring ability (Weisbach, 1988; Dann and DeAngelo, 1988; 
Boeker, 1992; Denis et al , 1997). 
Another governance attribute that captured a huge interest of agency 
theorists is board size. lndeed, while Yermack (1996) reported a negative 
relationship between board size and firm value and Eisenberg et al (1998) found a 
negative effect of board size on firm performance, Adams and Mehran (2003) 
reported a positive effect of board size on firm performance in the banking industry. 
ln their frequently cited study, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) stated that board size 
and firm value appear to be negatively correlated . However, board size could have 
both a positive and negative effects on firm performance. lndeed, while large boards 
could count on a larger pool of expertise , knowledge and experience provided by 
their members as weil as on a wide range of perspectives and opinions on the firm 
strategie issues (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), they may also suffer from coordination 
and communication problems or group dynamic issues such as fractions and 
coalitions that could hamper board ability to act orto effectively monitor management 
(Judge and Zeithaml , 1992; Golden and Zajac, 2001 ; Van den Berghe and Levrau , 
2004). Here again, the literature seems to show mixed and inconclusive direct effect 
of board size on firm performance or firm value. 
ln addition to the board of directors and executive compensation , agency 
theory prescribes severa! alternative mechanisms to achieve goal congruence 
between managers and shareholders, such as debt and dividends policies or 
ownership concentration, used simultaneously (or as substitutes) with (to failing) 
board monitoring and executive compensation (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
lndeed, Jensen et al (1992) found a negative relationship between management 
ownership, dividend and debt policies, and concluded that the causality was likely to 
run only from management ownership to dividend and debt policies' uses. 
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Consequently, dividend and debt mechanisms will not reduce agency costs when 
management ownership is important, indicating a substitution effect between the 
three mechanisms (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). Furthermore, McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) assert that, depending on firm context , debt could have a positive or 
a negative effect on firm value, and that negative effects are particularly present in 
the case of companies evolving in environments with multiple growth opportunities. 
Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber ( 1996) showed th at, to be effective, the use of debt 
should be coupled with internai monitoring exerted through inside shareholders, or 
outside members of the Board. 
For agency theory, nevertheless, only lnstitutional concentrated shareholding 
could constitute an efficient governance mechanism given that it may increase the 
takeover probability of the firm (Shivdasani , 1993), which would discipline managers 
and forces them to pursue shareholder interests (Fukuyama, 1995; Schulze et al , 
2001 ). lndeed, family controlled firms are viewed by the age ney theorists as 
inefficient and backdated structures that may hinder the efficiency of the takeover 
mechanism. ln addition , Public-traded family firms incur, according to the agency 
theorists , higher cast of capital due to the premium paid to minority shareholders in 
arder to compensate them for the expropriated private benefits that the controlling 
owners will, potentially, enjoy through their control rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
La Porta et al , 1999). 
On the bounce of the brief literature reviewed above, we deem that by 
considering boards as a strictly monitoring deviee and by fiercely promoting fiduciary 
features such as the presence of a majority of board outsiders, the use of equity 
based compensation or/and higher debt levels and the presence of concentrated 
institutional shareholding, the dominant agency perspective left out the interest on 
how the board could effectively and actively contribute to the firm's value creation. 
Furthermore, most of the studies based on agency theory, stewardship theory or 
resource dependence theory investigated the direct impact of board of directors on 
firm performance under normal circumstances, in which boards are not directly and 
significantly involved, and in which their contribution may not be considered as an 
-l 
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important direct determinant of firm performance (Kesner and Johnson, 1990; 
Deutsch, 2005). 
We conclude therefore that it would be more fruitful to assess board impact 
on firm performance by using an identified circumstance or critical decision, such as 
M&A, in which the board is supposed to play a direct and significant role . 
Consequently, the ultimate aim of the present thesis is to provide some guidel ines 
for corporate governance to help Boards in playing a more active role in the firm 's 
value creation processes, superseding the monitoring and disciplining function 
rooted in a strictly fiduciary view of corporate governance. 
Without contesting the importance of the monitoring function , we believe 
however that corporate governance should not consist only in reducing agency 
costs , as the agency theory's proponents suggest, but should also fulfill a resource 
allocation (O'sulivan , 2000) and a rent generating (Barney, 2001) or a value creating 
function (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003). 
The present study aims, therefore, to investigate how corporate governance 
should be extended in arder for boards to play a more strategie role in the firm 's 
value creation processes, rather than sticking to a monitoring and disciplining 
function rooted in the traditional agency perspective. Given that board of directors , 
while may have some direct effect on firms' critical decisions, such as acquisitions , 
and only an indirect effect on firm financial performance in normal circumstances 
(Deutsch, 2005) , we propose to study the role of board of directors in the most 
sensitive area of Merger and Acquisition decisions to assess their contribution to fi rm 
performance. Our study of governance with respect to the M&A phenomenon is 
sensitive to the main frameworks proposed in the literature on governance, including 
the Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), Stewardship theory (Donaldson, 
1990), the Resource Dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the Resource 
Based View (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and the Value Creating Perspective 
(Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003) . Through logistic and OLS regressions, we shall assess 
which governance attributes, if any, may significantly discriminate between 
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successful and unsuccessful acquirers, as weil as which ones, if any, have a 
significant impact on post- acquisition performance. 
Thus, we believe that by focusing on a single strategie event, that is , 
acquisition decisions, this dissertation will make a significant contribution to the 
understanding of corporate governance and its impact on firm performance. 
CHAPTERI 
GENERAL PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.1 General research questions and objectives 
Corporate governance has been extensively investigated in the finance field, 
and although sorne strategy and organizational behaviour scholars have investigated 
the role of the board of directors, Agency theory remains , by far, the most dominant 
perspective in the corporate governance research. Oespite of its strong and weil 
articulated theoretical framework in outlining the governance problem that stem from 
the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), agency theory has provided a limited one-dimensional, simplistic 
and instrumental conception of a complex, multifaceted phenomenon (Walsh and 
Kosnik, 1993; Finkelstein and d'Aveni , 1994; Lane et al , 1998). Thereby, the board of 
directors' limited monitoring and fiduciary role, as weil as the ill defined core 
concepts that underlie it (e.g . board independence), or other mechanisms (e.g. 
performance based compensation) that complement it, while supposed to address 
the corporate governance problem, have contributed , rather, to the notorious and 
awkward corporate governance failures witnessed in the dawn of the current decade. 
Therefore, several authors became to argue that to overcome its 
shortcomings, Agency theory should be complemented by other theoretical 
perspectives in arder to capture the real complexity of organizations and to come out 
with more realistic conceptions for solving governance problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
12 
Johnson et al , 1993). ln addition , the board of directors' strategy role, which the 
agency theory vaguely considers and highly understates (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Hill , 1995; Stiles and Taylor, 2001 ), should retain more 
attention in arder to understand how it could contribute in solving the agency 
problem through board activeness in shaping and implementing firm strategies. 
Furthermore, corporate governance should not consist only in reducing 
agency costs, as its proponents suggest, but should also fulfill a resource allocation 
(O'sulivan, 2000) , a rent generating function (Barney, 2001) and play a value 
creating role (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003, 2004) . lndeed, being the most important 
component of any corporate governance system, Board of directors should play a 
more active and dynamic role in the resource allocation decisions and firm strategy 
making processes (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), and more importantly, should 
become a source of competitive advantage, rather than continuing to be considered 
as a mere formai fiduciary deviee. 
ln arder to extend board raies and functions, a multi-theoretical approach of 
corporate governance is more relevant than one-dimensional perspectives. Thus, 
Stewardship theory complements the agency view by outlining the importance of 
simultaneously using control and collaboration (Donaldson , 1990; Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Sundaramurthy and Lewis , 2003) in arder to not fall in reinforcing 
cycles that may make them dysfunctional. lndeed, control oriented governance could 
lead to board and management polarization , restrictions on information flows, myopie 
behaviour that impede risk taking and suppress organisational learning, clan fights 
and impression management. On the other hand, collaboration oriented governance 
may lead to groupthink (Janis, 1982), overconfidence, environmental change 
discounting, complacency, entrenchment behaviour, consensus seeking and/or 
higher commitment toward irrelevant and suboptimal strategies (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). 
The Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salncik, 1978), on the other 
hand, highlights the notion of resources that directors bring to the firm, and 
discusses how they may contribute to reduce firm uncertainty by allowing it to have 
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access to scarce and critical resources, such as, information, technology and 
financial capital. ln addition to their role in reducing firm uncertainty, directors are 
supposed to provide the organization with other valuable resources such as skills , 
specialized and general expertise, strategie and functional advice , working 
knowledge and alternative points of view (Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978; Mizruchi , 1983; 
Hillman et al , 2000; Baysinger and Zardkoohi , 1986; Johnson et al , 1996). However, 
the Resource dependence theory omitted to explain how resources brought by 
directors are used and linked to firm governance processes in arder to enhance firm 
performance. 
Moreover, the Resource Based View (RBV) provides an additional insight on 
how board of directors could become a source of competitive advantage, and 
complements the resource dependence theory through its interest on the processes 
by which resources, including those provided by directors, are combined with other 
internai firm resources to shape specifie, and difficult to imitate capabilities. However, 
and while the RBV theorists have been interested in studying the raie of resources , 
competences and capabilities in general , as weil as their raie in creating and 
sustaining firm competitive advantage, a specifie application of these concepts in 
corporate governance remains highly missing (Barney, 2003) , excepting the study by 
Casta nias and Helfat (2001 ), which consider essentially manage rial resources and 
capabilities , while it vaguely discuss the board of directors' capabilities. Another 
study by Horner (2006), in which he tried to investigate how governance resources 
and capabilities could contribute to firm competitive advantage and acquisition 
performance, showed no correlation between acquirer's board average experience 
and acquisition performance. The present thesis aims to add a meaningful 
contribution to this line of research by providing an additional insight in the strategy 
field through the conceptualization of corporate governance in terms of Directors ' 
credibility and legitimacy (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2004; 2003; 2009) and by considering 
that efficient strategy processes and dialogue (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003, 2004; 
2009) based on relevant governance resources and capabilities could significantly 
contribute in shaping firm's competitive advantage. 
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From another point of view, the Socio-cognitive branch of the institutional 
theory shows us how directors' social interactions could be beneficiai for a focal firm , 
especially, when it appoints on the board individuals exercising executive functions 
on other firms, or are members of other companies' board of directors facing similar 
strategie contingencies (i .e. strategie context). These appointments could provide the 
focal firm with relevant strategie information , expertise and knowledge which 
contribute, therefore, to enhance firm corporate governance processes, board 
involvement and firm strategy making effective ness (Carpenter and Westphal , 2001 ). 
The Value Creating Governance perspective proposed by Allaire and 
Firsirotu (2003, 2005, 2008, 2009) provides, on the other hand, an interesting 
general framework with four pillars consisting in (1) Board legitimacy and credibility ; 
(2) Strategy process and dialogue; (3) The quality of financial and strategie 
information and (4) A calibrated compensation and incentive system. While ali the 
pillars are important for governance to create value, board legitimacy and credibility 
that constitute the first pillar, are considered as sine qua non antecedents of any 
effective governance system (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003; 2004; 2009). 
As for Legitimacy, and according to Allaire and Firsirotu (2009, p.251) "A 
board of directors is legitimate when most of ifs members are independent from 
management and have been selected or elected by those who have a stake in the 
company". According to Allaire (2008, pp 10-11 ), board legitimacy flows from two 
sources: 
1. Legitimacy based on independence from management as weil as on a 
nomination and election process that ensures adequate representation for the 
organization 's stakeholders, and in the case of exchange-listed companies, for its 
shareholders. These board members are formai/y independent from 
management and from al/ significant shareholders, if any. Stakeholders, in the 
case of public organizations, and shareholders, in the case of exchange-listed 
companies, must believe that those appointed or elected to the board represent 
weil their interests. 
-- --·---- ----
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2. Legitimacy based on important, committed shareholding. Significant 
shareholders active/y engaged in the governance of the company, are bearers of 
great legitimacy. ft is a tenet of our economie system that shareholders with large 
economie interests in a company will play an important rote in their governance, if 
they so wish. Who, under most circumstances, has more legitimacy to assert his 
or her authority over management than a shareholder with large stakes in the 
company? 
Credibility refers to board members' expertise and knowledge related to firm 
industries, businesses and activities. According to Allaire and Firsirotu (2009) , 
"credibility is the real challenge for the public/y listed corporation. Credibility is the 
joint product of competence and trustworthiness" .. . "A director's credibility results 
from his/her expertise and relevant experience as weil as the trust helshe inspires. 
Credibility cannat be measured. ft is virtually impossible for an outside observer to 
assess a board members' credibility, yet this quality is glaringly obvious to anyone 
sitting on a board. The unfortunate tact that many board members lacks credibility 
explains the weak performance and the little added value of governance in too many 
organizations", they conclude however that "white it is legitimacy that gives a board 
the right and authority to impose its will on management, it is credibility that makes a 
board effective and value-creating" (2009, pp. 253-254). 
Thus, Legitimacy and Credibility are better proxies for board independence 
than the outsiders/insiders measure used in the literature. Furthermore, being 
con tructs that could be measured in a multidimensional way, rather than single and 
one-dimensional variables, Board Legitimacy and Credibility will capture better the 
complexity of the directors' independence concept, and will allow for a better 
understanding of how legitimate and credible board of directors could contribute to 
create value by actively participating in the fi rm resource allocation processes. 
Strategy process and dialogue constitute the second pi llar of the Value 
Creating perspective (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003; 2004; 2009) and through which 
directors should , as principals, review and approve the strategie planning process, 
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include in that process an early discussion with management of firm 's strategie 
orientation before the strategie plan is finalized and ensure that sufficient time is 
allocated to review and discuss firm's strategie issues. While legitimate and credible 
directors can give full effectiveness to this pillar (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003; 2004, 
2009) we believe that the existence of relevant governance resources and 
governance strategie capabilities will further improve this strategy process and 
dialogue. 
The quality of financial and strategie information is the third pillar of the Value 
Creating perspective and directors should ensure the reliability and validity of 
financial information, show a weil understanding of the significant accounting 
judgement and ensure access to reliable and independent information on 
competitive position , on client assessment of company's products and services and 
on employee's perceptions of the company. Under this pillar, directors should also 
review capital investments, budgets and specifie proposais (Allaire and Firsirotu , 
2003; 2004; 2009). Here again the effectiveness of this pillar will be given by credible 
and legitimate directors. 
A calibrated Compensation and lncentive system constitute the fourth and 
last pillar of the Value Creating Perspective by which the board should set 
compensation principles and practices that are optimal for the company, link 
management incentives to genuine value-creation indicators and ensure a balance 
between short and long-term economie performance (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003; 
2004; 2009) . As in the case of the second pilla r, the thi rd and fourth pillars could be 
further improved if the firm possesses relevant governance resources and monitoring 
capabilities. 
ln the light of this brief discussion, the objectives of the present thesis is to 
assess board impact on firm performance, by trying to conceptualize the four pi llars 
of the Value Creating Perspective trough a multi-theoretical framework, within a 
decisional context in which the board of directors is directly involved (i.e. Acquisition 
context) and throug h a methodological approach that compare the corporate 
governance attributes of successful and unsuccessful acquirers to identify wh ich 
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governance attributes could be considered as governance resources or capabilities 
that may contribute to the firm competitive advantage. ln relation to these objectives, 
the formai research questions addressed in the present thesis are as follow: 
Research question 1 (Q1): 
O. 1. 1: /s Board Legitimacy related to acquisitions' success? 
0 1.2: If Board Legitimacy is related to acquisitions' success, how does it affect post 
acquisition- economie performance? 
Research question 2 (Q2): 
0 2. 1: /s Board Credibility related to acquisitions' success? 
0 2.2: If Board Credibility is related to acquisitions' success, how then does it affect 
post acquisition- economie performance? 
Research question 3 (Q3): 
03. 1: Are Board monitoring capabilities related to acquisitions' success? 
03.2: If Board monitoring capabilities are related to acquisitions' success, how th en 
do they affect post acquisition economie performance? 
Research question 4 (Q4): 
0 4. 1: Are Board strategie capabilities related to acquisitions' success? 
Q 4. 2: If Board strategie capabilities are related to acquisitions' success, how then do 
they affect post acquisition economie performance? 
Research question 5 (Q5): 
What are the relative impacts of board monitoring and strategie capabilities on 
acquisitions' success? 
ln order to undertake a finer grained analysis of the potential contribution of 
board and governance capabi lities in creating value, the present study uses the 
context of M&A to assess the acquirer's board of directors' impact on its post-
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acquisition performance. lndeed, the M&A context allow for assessing board of 
directors contribution to a specifie aspect of performance, that of post-acquisition, 
rather than general financial performance achieved under normal circumstances. 
The motivations that led to the choice of M&A as a context for the present thesis are 
presented and discussed in the next section . 
1.1.1 The rationale behind choosing M&A as a context to assess the link between 
Board of directors and firm performance 
Choosing the M&A decisions as the context for the present study was 
motivated by four reasons. First, boards of directors are legally required to 
participate actively in these highly strategie decisions (Bacon, 1985; Lorsh and 
Maclver, 1989; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Avery et al. , 1998; Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997; Wright et al. 2002; Thompson and Thomas, 2004) . ln addition , acquisitions are 
discretionary managerial decisions and present a situation in which agency problems 
become manifest (Jensen, 1986; Allen , 1981 ; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990, 
Cotter and Zenner, 1994; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Anderson et al , 2004). 
Second, acquisitions are important resource allocation decisions (Williamson , 
1975; Sirower, 1997) and constitute means to achieve operational efficiencies, 
strategie fit and economie growth (Sudarsanam, 2003; Gaughan, 2005). On the other 
hand, O'Sullivan (2000) defined corporate governance as a system that "shapes who 
makes investment decisions in corporation, what type of investment they make and 
how returns from investment are distributed', while Daily et al , (2003) defined 
governance as "the determination of the broad uses to which organizational 
resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts between a myriad 
participants in organization". Furthermore, Burgelman ( 1983) defi nes strategy as the 
concept that "provides a more or Jess shared frame of reference for the strategie 
actors in the organization, and provides the basis for corporate objective setting in 
terms of ifs business portfolio and resource allocation", and acquisitions are 
generally considered as nonroutine, resource allocation decisions that affect the 
long-term performance of the organization (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992), while Shmidt 
and Brauer (2006) argued that monitoring the resource allocation decisions was the 
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main concern of corporate governance. Finally, intended or unintended firm strategy 
tend to be generally materialized through resource allocation decisions (Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985; Noda and Bower, 1996), where Board of directors, in addition to 
the determination of the firm strategie orientations, should ensure that the executed 
strategy, manifested through firm resource allocation decisions , is consistent with the 
firm announced strategy. 
M&A are, therefore, among the most important resource allocation decisions 
involving corporate governance, strategie, organizational , economie and financial 
issues and are, consequently, salient contexts to be used in order to assess how 
board control and strategy making capabilities could affect firm performance 
measured as an outcome of a specifie event, and not as a general financial outcome 
realized under normal circumstances (Hermalin and Weisbach , 2003; Kesner and 
Johnson, 1990). 
Third , the M&A literature shows that, in general, acquisitions failed to create 
value for the acquirers and many authors suggested that this letdown could have 
been the result of the corporate governance failure (Weston et al , 1998; 
Sudarsanam , 2000; Gaughan, 2005) . lndeed, Sudarsanam (2000) argued that "the 
systematic nature of the evidence of failure of M&A suggests th at the source of the 
problem may a/so be systematic if not systemic .... and that poor corporate 
govemance in the acquirer firms may have led to inadequate monitoring of the 
various stages of the acquisition process, such as pre-acquisition evaluation of the 
target, deal restructuring and negotiation, and post-acquisition integration " and 
concluded that "the causes of failure in acquisitions may, thus, be traced to the 
causes of failure of the corporate govemance system". ln the same vein , Gaughan 
(2005: 211) noted th at "The discussion of corporate go vern ance has focused more 
on the accounting frauds and less on the need to more close/y monitor the M&A in 
which companies may engage. However, this is an important govemance function, 
and increased focus in this area is needed" and that "Many of these dea/s (which 
were the product of poor corporate strategy) cou/d have been prevented by better 
corporate govemance and more diligent directors". 
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Fourth, M&A activit ies are important economie activities ali over the world , 
and Canada is far from being an exception. lndeed, worldwide M&A activities 
doubled between 2002 and 2006 to reach the peak of $3 trillion , and Canadian M&A 
activity reached an unprecedented volume of $294 billion in 2007 (Figure 1.1 ). 
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Figure 1.1 M&A Activity in Canada (1994-2007) 
Among the 1379 transactions performed in 2007 (Figure 1.2) Canadian firms 
performed 349 cross border deals valued at $68,2 bill ion, while foreigners performed 
129 deals valued at $169,8 billion (Crosbie and Co, 2008). Thus, seme 900 
transactions were domestic and involved only Canadian firms. Furthermore, 
Canadian acquisitions have grown at an average rate (CAGR) of 59,4% between 
2004 and 2007, which could be explained by a healthy economy, readily available 
and low priced fi nancing, high share priees, strong profits and balance sheets, and 
the growth of buyouts and hedge funds. 
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Figure 1.2 Number of M&A announcements in Canada (1994-2007) 
Taken together, we believe that these four motives demonstrate the 
soundness of using the M&A decision as a context to investigate the link between 
governance capabilities, and particularly the impact of board of directors' control and 
strategie capabilities on firm performance. 
CHAPTER Il 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS: LITERA TURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Corporate governance is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon involving 
resources, processes, conflicting interests and economie value creation. However, 
much of the recent interest on corporate governance has focused on its fiduciary 
aspects, largely derived from the agency perspective that has dominated the field for 
more than three decades. Although other theories began to show interest on 
corporate governance, the fragmented, and usually opposed perspectives on which 
they draw, yielded contradictory and mixed results. Many scholars became to 
question the dominance of agency theory in corporate governance and called for 
using a multi-theoretical perspective , rather than one-dimensional approaches to 
investigate corporate governance issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry and Kiel , 2004; 
Hoskisson et al , 2002; Johnson et al , 1993). 
ln line with these recent ca lis , the objective of the present chapter is to review 
the literature on corporate governance from a multi-theoretical perspective, using the 
agency theory, stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory, resource 
dependence theory, institutional theory, the resource based view and the 
governance value creating perspective. ln the next sections, we will discuss the 
implications of each theory for corporate governance and board of directors' role and 
highlight the issues, strengths and limitations of each perspective. 
2.1 The agency theory perspective 
Traditionally, corporate governance issues were the province of the agency 
theory and both its normative and positive streams were interested in studying the 
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relationships between principals and agents. ln this section , we will first review the 
main propositions of the agency perspective , its roots and its implications for 
corporate governance in general , and subsequently, emphasize its main 
assumptions , propositions and limitations, specifically, those in regard to the board of 
directors' roles and functions . 
Agency relations exist in virtually every situation in which one party, called the 
Principal engages another party, called the Agent. to execute in return of a certain 
utility, some services or tasks that involve the delegation of some decision making 
authority (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Arrow, 1985; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). 
Agency relations become problematic in situations where Information asymmetry, 
along with diverging interests between the principal and the agent, tend to be 
present in a significant way (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). These situations may lead 
to deviant managerial behaviour caused by the presence of moral hazard and/or 
adverse selection problems. Moral hazard implies the dissimulation , by the agent, of 
some actions or behaviour that maximize his own interest at the detriment of the 
principal , while adverse selection leads to the dissimulation of some critical 
information during the contract seUlement or later during its execution (Arrow, 1985). 
ln their seminal work, Serie and Means (1932) pointed out that the separation 
between ownership and control , as a result of the scattered nature of the 
shareholding structure, has led to the concentration of power on the hands of a small 
class of professional managers that were not necessarily acting in the best interest 
of the firm shareholders. Several perspectives took roots on this observation , and 
different theoretical proposais were developed in arder to explain and solve agency 
issues. However, ali these propositions share approximately the same central 
preoccupation, that of how to ensure, under the conditions of uti lity maximization 
assumptions, that agents (i.e. management in the case of the modern corporation) 
will act in the best interests of thei r principals (i.e. shareholders or owner's of the firm 
capital) . 
According to Donaldson (1 990), management theory was more interested in 
studying organizations as systems with purposes, structures and outputs, while 
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economies was interested in analyzing individual conscious actions. On the other 
hand , Organizational economies, from which agency theory derive, along with 
Transaction costs economies (Williamson, 1975), reconcile the management and 
economie perspectives by providing tools for analyzing organizational systems, 
through the rational and conscious actions of the ir individual actors. 
Agency relations come generally within the scope of microeconomies finance, 
and refer to contractual relations between principals and agents. Coase (1937) was 
the first to raise the idea that market transactions were not costless, and that firms 
exist because they contribute to reduce these costs through internai contractual 
structures (i.e. organizations) , considered as substitutes for the costly market 
transactions. Consequently, Coase's perspective considers the entrepreneur as the 
central party in managing and directing ali the transactions occurring within or 
involving the firm, having therefore the ability to negotiate separately with the 
transacting parties , in addition to the right of selling or disbanding the organization. 
However, the rise of modern public corporations -with highly dispersed 
shareholders controlled by professional managers instead of entrepreneurs , 
replacing them as the central party in directing organizational transactions and 
negotiating with the other contracting parties- has caused a transition from an 
entrepreneurial era to a managerial one (Chandler, 1962, 1977). Hence, managers 
in public corporations became to perform the duties of Coase's entrepreneur, but 
without being the owners or the residual claimants of the firm . 
ln an underlying effort to extend and retine Coase' proposition , Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) argued that given the voluntary nature of the contractual relations, 
firm activities could not be governed by hierarchical or authoritative structures and 
should be considered, rather, from a team production perspective, particularly, when 
firms are viewed as a bundle of contracts between different input parties holding a 
property right on some resources they bring along in order to participate in the 
cooperative effort. Pushing forward their analysis, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) noted 
that potential shirking behaviour of some participants during this cooperative effort 
may lead to minimize the production output, and ultimately, to reduce the income of 
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ali the parties involved in this joint effort. They assert, therefore, that in arder to 
contain this potential shirking and maximize production output, the contracting 
parties should readily agree to choose among them a monitoring one. However, the 
designated monitoring party should have sufficient inducement- essentially the 
residual right on the net income following from the cooperative effort- to ensure that 
ali the participants are fulfilling their duties in an efficient way. ln an entrepreneurial 
firm , this role is assumed by the entrepreneur owner, however, in large owned 
corporations, entrepreneur-owners are replaced by professional managers appointed 
by scattered shareholders (i.e. residual claimants) who assume the residual risks, 
but who have no incentive in assuming the control role . Therefore , managers are 
appointed by these residual claimants and are , subsequently, vested with the duty of 
directing and monitoring the production process, on behalf of the capital owners , in a 
way that maximizes the overall value of the firm , and consequently maximizes the 
value of ali the other parties. 
Contesting the team production concept, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued 
that the joint input perspective used by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) was narrow and 
that agency relations could be extended to ali the other contracting parties such as 
suppliers, customers, and creditors. They questioned also the concepts of fiat and 
authority proposed by Coase, and suggested that since the firm was a nexus of 
voluntary contracts, monitoring deviees are more efficient than any other 
authoritative mechanisms in preventing opportunistic behaviour. Viewed from this 
perspective, organizations are the outcome of contractual relations between 
confl icting ind ividual interests expressed through a complex equil ibrium process, 
meaning that organizational behaviour is similar to market behaviour and should be 
considered, therefore, as an outcome of continually renegotiated sets of contracts. 
Although they have extended the contracting concept to ali the parties 
involved in firm activities, Jensen and Meckling ( 1976) consider the contracts 
between shareholders and corporate managers as the most important ones, mostly, 
because of the significant agency costs they're supposed to generate. However, the 
emphasis on shareholders as the Principal is not based on the assumption of being 
the owners of the firm , but rather, on the residual risk they're supposed to assume, in 
addition to the agency costs stemming from self maximizing managers seeking to 
appropriate a large amount of corporate resources in the form of perquisites or 
willing to concede less efforts to create value for the firm. These agency costs are 
likely to increase when firm equity shifts from owner managers to outside investors , 
leading ultimately, to the separation of property and control as initially pointed out by 
Searle and Means (1932). Put other way, agency costs result from vesting any party, 
other than the residual claimant , with ultimate decision making authority, and are 
essentially attributable to: (1) the effort of monitoring engaged by the principal to 
oversee his interests; (2) the bonding costs caused by sorne incentives consented to 
the agent in arder to use firm resources in the best interests of the principal ; and to 
(3) the principal 's residual loss following the divergence resulting from agent's 
decisions in comparison to the optimal decisions that would maximize the principal's 
interests (Jensen and Meckling , 1976). Additional agency costs may result from 
other sources such as power seeking by managers , managerial risk aversion and the 
existence offree cash flow (Denis, 2001 ; Jensen, 1986). 
However, highly dispersed ownership structures, wh ile prevalent in the US 
and the UK, do not constitute the sole form of modern corporations and the 
governance issues related to widely held corporations are not necessarily the same 
as those faced by firms in Canada and Europe, where these structures are more 
concentrated and usually controlled by families , investment funds , governments or 
industrial groups (La Porta et al , 1999; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Ben-Amar and 
André, 2006). lndeed, the firm 's ownership structure affects the nature of 
governance problems by shift ing the agency problem form the management-
shareholders confl icts to minority-controlling shareholders concerns (Ciaessens , 
2006) . 
ln a survey conducted by Gadhoum (2006), the author reported that fam ilies 
control 56,17 % of Canadian firms at the 10% eut point compared to 20% in the U.S 
and 54,24% in Western Europe. lndividuals and families control sorne 23% of the 
253 listed firms in the S&P/TSX index at the 10% eut-off rule (Allaire, 2008) . 
Furthermore, Gadhoum (2006) analyzed the ownership of sorne 1120 Canadian 
fi rms and came to the conclusion th at "ln Canada, wide/y held firms are the 
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exception rather than the rule. Moreover, families are the most pronounced 
contra/ling shareholders. These results suggest that the Berle and Means view of the 
widely held corporation as the foremost ownership does not hold in Canada" (p. 
187). 
Yet, firm ownership tends to play an important role in the firm governance 
systems, where differences in ownership structures lead to significant variations in 
what should constitute efficient corporate governance arrangements . Thus, and 
while family controlled firms are viewed by agency theorists , as inefficient and 
backward structures that may hinder the efficiency of the takeover mechanism , 
lnstitutional concentrated shareholding structures are considered by the agency 
perspective as likely to increase firm takeover probability (Shivdasani , 1993), which 
constitute a potentially disciplining governance mechanism that forces management 
to pursue shareholders interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Schulze et al , 2001) . However, other authors state that family control may enhance 
firm value under certain conditions (McConaughy et al , 1998; 2001 ; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), especially when the founder serves as a 
CEO or acts as a chairman with a hired CEO (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) . We will 
discuss, in subsection 2.1.2.3, the role and the impact of firm ownership on its 
governance and how the family owned structure may, in the specifie case of Canada, 
enhance firm corporate governance and contribute to create sustainable economie 
value. 
2.1.1 Significance and implicat ions of the agency problem: main governance 
mechanisms and evidence from previous research 
Following the fundamental propositions and assumptions of the agency 
perspective (e.g. information asymmetry, diverging interests, agents' opportunistic 
behaviour and the agency costs that these situations may generate), a huge amount 
of empirical research was produced in arder to evaluate the subsequent impacts of 
these agency problems on governance issues, firm performance and organizational 
behaviour. 
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ln her widely quoted study, Eisenhardt (1989) identified two broad streams of 
research : the positivist and the principal-agent perspectives . While these two 
currents are somewhat different, they tend to share the same fundamental 
assumptions about individuals' motivations, organizational behaviour, and the nature 
or use of information systems. lndeed , while the principal-agent perspective is a 
general theory and its concepts are applied in virtually every agency relationships, 
the positivist stream is primarily concerned with conflicting owner-managers relations 
in large public corporations, constituting the stream from which the major part of 
corporate governance research was produced. lndeed, issues concerned with 
internai mechanisms (such as board of directors and other information systems, 
compensation and other outcome based contracts) or external mechanisms (such as 
capital , labour, and competitive markets) supposed to circumscribe the opportunism 
of agents, were largely proposed and tested under the positivist perspective. ln the 
following subsections, we will review and discuss some of these important issues, 
particularly, those in relation with internai and external mechanisms used by the 
principals to circumvent agency problems and their corresponding costs. However, a 
particular attention will be given to the board of directors' role and function , which 
under the agency perspective, is considered as an internai mechanism , serving 
essentially to prevent and reduce shareholders' residual lasses. Furthermore, and 
given its weight within the set of prescriptions proposed by the agency theorists, we 
will also discuss in some details the issue of managers' compensation. 
2.1.2 Internai mechanisms 
From the agency perspective , the principal-agent problem could be solved by 
(1) an efficient monitoring system ensuring that the decisions and behaviour of 
executives are consistent with the principa ls' interests; and/or by (2) an incentive 
system that induces the agent to maximize what the principal considers as an 
important outcome, such as, firm profitability (Tosi et al , 2000) . Thus, efficient 
monitoring results from the appointment of an expert board of directors entitled with 
the responsibility of preserving the shareholders' interests through the ratification 
and the monitoring of important decisions made by the agents. 
~--
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Board of directors , as the primary internai control mechanism, plays also a 
disciplining role through its ability to dismiss and reward management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). However, incentive outcome based contracts are considered by 
agency theorists as a "second best solution" to the monitoring system, mainly, 
because it transfers some risks to the agent (considered as risk averse) , and should , 
therefore, be used only in the absence of good information about the agent activities 
or behaviour (Tosi et al , 2000, Eisenhardt, 1989). Other internai mechanisms are 
lnsider shareholding , outside representation on the board , debt financing , dividend 
decisions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Jensen et al , 1992) and mutual or peer 
monitoring (Fama, 1980). 
2.1.2.1 Board of directors as a control instrument 
According to the positivist stream of the agency theory, boards should 
primarily play a control role in the firm decision making process (Johnson et al , 
1996). ln the same vein , Fama and Jensen (1983) consider the decision process in 
terms of a system formed by mainly two components: (1) The decision management 
component, consisting in the initiation phase where proposais for resource allocation 
and utilization are generated, and followed by the implementation phase during 
which ratified decisions should be executed and translated in real actions; (2) The 
decision control component, referring to the ratification of the decisions initiatives to 
be implemented and to the monitoring of these decisions through measuring their 
output performance and through the determination of the agents' reward 
mechanisms associated with it. 
However, and given that managers do not bear the substantial risk 
associated with their decisions, effective control procedures should be instituted . 
Organisational ru les (i. e. accounting and budgeting systems), mutual monitoring (i.e. 
internai agent market used by managers to enhance their human capita l) and boards 
of directors, vested with the authority to exercise an ultimate control over the 
management (by holding the authority to ratify firm decisions and to cease 
managers' contracts) , are among the most important components of the firm control 
systems. Accordingly, management should initiate and implement decisions, while 
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the board of directors should ratify these decisions and ensure that their 
implementation is in line with the interests of the principals. 
Thus, under the general objective of the agency theory (that of preventing 
and reducing agency costs) , board of directors' role consists primarily in checking 
self-serving managers and aligning , through incentives or coercive measures (firing 
and replacing managers) , the interests of top management along with those of the 
firm shareholders. 
Eisenhardt (1989) considers board of directors as an information deviee, and 
according to her, boards are substitutes for complex and costly incentive based 
compensation contracts, particularly, when they have the capacity to provide richer 
information through frequent board meetings, subcommittees, board members 
tenure, managerial and industry experience, and adequate representation of specifie 
ownership groups. Put otherwise, board of directors is considered as an independent 
variable- along with risk attitude of the principal and the agent as weil as the degree 
of outcome uncertainty - that serve to predict whether a firm should adopt behaviour 
or outcome based contracts to align the agent and the principal interests 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to the agency perspective, boards will exert more efficiently their 
decision control role and fulfill better their informational function if they're composed 
by a majority of outside decision control experts willing to put their reputation at stake 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, the few insiders to be appointed to the board are 
there for their specifie knowledge of the firm, and for their va luable contribution in 
informing the board about the decision initiatives and performance of ether 
managers, essentially, through mutual monitoring systems. lnsiders are supposed , 
therefore, to reduce information asymmetries between outside board members and 
the incumbent managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson , 
1990). Conversely, Non Executive Directors should perform ali the decisions that 
involve severe agency problems between shareholders and managers, particularly, 
the compensation and the replacement of top managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
lt is worth to note here that, even if the agency theorists recognized vaguely the 
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service task that outside board members could perform by providing advice to top 
managers on important strategie decisions (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999), it remains, however, a secondary aspect of board responsibility . 
lndeed, board of directors are supposed to focus more on how to control 
management self serving behaviour and how to reduce agency costs, than on how to 
use directors' expertise, knowledge and cognitive resources to enhance 
comprehension , creativity and coherence of firm decisions (Rindova , 1999). 
According to this view, the control role performed by the board contributes to shape 
the strategie direction of the firm by imposing constraints on management (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001 ). We will discuss, further away in the present chapter, the importance 
and implications of the Board service and resources under the assumptions of the 
resource dependence and the resource based view theories reviewed, respectively , 
in sections 2.4 and 2.6. 
Moreover, empirical findings on the control role to be performed by directors , 
under the assumptions of agency theory, are highly inconsistent and provide no clear 
evidence on the ability of outside dominated board , used as a proxy for board 
independence, to effectively monitor the CEO and other top management (Daily, 
1995; Johnson et al ; 1996). The lndependence of directors with regard to the CEO 
constitutes, however, the corner stone of the fiduciary control role that board 
members should fulfill in arder to achieve monitoring effectiveness (Pearce and 
Zahra , 1991 ; 1992; Lipton and Lorsch , 1992). 
Directors' independence is generally assessed by examining the existence or 
not of a material relationship between the director and the company in which he 
serves as a board member. This material relationship may include any commercial , 
industrial , banking , accounting, legal, consulting , charitable or familial relationships 
(NYSE, 2004). ln addition, a director is not considered as independent if he (she) or 
an immediate member of his (her) family: 
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Has received, du ring the period of fast three years, more th an 100 000$ per 
year as a direct compensation other than director and committee fees and 
pension or other deferred compensation not based on a continued service. 
Was affifiated or empfoyed by a firm former internat or externat auditor who 
provided audit services during the fast three years; 
Was empfoyed, during the fast three years period, as an executive officer of 
another company where any of the focal firm's present executives serves on 
that company's compensation committee; 
Was empfoyed, during the fast three year period, by a company that accounts 
for 2% or 1 million$ (whichever is greater) of the focal firm 's consofidated 
gross revenues, or by a company in which the focal firm 's gross revenue 
accounts for 2% or 1 million$ of th at company's consofidated gross revenue. 
ln Canada, the TSX (2006) standards in relation with directors' independence 
are based on the same general criteria as those adopted by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) Authorities. The main difference between the TSX and the NYSE 
requirements consists in the amount of 75 000$, within a period of one year, for the 
TSX listed companies, instead of 1 00 000$, within three years, for the NYSE listed 
firms. Also, the last NYSE rule -considering a director as not independent if he (she), 
or a direct member of his (her) family, is employed by a firm that accounts for 2% 
and 1 million$ of the focal firm's gross revenue- is not required as an independence 
criteria und er the TSX standards. 
Previous studies, relying on the mere separation between outside and inside 
directors as a proxy for board independence, provided mixed evidence on its effect 
on firm performance. ln their extensive review of board literature, Johnson et al 
(1996) identified studies th at reported (1) a positive relationship between the 
proportion of inside board members and firm performance (Vance, 1983; Cochran et 
al , 1985; Kesner, 1987), (2) a positive relationship between the proportion of outside 
board members and firm performance (Hill and Snell , 1988; Pearce and Zahra, 
1992), and (3) a non significant relationship between the proportion of inside board 
members and performance (Molz, 1988). Allaire and Firsirotu (2003) found , also, a 
non significant relationship (with a relatively negative tendency) between board 
composition and firm performance. 
---- -------
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These mixed results show that the independence concept, based solely on 
the material relationship rule is not, by itself, a sufficient condition for board 
effectiveness. Furthermore, Beatty and Zajac (1994) found a negative association 
between the proportion of outside directors and firm performance, while Bhagat and 
Black (1997) found no significant evidence on the effect of the proportion of outside 
directors on firm performance. Notwithstanding , the theoretical positive effect 
expected from the presence on the board of a large majority constituted by materially 
independent members, is likely to be reversed by an exacerbated information 
asymmetry when these directors are lacking specifie information, expertise and 
knowledge about the company and its businesses (Walsh and Seward , 1990; Allaire 
and Firsirotu , 2003) . Severe information asymmetries suffered by the so called 
independent directors will imply, therefore, a passive implication of the board in the 
firm decision making processes, in addition to an awkward accomplishment of its 
decision control role , as prescribed and expected by agency theory. Consequently, 
the concept of independence, as defined by the current rules , should be 
reconsidered in arder to avoid the potential counter effects that stem from boards 
composed by a majority of outsiders. lndeed, composite measures accounting for 
information asymmetries, along with material independence, power issues and board 
financial involvement, could capture better the real degree of board independence 
than the mere outsider/insider classification , generally used in corporate governance 
research. ln this regard , the Value Creating Governance perspective, discussed in 
section 3.6 is highly relevant, particularly, through the concepts of board Legitimacy 
and Credibility. 
2. 1.2.2 Compensation and insider ownership mechanisms: interests ' alignment and 
entrenchment behaviour 
Executive compensation , along with board monitoring actions, is one of the 
most important components of corporate governance structures (Core et al , 2003) , 
and Agency theorists consider the optimal compensation contract as the one that 
ties the manager's expected uti lity to the shareholder's wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Thus , linking manager's pay to firm performance would , according to the 
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agency perspective , enable a better al ignment of interests between shareholders 
and managers' interests . 
According to orthodox agency scholars, the primary role of the board is to 
hire, fire, and set remuneration of top management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 1993; Finkestein and Hambrick, 1996; Tosi et al , 1997; Jensen et al , 2004). 
Hence, the likelihood to set an optimal compensation contract is highly dependent on 
the board ability to manage the remuneration setting processes, including 
information gathering, CEO and top management market assessment, negotiation 
expertise , power relationships and board independent judgement, in addition to a 
deep understanding of the pay to performance sensitivities (Bebchuk and Fried , 
2004; Jensen et al , 2004). Empirical evidence on the relationship between board 
independence and top management compensation is, however, highly inconclusive 
(Johnson et al , 1996). lndeed, some studies reported a non significant association 
between independence and compensation levels (Mange! and Singh, 1993; Kerr and 
Kren , 1992; Carpenter and Sanders, 2002), while others found a positive relationship 
when outside board members are appointed by the CEO (Zajac and Westphal , 1995; 
Core et al , 1999). Finally, a negative association between insiders dominated boards 
and compensation level was also reported (Boyd, 1994). 
Compensation issues were largely investigated under the agency perspective 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998; Healy, 1985). Theoretically, 
incentive mechanisms in form of a performance based compensation such as stock 
related packages and deferred cash compensation are supposed to enable a better 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, particularly, when 
agents' activities and behaviour are hard to be efficiently monitored (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al , 2000). 
Compensation packages became, therefore, increasingly sophisticated and 
complex, leading to a mix of fixed and variable, direct and indirect, short-term and 
long-term components, and while thei r fixed components, such as base salary 
tended to decrease in the last decades, the proportion of variable compensation 
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linked to performance has become the dominant form of executive remuneration 
schemes. 
Consequently, the increasing use of variable or performance based 
compensation led to the creation of a variety of short and long term incentive 
packages. Thus, and according to Murphy (1998), short-term incentives in form of 
bonuses are generally based on three categories: (1) Performance measures: based 
on revenues , incarne (net and pre-tax), profits or Economie Value Added ; (2) 
Performance standard: based on budget goals, previous growth, board assessment 
of business plans, peer comparison or cast of capital improvements; and (3) Pay-for-
performance structures: based on a defined target bonus pools that could vary 
depending on the performance standard, or could take a form of discretionary plans 
determined subjectively by the board of directors on the basis of organizational or 
individual manager's performance. 
Among ali the incentive components, long-term incentives received a 
particular attention during the 90s and continue to represent the most important part 
of the executive pay packages. Long-term incentives are designed in a way that 
encourages executives to pay more attention to long term strategies and firm 
performance instead of prioritizing short term efficiency. This category of incentives 
include stock purchase plans, stock options plans, stock awards or appreciation 
rights, and deferred performance units (Murphy, 1999; Henderson, 1997; Dessler et 
al , 1999). 
However, executive compensation remains a highly controversial issue within 
bath the academie and the business communities, especially, when it cornes to the 
determination of optimal structures and levels or to the assessment of pay to 
performance sensitivity. lndeed, the use of long-term incentives, such as stock 
ownership and stock options, yielded controversial results , particularly, when the risk 
aversion phenomenon is considered . On one hand, Managers are generally 
considered risk-averse (Eisen hardt, 1989; Denis, 2001 ), and if a large part of thei r 
wealth is invested in the company through equity plans, they'll inevitably consider 
themselves as taking a high downside risk and expect, consequently, a higher rate of 
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return from the projects the company have to invest in . On the other hand, 
shareholders are considered as risk neutral because of their ability to diversify their 
investments, and their return expectations are, therefore, lower than those of their 
agents. Th is discrepancy between the principal 's and the agent's return 
requirements constitutes a major source of their diverging interests , implying that 
managers will , simply, not invest in projects that not meet their expected rate of 
return even if it is worthwhile from the shareholder point of view. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence on the relationship between performance 
and equity ownership (i.e. lnsider ownership) is mixed. While Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Loderer and Sheehan (1989) found no relationship between the level of 
executive equity ownership and firm performance, other researchers reported, at 
best, a weak positive, but instable association (Marck et al , 1988; McConnel and 
Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Loderer and Martin , 1997; Core and Larcker, 2002). 
Furthermore, several researchers identified a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance (Marck et al , 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 ) and argued that high managerial 
ownership could induce managers to exert insufficient effort, maximize private 
benefits and adopt entrenchment behaviour (Marck et al , 1988, Short and Keasey, 
1999). The management entrenchment hypothesis suggests, therefore, that 
managers with high stockholdings would seek to design control systems that 
enhance their private interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995; 
Bebchuk et al , 2004 ) and decrease (or neutralize) the effectiveness of the other 
governance mechanisms, including the shareholder participation in policy making 
processes and board monitoring abil ity (Weisbach, 1988; Dann and DeAngelo, 1988; 
Boeker, 1992; Denis et al , 1997). 
Entrenchment behaviour could also lead top executives to invest in projects 
or acquisitions that contribute to protect their own job and to enhance their power 
and benefits at the expense of the firm shareholders (Walsh and Seward, 1990; 
Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995). 
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Moreover, stock option plans became the fastest growing component of 
executive compensation (Murphy, 1999). This growth could be explained by: (1) 
the non linearity that stock options add to the executive rewards instead of the linear 
nature of direct stock ownership rewards; (2) the need for firms to overcome cash 
constraints associated with the competition for talent; and (3) the timing advantages 
associated with tax efficiency (Denis, 2001 ). ln addition , options grants were not 
considered , until recently, as expenses and were not supposed to affect firm net 
earnings. However, this latter argument is not holding anymore with the FAS 123R 
issued in December 2004. 
According to Allaire (2003) , stock options based compensation is an 
expensive form of management incentives, particularly, if we consider their impact 
on earnings per share. This view adds, therefore, another aspect to the negative 
effects of stock options reported by several other researchers (Rappaport, 1999; 
Clawson and Klein , 1997). Furthermore, recent studies have reported a positive 
association between option-based compensation and the likel ihood to commit fraud , 
to restate earnings and to undergo lawsuits (Johnson et al , 2003; Roell and Peng , 
2006; Denis et al , 2005; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) . Another criticism, pointed out 
by Allaire (2003) , is the lack of a valid indexation between the exercise priee and the 
general performance of the stock market. This absence of indexation gives 
executives a premium for the passage of time, in the words of Warren Buffet, and will 
always imply a negative perception on managers when the stock priee fall after they 
cash their options, which could means that managers should not exercise their 
options as long as they work for the company given that no one could ensure that 
the fi rm stock priee will not fall during a given period (Alla ire , 2003). lnstead of 
proposing a va lid indexation, several unrealistic proposais were made in arder to 
constra in the exercise of options, such as the prohibition of exercising options before 
retirement, which could reduce the value and the attractiveness of options as an 
incentive compensation mechanism (Alla ire, 2003). 
To solve this recurrent problem, and give options a life back, Allaire (2003a) 
proposed several measures: (1) Board shou ld carefully calibrate the percentage of 
gain in value of shareholders equity to be shared with management; (2) option grants 
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should be linked to an adequate measure of economie performance; (3) the exercise 
priee should be indexed by the firm 's cost of equity or any other relevant market 
index (Allaire , 2003); (4) senior management level of shareholding should be linked 
to some multiple of their salary; (5) the vesting period should be fixed within a range 
of three to five years and the life of the option should be limited to five years; and (6) 
insiders should inform the securities commissions of their intention of buying or 
selling company shares one month before the transaction date. But ultimately, Allaire 
and Firsirotu (2009) propose the elimination of ali sorts of options and conclude that: 
"lt was a major mistake, and a source of many shenanigans, to link variable 
compensation of executives direct/y ta the stock priee. lt may have seemed a simple 
and effective way of tying the interest of management ta the interest of shareholders. 
ln practice, however, stock priees are very volatile, are influenced by numerous 
factors beyond the control of management, yet can to a large extent be manipulated 
in the short term. Therefore, we recommend that compensation in the form of stock 
options, restricted shares or their equivalent, be banned' (2009, p.247). 
ln addition, firms tend to adopt compensation systems that enhance their 
institutional legitimacy in regard to their shareholders, and institute measures that 
signal a sound board control and absence of any significant agency problems 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). Hence, the adoption of 
popular measures dictated by normative and mimetic processes (Dimaggio and 
Powell , 1983) has led numerous firms to understate their specifie reality, to ignore 
the dynamic and the real sources underlying their value creation and , above ali , to 
not assess the real impact of management actions on their market value, or the 
effect of other important phenomena, such as, talent mobility on its ability to create 
sustainable value (Allaire, 2003). 
ln summary, compensation issue, both non-equity and equity-based, remains 
highly controversial , and agency theorists have generally recommended vague 
prescriptions lacking a careful assessment of their potentially negative implications, 
which led to counter intuitive effects (Bebchuk and Stiles, 2004) . 
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Thus, if we concede to the agency theory its contribution in the clarification of 
the corporate governance problems, we should admit however its flaw when it 
cames to address the consequences of these problems. lndeed, and while 
considered by its tenants as an optimal solution, the compensation mechanism is 
actually suffering from a lack of rigor and effectiveness, particularly, if implemented 
without a sound and careful assessment of the firm specifie reality, as pointed out by 
Allaire (2003; 2003a). These flaws were also , in some way or ether, acknowledged 
by the main tenants of the agency perspective as we could notice in Jensen et al 
(2004) , even if they largely attributed the recent governance failure to external 
factors , such as, the market enthusiasm, and not to some weaknesses of agency 
theory's core prescriptions that induced, in many cases, pervert behaviour and value 
destructing actions. 
2.1.2.3 Ownership structures and ether internai mechanisms: 
ln addition to the board of directors and executive compensation , agency 
theory prescribes several alternative mechanisms to achieve goal congruence 
between managers and shareholders, such as debt and dividends policies or 
ownership structures that may be used simultaneously (or as substitutes) with (to 
failing) board monitoring and executive compensation (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
Debt policy may be used to mitigate the potential agency costs of free cash 
flow by committing managers to generate cash and meet the firm interest and 
principal obligations (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986; 1993; Stulz, 1988). ln 
addition , Debt is supposed to reduce total equity financing and the need for external 
equity to be issued , which could facilitate managerial ownership and mitigate, 
therefore, the manager-shareholder conflict, especially, when the initia l owner-
manager is still the major and dominant stockholder. Debt is also supposed to 
reduce information asymmetry that su rrounds equity based firm value (Myer's and 
Majluf, 1984 ), particularly, in the case of short-term debt, which enables outside 
investors to monitor managers through signalling and renegotiation mechanisms 
(Fiannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991 ; Franks et al , 2001). 
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However, debt generates its own agency costs which may compromise its 
bonding commitment. lndeed , the cast of debt may increase following suboptimal 
investment decisions associated with higher risk levels, higher monitoring and 
bonding expenditures by debt holders, and bankruptcy or reorgan ization costs 
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Jensen and Meckling , 1976). To be efficient as a 
disciplining mechanism, debt leve! should be determined by balancing the equity 
cast reduction benefits against debt agency costs within a given context . lndeed , 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) assert that, depending on firm context, debt could 
have a positive or a negative effect on firm value, and that negative effects are 
particularly present in the case of companies evolving in environments with multiple 
growth opportunities . Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) showed that, to be 
effective, the use of debt should be coupled with internai monitoring exerted through 
inside shareholders, or outside members of the Board. They suggested also that 
high debt financing tends to be negatively related with firm performance, while in 
opposition , improved performance may lead to Jess debt financing. 
Moreover, Dividend policy is another internai mechanism expected to control 
equity agency problems. While Jensen (1986) considers dividends as a way to avoid 
management overinvestment in non value maximisation projects, other researchers 
su ch as Easterbrook, ( 1984) stated th at dividends payment may signal the 
effectiveness of primary capital market in monitoring firm 's activities and 
performance (i.e. disciplining management) , especially, in the case of firms planning 
to raise capital through common stock sell ing (Smith , 1986; Fluck, 1998; Jain and 
Kini, 1999; Myers, 2000). 
Given the interdependency of debt, dividends and insider ownership, Jensen 
et al (1992) used a three stage !east square equations system to test the relationship 
between these three mechanisms. They found a negative relationship between 
management ownership, dividend and debt policies , and concluded that the causality 
was likely to run only from management ownership to dividend and debt policies ' 
uses. Thus, dividend and debt mechanisms will not reduce agency costs when 
management ownership is important, indicating a substitution effect between the 
three mechanisms (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). 
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As another agency mechanism, large outside shareholders are likely to play 
an active role in monitoring management behaviour and firm performance (Demsetz, 
1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 1997; Holderness, 
2003). However, blockholder impact on firm governance will be different in the case 
of individual , family or institutional shareholding. 
Hence, and while family controlled firms are viewed by agency theorists as 
inefficient and backdated structures that may hinder the efficiency of the takeover 
mechanism, lnstitutional concentrated sharehold ing structures are considered by the 
agency perspective as likely to increase firm takeover probability (Shivdasani , 1993), 
which constitute a potentially disciplining governance mechanism that forces 
management to pursue shareholders interests (Fukuyama, 1995; Schulze et al , 
2001 ). lt is a Iso argued that large lnstitutional shareholding may be associated with 
higher takeover premiums (Burkart, 1995; Sudarnasaram, 1996), while public-traded 
family firms incur higher cast of capital , due to the premium paid to minority 
shareholders in arder to compensate them for the expropriated private benefits that 
the controlling owners will potentially enjoy through their control rights (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Prota et al , 1999). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that even if there is no clear and 
unrelenting evidence of its impact on increasing firm value or firm performance 
(Karpoff, 2001 ; Romano, 2000) , lnstitutional shareholding would lead to 
shareholders activism (Smith , 1996; Brickley et al , 1994) which would , in turn , alter 
the firm governance structure by moderating management compensation 
(Hartzell and Starks , 2003). An exception to this assertion is the study, by McConnel 
and Servaes (1990), which reported a direct positive association between the 
fract ion of shares owned by lnstitutional investors and performance, as we il as an 
indirect positive impact on fi rm performance through insider ownership 
reinforcement. 
According to some authors, concentrated ownership structures, conversely to 
the widely held ones, are characterized by a mitigated agent-shareholders problems 
and a more significant principal-principal conflict that consist in the potential risk of 
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expropriation by the controlling shareholder of minority rights (La Porta et al , 1998; 
1999; Dyck and Zingales , 2004) . Drawing on the Morck et al (1988) 's definition of 
expropriation , Dharwadkar et al (2000) stated that: "expropriation occurs when firm 
performance decreases because of individual ownership, reaching a point where 
large owners assume full control and use the firm to generate private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders" (Page: 659) . Opponents of concentrated 
ownership forms, particularly the family owned ones, argue that these structures 
may lead to suboptimal investments (Bebchuck et al , 2000) , tunnelling (Johnson et 
al , 2000), perk consumption (Yermack, 2006) , wealth preservation and poor 
management capabilities to run large-scale, complex and technologically advanced 
structures (Chandler, 1990) and for some radical foes , to the impediment of 
economie growth at the macro level for countries where these structures are 
prevalent (Morck et al , 2005) . 
On the other hand, proponents of family held firms put forward that these 
structures tend to exhibit , under some particular circumstances (i.e. firms with 
founder serving as the CEO, with founder as chairman with a non-family CEO or 
family firms with higher board independence), higher performance than other forms 
of ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 2004; Durand and Vargas , 2003; Miller et 
al , 2005, Villalonga and Amit , 2006). Similar findings were also reported in studies 
from Western Europe (Maury, 2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006) . However, Miller et 
al , (2007), conclude that only family firms with lone founders as CEO (i.e firms in 
which no relatives of the founder are involved) outperform the other forms of 
corporations . Furthermore, King and Santor (2008) found that Canadian fami ly firms 
are more profitable than the widely held ones, exhibiting a higher returns on assets 
(ROA) than the average in their sample. 
lndividual or family control is generally achieved by separating ownership and 
control rights through pyramidal and cross holdings schemes or through the use of 
dual-class shares (La Porta et al, 1999). ln Canada, the use of Dual class shares by 
families is very common (Allaire, 2006; 2008; Gadhoum, 2006; King and Santor, 
2008) and the controlling shareholder is very often the CEO of the company 
(Gadhoum, 2006). lndeed, the latter documented that more than 55% of his sample 
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(composed by 1120 listed Canadian firms) have a controlling shareholder who is 
a Iso a top manager (at 10% eut-off) , wh ile at the 20% eut-off, this proportion 
increased to reach 65,9% of the same sample. Allaire (2008: p.6) reports that "An 
assessment of the 253 Canadian firms making up the S&PITSX Index (that is, the 
largest listed corporations in Canada) reveals that 53% of them have at /east one 
shareholder with 10% or more of the votes. The se companies represent 40% of the 
market capitalization of the S&PITSX Index" .. . and that "the voting power of these 
significant shareholders cornes from direct holdings in three quarters of the cases 
and from superior class of shares in a quarter of cases" (p. 7) . 
Following a close examination of the extant literature on the effect of 
concentrated ownership and the use of dual class of shares, Allaire (2006) and 
Allaire and Firsirotu (2009: p.236-237) propose an interesting framework to extract 
the benefits associated with family-controlled firms using dual class shares while 
ensuring the protection of minority shareholders and note that: "An appropriate 
framework should conta in sorne of the following prescriptions: 
Aff classes of shares should be entitled to receive the same terms and 
conditions in the event of a proposed takeover of the company. This 
stipulation is called a "coattail" provision in Canada and has been enforced by 
the Toronto Stock Exchange since 1987; 
The class of multiple-vote shares should be capped at 4:1, that is four votes 
as compared with one vote for the other class of shares (compared to the 
typical 10:1 observed now); this maximum ratio means that the controlling 
shareholder must own at !east 20% of the equity to maintain an absolute 
control over the votes (i.e. 50% or more). Studies show that tao large 
discrepancy between share of votes and share of equity rapidly reduces the 
benefits of control (Gompers, lshii, and Metrick, 2006). Glass of shares 
without any voting right should be banned; 
The class of shares with inferior voting rights should elect one third of board 
members; 
Whenever a kin or descendant of the controlling shareho/der is a candidate 
for the CEO position, independent members of the board must discuss the 
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merits of various candidates with the contra/ling shareholder and report fui/y 
at the next annua/ meeting of shareholders on the process by which the 
board arrived at a decision; 
A special committee of the board, made up of members independent from the 
contra/ling shareho/der, shou/d review and report on al/ transactions between 
the company and related parties; 
When non family member of the contra/ling shareholder is like/y to play in the 
future a significant rote in the management or the governance of the 
company, the board and the contra/ling shareholder shou/d discuss what 
ownership structure would be best to ensure the firm 's success in the future 
and protect its founder's legacy. " 
As to the case of acquisitions, Yen and André (2007) found that in Anglo-
Saxon countries, higher levels of ownership are associated with post-acquisition 
performance (measured by the operating cash flow returns) over the 3 years after 
the acquisition, while the separation of ownership and control leads to value 
destruction. Furthermore, Ben-Amar and André (2006) concluded in their study of 
the impact of ownership on acquisition performance in Canada that: "Results 
suggest that the criticism of family owned firms (Nguyen, 2002), often based on a 
governance mode/ developed for dispersed ownership countries like the US and the 
UK may not be warranted. While large shareholders can impose costs to sma/1 
shareholders by tunnelling earnings or by imposing sub-optimal investment 
decisions, these shareholders can add value by the competencies they bring to the 
firm and the monitoring rote they play." (2006, p. 538) . 
ln view of the fact that our thesis investigates which governance variables 
could better discriminate between successful and unsuccessful acquisitions in 
Canada, the ro le of concentrated family ownership and the separation of ownership 
and control on corporate governance quality and value creation cannat be ignored. 
Th us, we shall include in our empirical madel developed in chapter 4, some relevant 
variables that wou Id take account of these important issues. 
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2.1.3 External mechanisms 
External governance mechanisms- such as efficient market for corporate 
control , competition on product and managerial labour markets, legal environment, 
as weil as security analysts and other gatekeepers, including external auditors or 
debt rating agencies- may intervene when internai mechanisms fa il to address firm 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Daily et al , 
2003) . 
Corporate takeovers or market for corporate control is the major mechanism 
highlighted by agency theorists and considered as an effective way to filling up 
internai governance failures in circumventing and monitoring management behaviour 
(Easterbrook and Fischel , 1991 ; Jensen, 1993). The basic assumption behind this 
mechanism is that inefficient or value destructing managers will face the threat to 
see their company acquired by a raider, which would generally fire them, manage it 
in a better way, and in some cases, sell it back at a premium priee . Jensen (1986) 
considers takeovers as a solution to the free cash flow problem , while Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) argue that takeovers increase the value of the combined entities. ln 
practice, however, the takeover mechanism is likely to be activated only in the case 
of a very poor performance that goes beyond the takeover costs to be supported by 
the bidder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Marck et al , 1989). The governance madel 
based on shareholder rights, and highly advocated by Gompers et al (2003) , is 
largely based on this mechanism and considers it as superior to any other 
governance deviee (Allai re and Firs irotu , 2003). 
However, and as long as the share priee stands above the takeover costs 
(i.e. search costs, bidding costs and the premium offered to induce reluctant 
shareholders), managers could continue to underperform without fearing the threat 
of takeovers. lndeed, this threat could be more .effective than the takeover operation 
itself, given that the corrective actions following takeover operations intervene when 
the costs of managers' misconduct have already caused important decline in firm 
value (Farinha, 2003) . Thus, the real benefit that fi rm shareholders wi ll extract from 
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an efficient market of corporate control is its deterring effect on managers, rather 
than hostile offers manifestations that occur only when internai governance 
mechanism have already proved to be not effective in the first place . 
Furthermore, anti takeovers legislations and firm internai provisions, such as 
the greenmail provisions, poison pills and dual class shares , largely and fiercely 
banned by agency theorists , were widely adopted as solutions for hindering and 
offsetting the supposed effectiveness of the takeover mechanism. ln some cases, 
unconstrained takeover activities could threaten the national economy of countries 
that have weak takeover legislations, which could lead to the concession of strategie 
industrial sectors to foreign interests. ln Canada, the recent wave of takeovers 
initiated by foreign investors, and largely attributed to the lack of sufficient anti 
takeover legislations and Canadian boards' legal ability to reject hostile offers, have 
raised numerous questions about the benefits of free takeover markets for the 
Canadian economie sovereignty (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2008) . 
The product market may also affect the behaviour of management, 
particularly, in contexts of high competition. Though Agency theorists consider that 
product market competition may have some positive effect in disciplining managers , 
they remain largely sceptical about its effectiveness as an alternative governance 
mechanism. lndeed, while Jensen (1993) considers it as a "b/unt governance 
mechanism", Shleifer and Vishny (1997) recognize that product market competition 
would contribute to better corporate governance by limiting the amount of available 
returns that managers can expropriate, but cannet prevent expropriation per se. 
Recent studies tend to show some direct and significant effect of product market 
competition on governance mechanisms such as managers' compensation . Thus, 
Aggrawal and Samwick (1 999), as weil as De Fond and Park (1999) and Karuna 
(2007) have ali reported evidence that product market competition reduce the 
marginal costs supported by shareholders to determine optimal incentive contracts. 
Managerial labour markets constitute another external mechanism that 
contribute to discipline managers through wage leve! fixation, managers' turnover, 
manager performance and its implication on potential job and directorship 
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opportunities, reputation, and mutual monitoring by other top managers (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Warner et al , 1988; Gilson, 1989; Cannela et al, 
1995; Murphy 1999; Yermack, 2004; Aggrawal et al , 2006). 
Financial analysts and other Gatekeepers (i.e. service providers) may also 
play a monitoring role by scrutinizing and publicising management actions and 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Moyer et al , 1989). However, this 
mechanism is not available to ali firms, and tends to have some significant positive 
effect only in the case of large, public firms with a significant portion of dispersed 
shareholdings. 
Finally, the legal environment plays an important role in enhancing or 
neutralizing corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, anti takeovers legislation may 
hinder the threat of the market for corporate control or at the other extreme, could 
contribute to transform this market in a highly damaging one for the focal country's 
economy. Furthermore, the mandatory versus the voluntary aspects of the stock 
exchange rules may also contribute or restrain the adoption of widely accepted 
practices, while the extent to which the legal system actually protect minority 
shareholders may play a significant role in making firms adopt or discard appropriate 
corporate governance structures (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
2.1.4 Conclusions on the agency perspective 
The above sections covered severa! internai and external governance 
mechanisms used by firms to reduce agency costs, and to circumvent management 
discretion by inducing or compelling managers to align their interests with those of 
firm shareholders. Therefore, it was noted that for agency theorists , monitoring and 
information systems, such as board of directors, budgeting systems and peer 
monitoring are considered as the primary governance deviees when good 
information is available on firm performance and management behaviour. However, 
in the absence of such a good information- which is generally the case of large, 
diversified and widely held firms- principals should use incentive outcome based 
contracts, along with some compulsory features, such as the right to terminate the 
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agent contract, in arder to induce management to take actions that are consistent 
with the shareholders' interests. Compensation packages, inside ownership, debt 
and dividend policy are, according to agency theorists , the primary internai deviees 
to consider in solving the agency problem, while the takeover threat, the competition 
on product and labour markets, financial analysts and the efficiency of the legal 
system are external mechanisms that may intervene only when internai structures 
fail to address the agency issues. 
As the main monitoring governance mechanism, board of directors should be 
structured in a way that enables board members to effectively exert their control 
decision function . lndependent boards, composed by a majority of outsiders, are 
supposed to be the guardians of shareholders interests and should focus their 
activities on watching what management do in arder to take corrective or disciplin ing 
actions when the latter departs from shareholders interests' maximisation. 
The concept of lndependence was, however, merely measured by the 
outsider/insider proportion and the absence of any material relationship between the 
company and its directors, which , in addition to the lack of a rigorous definition and 
proxies associated with it, have led to confused, mixed and inconclusive evidence on 
the positive impact of independent boards on firm performance. 
Furthermore , and while the objectivity and monitoring ability accorded to non 
executive directors appear theoretically appealing , outside and materially 
independent directors may become heavily dependent on management for getting 
relevant, and specifie information on firm activities and performance, which tend to 
exacerbate the information asymmetry problem that corporate governance is ali 
about. lndeed, a recent survey by Heidrick and Struggles (2007) indicated that more 
that 69% of boards have no independent information channels that provide them with 
useful information on firm operations and management activities. 
Thus, the real problem of contemporary boards is the systematic lack of 
timely, accurate and independent information that would enable them to monitor 
effectively management actions and to provide, ideally, a valuable input and play a 
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more active and value adding role in the firm strategy making processes. However, 
information availability would not constitute, by itself, a sufficient condition for an 
independent board to fulfill effectively its role , no matter if it is a monitoring or a 
strategie one, especially, when directors have no relevant experience, knowledge, 
analytical skills , and most of ali , the motivation and the incentives to be actively 
involved in firm businesses and strategie processes. 
The other internai mechanisms suggested by agency theorists, such as , 
management compensation , insider ownership, ownership concentration , or debt 
and dividend policies proved difficult to be effectively implemented , either individually 
or jointly. lndeed, while compensation remains a highly controversial issue, and 
some of its components, such us the non indexed option grants, have led to 
perverted and short-term oriented management behaviour, higher levels of insider 
ownership increase the likelihood of entrenchment behaviour, which may neutralize 
the effectiveness of the other governance mechanisms. 
Ownership concentration, debt and dividend policies are simultaneously 
determined and suffer from substitution effects, and their effectiveness is contingent 
to the presence of numerous internai and external factors , such as investment 
choices, the extent of fixed assets, risk exposure, growth conditions and investment 
opportunities. 
Finally, external governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate 
control are to be considered as a last resort solution , and are ineffective to prevent 
management's departure from creating firm value, given that their intervention 
comes, generally, when performance have already reached a criticallevel. 
Ali in ali , the literature review of internai and external governance 
mechanisms bring out the tact that agency theory, despite of its strong and weil 
articu lated theoretical framework that clearly outlines the governance problem, has 
understated the consequences of the one-dimensional , simplistic and instrumental 
conception of its main prescriptions. Thereby, the board of directors' limited 
monitoring and fiduciary ro le, as weil as the consequences of ill-defined core 
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concepts that underlie it such as board independence, or performance based 
compensation forms , have ali contributed to the notorious and awkward corporate 
governance failures witnessed in the dawn of the current decade. 
Agency theory should , therefore , be complemented by other theories in order 
to overcome its own shortcomings and weaknesses by capturing the real complexity 
of organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989). The board of director strategy role , that the 
agency theory has vaguely considered and highly understated (Pearce and Zahra , 
1989; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Hill , 1995; Stiles and Taylor, 2001) should retain 
more attention in order to enable the board of directors to be more effective in 
solving the agency problem through a real contribution in shaping and implementing 
firm strategies. 
The next sections highlight the assumptions and the implications of other 
relevant theories that complement the agency perspective, which will help us to 
develop the multi- theoretical ground to be used for the present study. 
2.2 The Managerial hegemony theory 
2.2.1 Literature review and previous research : Boards of directors as legal fictions 
The concept of separation between ownership and control , discussed in the 
previous section , leads us to another weil established tradition called managerial 
hegemony, within which, several scholars attempted to describe board of directors 
role and influence on the decision making processes of the firm. Managerial 
hegemony belongs to wh at Pettigrew ( 1992) have ca lied the field of managerial 
elites studies and tends to encompass research in relation to CEO selection and 
compensation , strategie leadership and decision making, top management teams, 
lnterlocking directorates and the study of board of directors. 
ln its broad sense, managerial hegemony is achieved when managers 
consider themselves as the only group able to represent the concerns of ali the 
organizational actors . Therefore, managerial hegemony theory considers that firms' 
success rests with their managers (Lorsh and Maclver, 1989) and tends to portray 
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board of directors as an ineffective, symbolic and legal requirement that may 
occasionally serve management by providing some passive advice and counselling 
(Mace , 1971 ; Pfeffer, 1972; Vance, 1983; Patton and Baker, 1987; Kosnik, 1987; 
Lorsh and Maclver, 1989). According to Kosnik (1987) , Managerial hegemony's view 
of directors draw on a Marxist sociological tradition that considers boards as an 
instrument used by the American upper classes to reinforce their ruling power in 
modern society. ln addition , Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue that this perspective was, 
for a long time, reinforced by the looseness of the legal specifications of board 's 
duties, especially the fiduciary duty of care and the business judgement rules that 
boards are supposed to observe . 
Though agency theory shares with managerial hegemony the same 
assumptions on self-serving behaviour, information asymmetry, as weil as on the 
implications of Berle and Means's separation of ownership and control , its 
conclusions and conception of boards role seem to be an antithesis of the 
management hegemony conception (Rindova , 1999). Thus, management theory 
considers that boards are dominated by their managers , while agency theorists seek 
to prescribe how boards should , along with the other internai and external 
mechanisms discussed in the previous sections, circumscribe management 
discretion and control over firm resources. 
For the managerial perspective, board of directors have no real power on firm 
activities or performance, and their selection and nomination are largely influenced 
by managers (Mace, 1971 ; Pfeffer, 1972). Furthermore, its proponents argue that 
outside directors have usually no sufficient time, information , knowledge and 
expertise to exercise effectively their independent control function (Estes, 1980; 
Herman, 1981; Lorsh and Maclver, 1989). Bebchuck et al (2002) and Bebchuk and 
Stiles (2004) have extensively described how managers, especially the CEO, 
dominate board decisions on compensation setting by affecting the nomination 
process of directors, and by exercising their authority over the board members, in 
order to extract persona! benefits . Also, managers of profitable firms tend to reduce 
their dependence on shareholders and their agents (i .e Board of directors) by 
reinvesting retained earnings instead of seeking external financing (Mizruchi , 1983). 
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Finally, other structural factors , su ch as board size (Herman, 1981 ), insider directors ' 
proportion , board norms and culture (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998) may also support 
board ineffectiveness in reducing the potential agency problem that spring from the 
separation between ownership and control. 
Thus, Pettigrew and McNulty (1995; 1998) investigated power relationships 
between boards and management in arder to identify contextual , structural and 
process-related contingencies that contribute to board activeness and found that 
board degree of activeness is function of the outer and inner contexts ' features . 
They found that outer context such as political , social and legal environment, 
along with the accepted governance codes of practice, culture and history of sorne 
industrial sectors may influence (and are influenced by) the structural conditions of 
the inner context features, especially, the board own history and culture, its norms of 
conduct, the patterns of selection and socialization of board members, and the 
directors' role expectations and perceptions. 
Finally, they asserted that , in order for board members to build and use an 
enabling power base, they should possess a relevant sector and functional 
experience, prestige, access to people, relationships and information inside and 
outside the firm , as weil as the ability to form coalitions with external key figures . ln 
addition to the existence of an enabling power base, directors should have the 
willingness and skills to use their power sources if they are willing to influence 
constantly the firm decision making processes, rather than intervening only when the 
firm is facing a major crisis. 
2.2.2 Conclusions and impl ications from the manageria l hegemony perspective 
The Managerial hegemony propositions and findings are very useful in 
understanding the circumstances within which boards can play an ongoing active 
role in firm decision making, especially, in formulating and executing firm strategy 
instead of waiting for major crisis or poor performance to do so (Lorsh and Maclver, 
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1989). We will consider the implications of these findings by integrating them with 
the other perspectives in the theoretical framework presented in chapter 4. 
Finally, and despite their apparent divergence, agency theory and Managerial 
hegemony theory are highly complementary in setting the contextual contingencies 
for the corporate governance system (Kosnik, 1987). Thus, and besides its negative 
view of boards and its lack of proposing adequate and positive solutions to solve the 
governance issue, the Managerial hegemony perspective has the merit of painting 
out the causes of board passiveness and ineffectiveness, which invites us to re-
examine simultaneously the selection processes of board members, the relevance of 
their skills and experiences, the motivations or constraints that impede them from 
dedicating more time to firm affairs, their ability to have access to relevant 
information and their predisposition to shape and use their power sources in a given 
structural setting . 
2.3 The Stewardship theory 
2.3.1 Literature review and previous research : Directors and Managers as 
Stewards 
Drawing on sociological and psychological perspectives, stewardship theory 
challenges the basic assumptions of the agency perspective (Donaldson, 1990). 
However, and rather than pretending to substitute the agency theory, the orig inal 
proponents of the stewardship perspective have reconsidered their position by 
attempting to propose a contingency approach that reconciles the two theories 
(Davis et al, 1997). 
Though it is concerned with organizational control, the stewardship 
perspective derives its principal assumptions from the organizational behaviour 
school of thought, and considers managers as good stewards rather than self-
interested, maximizing and opportunistic agents (Donaldson and Davis, 1991 ). 
Accordingly, managers are not always motivated by extrinsic and material incentives 
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and are not necessarily seeking persona! wealth, status or leisure, but are interested, 
rather, in self actualization , responsibility, achievement and social recognition . 
Furthermore, they are team players predisposed to accept authority, and their 
behaviour is not always conscious (Donaldson and Davis , 1991 ). The most important 
assumption that distinguishes radically the stewardship from the agency theory is the 
absence of any conflict of interest between managers and owners. Thus, the 
stewardship perspective considers that corporate governance should focus on 
setting structures that facilitate managers ' empowerment and not on establishing 
formai and costly monitoring systems to align the interests of the agents with those 
of their principals (Donaldson , 1990). Thus, managers tend to make a trade-off 
between their persona! needs and their organizational objectives and choose to 
become stewards when they perceive that the utility extracted from pro-
organizational behaviour exceeds the utility gained through self-serving conduct 
(Davis et al , 1997). 
ln addition, stewardship theorists consider that self-control and self-
management (Argyris, 1964), through identification and shared organizational vision , 
are the most effective control mechanisms, and this view is re inforced by the 
assumption that managerial tasks ' formulation , execution and control should not be 
viewed as separate parts (Lawler, 1986; 1922 quoted in Davis et al , 1997). Thus, 
Collectivism, pro-organizational behaviour and trust are, therefore, the cornerstones 
of the stewardship theory. 
Besides, and in arder to avoid the trap of substituting the "self actualizing 
man" proposed by the stewardship theory for the criticized , one-dimensional and 
narrower view portrayed in the "economie man", and largely used by the agency 
perspective, Donaldson (1990) and Davis et al (1997) concede that the reliance on 
one or the other of the two perspectives depends on numerous contingency and 
situational factors. Contingency factors refer to the psychological predisposition of 
managers and the nature or level of risk that the principal is willing to take, wh ile 
situational factors are those related to the organizational structure, culture and power 
relationships. However, stewardship proponents claim that in normal times, firms 
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tend to function under the conditions of coalition between managers and owners, 
and that conflicting and diverging interests will arise only in specifie situations such 
as that of a takeover event, in which, the agency theory becomes more relevant 
(Donaldson , 1990). 
ln line with these assumptions, the governance prescriptions that emanate 
from the stewardship perspective prone insider dominated boards, the duality of the 
CEO and the Chairman positions, and the significant collaboration and involvement 
of Boards in the strategie processes of the firm . Board members are considered 
therefore as mentors and are supposed to actively guide and support incumbent 
management to accomplish the organizational mission and goals (Shen, 2003). 
The distinction between lnstitutional (coercive, legitimate and reward power) 
and Persona! (expert and referent power) components of the power concept-
borrowed by Davis et al (1997) from French and Raven (1959) and Gibson et al 
(1991) - offers an interesting insight on the complementary nature of the agency and 
stewardship perspectives, and highlights the attributes that boards and their 
members should possess in order to effectively fulfill their role . Thus, agency theory 
relies heavily on the institutional power, including the legitimate authority of the 
principal (and by extension the board of directors) , the use of appropriate incentives 
to align management and shareholders' interests and the threat of employment 
termination to discipline managers. Conversely, stewardship theory relies on the 
expertise and referent powers of the board members to induce management's 
collaboration. The power of expertise refers to distinctive knowledge, expertness , 
skills and abilities that command managers' respect and esteem, while power 
referent refer generally to board members that possesses some powers or some 
prestige that induce managers to identify themselves with these directors or to seek 
how to become associated with them (Davis et al , 1997; French and Raven , 1959). 
A more realistic and balanced proposition that alleviates the tensions 
between the agency and the stewardship theories was provided by Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis (2003), who highlighted the potential dysfunctions associated with 
reinforcing cycles of both the control and the collaboration approaches, and showed 
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how to integrate them in arder to avoid their respective pitfalls. lndeed, they stated 
that, on one hand, the reinforcing cycles of control-oriented governance lead 
generally to board and management polarization , to the restriction of information 
flows, to myopie behaviour that impede risk taking and suppress organizational 
learning , as weil as to clan fights and impression management (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). On the other hand, they noted that the reinforcing cycles of the 
collaboration oriented governance lead to goupthink (Janis, 1982), overconfidence, 
the discounting of environmental change , complacency and entrenchment 
behaviour, consensus seeking , and higher commitment to irrelevant and suboptimal 
strategies. 
Consequently, Sundaramurthy and Lewis, (2003) noted that a balanced 
combination between control and collaboration components is needed to create self-
correcting cycles that replace the self-reinforcing ones and enable trust to cohabit 
with constructive cognitive and task-oriented conflicts. Finally, they concluded that 
for this integration to be successful , governance structures should , however, 
encourage board members background's diversity, as weil as outsider-insider mix 
within the boardroom, board-management formai and informai interactions, and 
board subcommittees' involvement and dynamism (Sundaramurthy and Lewis , 
2003). These propositions are in line with the proposai of balancing the humanistic 
and the economie perspectives in arder to come out with an efficient incentive 
system and with the value creating governance madel proposed by Allaire and 
Firsirotu (1993; 2003; 2004) and discussed in details in section 2.6. 
lndeed , Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004) stated that the challenge for the 
organizational life consist in reconciling the humanistic and the economie concepts of 
man through a balanced incentive systems that integrate monetary incentives with 
aspirations and psycho-sociological needs of people. lndeed, these two perspectives 
carry useful teachings, and whenever an organization shifts to an incentive system 
based on a strict economie perspective or a radical humanist view, perverse and 
dysfunctional behaviour will inevitably arise (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1993; 2004) . 
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As described by Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004; 2009), the economie 
perspective considers that " ... man is, by nature, a greedy, ca/culative, opportunistic, 
homo economicus, to be contra/led by fear and motivated by appealing to his selfish 
nature" (2009, p.79-80). Thus, and according to the agency theorists, human self 
serving propensities of agents could be controlled through financial incentives that 
align the interests between these self maximizing agents and their principals (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and through governance structures characterized by tight 
monitoring and control deviees (Williamson, 1975). ln a more positive way, 
organizational actors, like any other resources, are considered as specifie, valuable , 
imperfectly mobile and costly to reproduce key resources (Wernerfelt , 1984; 1989; 
Barney, 1986; 1991 ; Rumelt, 1987; Conner, 1991) that contribute to competitive 
advantage. 
Moreover, the humanistic view considers humans as social actors motivated 
by self actualization (Maslow, 1968; McGregor and Bennis, 1960), achievement and 
social recognition. ln organizations with highly institutionalized values, socialized 
individuals restrain themselves from opportunistic behaviour because of their 
perception that their interests hinge upon those of their organization (Etzioni , 1988, 
[Drawn from Allaire and Firsirotu, 1993, 2004]) 
While stewardship theory finds its basic assumptions in the humanistic 
perspective, the challenge of corporate governance lies , however, in finding the 
balance between the economie and the humanistic views , and despite the 
attractiveness and the important role played by the economie perspective in a 
context of talent mobility, especially at the management level, any swing toward an 
exclusively economie view will create an organizational culture where utilitarianism 
and mercenary attitudes will become the norm (Allaire and Firsi rotu , 1993; 2004) 
2.3.2 Conclusions and implications from the stewardship perspective 
Stewardship theory presents a different perspective that complements the 
simplistic, instrumental and monitoring view by which agency theory deals in regard 
to board role within the corporate governance system. Though stewardship theory is 
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not a superior or an alternative theory to the agency perspective in solving the 
governance problems, it adds a human dimension that allows corporate governance 
to capture the complex real ities of organizational life. Furthermore, it attributes to 
directors a more active and strategy oriented role , and suggests the use of 
collaborative mechanisms to complement and avoid the domination of self-
reinforcing , dysfunctional control-oriented approaches. lt also departs from the 
passive and negative view of the managerial hegemony view, and takes a middle 
course between the agency and managerial theories ' positions in regard to board 
roles and directors' degree of activeness. 
Thus, inviting Directors and management to work in a collaborative structure-
in which mutual respect, constructive dialogue and shared responsibility are 
preponderant- would lead to superior performance, and will alleviate the governance 
problem of the modern corporation . However, excessive collaboration and insider 
domination should not invade control and corrective intervention that outside 
members and other governance mechanisms aim to provide, and vice versa . lndeed, 
Westphal (1999) has clearly showed that working collectively with management in 
setting fi rm strategy did not compromise directors' monitoring effectiveness. 
Furthermore, there is a growing need to integrate severa! theoretical lenses 
to enrich the corporate governance field and to capture the complexity of modern 
corporations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Hillman and Dalziel , 
2003; Bouzinab, 2005; 2007; Anderson et al , 2007) . Thus, complementing the 
agency control perspective by the stewardship concept of collaboration , respond 
partially to these calls. 
2.4 Resource dependence theory: 
2.4.1 Literature review and previous research : Board of directors as a boundary 
spanning mechanism 
The organizational perspective, in which the resource dependence theory is 
rooted , considers firms as "a coalition of vested interests" (Cyert and March, 1963), 
and their objectives and strateg ies as an outcome of bargaining processes that 
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involve firms ' internai and external actors (Emerson , 1962; Thompson , 1967; 
Andrews, 1971 ; Klein, 1982; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Drawing on the contingency school (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch , 
1967), Pfeffer (1972) considered Board composition and size as organizational 
response to firm's external environment, while Pfeffer and Slancik (1978) viewed 
board of directors as a linking and resource co-opting mechanism used by firms to 
rationally manage their environmental interdependencies, and to enhance their 
external power. 
Resource dependence is , therefore, an externally oriented perspective 
concerned with the problem of environmental uncertainty and connections (Clarke, 
2004). ln this tradition , directors serve as boundary spanners , and contribute to 
reduce firm environmental uncertainty and transaction costs (Hillman et al , 2000; 
Hillman and Dalziel , 2003) by linking the firm to its external constituents, particularly 
those possessing critical resources for its survival (e.g. financial capital , raw 
materials, information about the general environment, technology ... etc.), or those 
having a significant influence on its environment or activities, especially when the 
firm is seeking legitimacy, political support and reputation. ln addition to their 
contribution in reducing firm uncertainty, directors provide the organization with other 
valuable resources such as skills , specialized and general expertise, strategie and 
functional advice, working knowledge and alternative points of view (Pfeffer and 
Slancik, 1978; Mizruchi , 1983; Hillman et al , 2000; Baysinger and Zardkoohi , 1986; 
Johnson et al , 1996). 
However, early theorists from the resource dependence perspective have 
considered boards as instruments that support managers in running the fi rm 's 
activities (Pfeffer, 1972), and at best, as resources at the disposai of managers to 
reach some va luable inputs for the firm (Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978). 
Recently, several researchers attempted to transcend the instrumental and 
passive views of boards- including those portrayed by the agency theory, the early 
resource dependence theorists, and the management hegemony perspective- by 
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asserting that directors should provide more than passive advice and counsel on firm 
strategy (Hillman and Dalziel , 2003) , and should play a more active role in strategy 
formulation (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Other scholars (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Pye, 2001; Stiles and Taylor, 2001) proposed that boards should be actively involved 
in shaping the context of strategy (i.e. conditions of the strategy process), its conduct 
(i.e . strategy development processes), and its content (i.e. challenging management 
propositions, evaluating alternative course of actions and monitoring the 
implementation of strategie decisions). 
Finally, and despite the importance accorded to the resources brought by 
directors, the main limitations of the Resource dependence theory remain its lack of 
providing or conceptualizing the processes and strategies by which the firm ensures 
that its board resources are efficiently used to improve performance through 
environmental linkages; and the overlooking of power dynamics between the board 
and management, (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
2.4.2 Conclusions and implications from the Resource dependence perspective 
Resource dependence theory provides a more contingent and environment-
oriented view of corporate governance, which the other perspectives have largely 
overlooked. lndeed, Agency theory recognizes that board members bring expertise 
to the firm decision making processes, but it remains highly focused on the decision 
control skills and how to use them, internally, in order to formally monitor 
management activities. However, the overemphasis of agency theorists on the 
concept of board independence, measured by the outsiders/insiders proportion , has 
largely shadowed the contribution of knowledge, experience, relationships and other 
resources that directors bring to the firm. Stewardship theory is almost internally 
oriented , and it supposes that inside directors' knowledge and their experience with 
firm activities are valuable resources to be used in the strategy making process. 
Thus, boards dominated by insiders are more effective and, through collaboration , it 
would lead to superior firm performance. 
----··-----
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Resource dependence brings, therefore, an additional insight on corporate 
governance by highlighting the firm environmental uncertainty and its impact on 
board composition and structure. lt underlines, also, the implications of board 
resources in terms of access to external inputs, information and legitimacy as 
mechanisms used to reduce uncertainty and to ensure firm survival , growth and 
power. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of external resources, such as the 
relevant functional and working knowledge, or a particular expertise that outsider 
directors bring to the firm . 
Though , Resource dependence theory failed to describe how this resources 
are selected and used through dynamic processes to enhance firm strategy, and 
subsequently, firm performance. 
2.5 lnstitutional and Stakeholders theories 
2.5.1 Literature review and previous research: Board of Directors as lnstitutional 
Agents 
lnstitutional theory was originally interested in studying the effect of the 
broader institutional environment on the organizational structures and processes 
(Selznick, 1949; Zucker, 1987). However, it has evolved in different directions to give 
birth to several perspectives embedded in what is now known as the old, the new 
and the neo-institutionalisms, with several ramifications in sociology, economies and 
political science traditions. Thus, ln the economies and organization fields , Coase's 
concept of transactions costs and its extension by Williamson (1 975) or Simon's 
concept of organizations as means to reduce the effects of cognitive and 
informational constraints of their actors are ali rooted in the neo institutional 
perspective (Fi igstein and Feeland, 1995; Scott, 2001 ). 
While old institutionalists emphasized the importance of influence, values, 
coalitions, power and informai structures (Selznick, 195), neo-institutionalists went 
beyond these aspects by integrating the analysis of meaning, symbolic and 
governance systems as weil as regu latory and forma i processes within a given 
organizational field (Scott, 1994; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
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The institutional theory of action, derived from the neo-institutional theory, is 
more concerned with the effect of institutionalized rules on organizational actions 
and decisions (Ocasio, 1999; March and Olsen, 1989; March , 1994) and while 
drawing on the Giddens (1984) concept of structuration , Ocasio (1999) have 
reported evidence on the heavy reliance of board of directors on formai and informai 
rules , firm history and past precedents to define their behaviour and to guide their 
decisions. However, other scholars have noted that systematic reliance on rules and 
past precedence may lead to the routinization of governance processes and 
become, therefore, a source of organizational inertia (March and Olsen, 1989). 
Moreover, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) argued that board involvement in 
strategy making processes was partially affected by external pressures that 
emanated from their institutional environment. They found that a low leve! of 
diversification allowed more space for isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell , 1983), 
while at higher levels, diversification tended to dilute the effect of isomorphic 
behaviour by lowering external pressures for conformism , enabling , therefore, the 
adoption of distinctive and innovative practices. 
Carprenter and Westphal (2001) used a sociocognitive perspective to assess 
the effect of interlocking directorates, director's social structural context and social 
interaction on directors' knowledge structure and their ability to effectively participate 
in firm strategy making processes. They found that the effect of social contexts on 
firm behaviour, advanced by institutional theorists , was overestimated and that this 
effect is actually moderated by the firm strategie context (measured by the degree of 
stability, uncertainty and strategie change of the firm 's competitive envi ronment) . 
Accordingly, appointments on the board of directors of individuals exercising 
executive functions on other firms, or are members of other companies' board of 
directors facing similar strategie contingencies, will provide the focal firm with 
relevant strategie information, expertise and knowledge and will contribute to 
enhance firm corporate governance processes through board involvement and firm 
strategie effectiveness. ln addition, relevant social or relational capital , defined as a 
set of resources embedded within , or derived from social networks (Nahapiet and 
Goshal , 1998; Hillman and Daziel , 2003) , enable directors to provide relevant advice 
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and counsel on firm strategy and to contribute in improving firm performance 
(Westphal , 1999). 
For the Stakeholders theory, whose propositions are highly intertwined with 
bath the resource dependence and the institutional theories, Boards should reflect 
stakeholders' interests in corporate governance and policy decision making (Jones 
and Goldberg , 1982). Thus, Directors appointed by severa! stakeholders are 
supposed to review firm 's compliance with regulations, evaluate corporate donation 
policies, and address ethical and other social issues (Cochran and Watrick, 1988). 
Stakeholders' representation on corporate boards could also be used as a symbolic 
strategie response to institutional pressures, in arder to reconcile conflicting 
institutional demands, or uncertain technical capabilities (Luoma and Goodstein, 
1999). Thus, Stakeholder theory, in regard to board of directors' raie , is highly 
related to institutional and resource dependence theories in terms of firm legitimacy, 
and the integration of stakeholders' interest into corporate governance concerns 
(Luoma and Goodstein , 1999). 
Furthermore, normative and moral values such as integrity, fairness, and 
transparency could be infused in the company through the stakeholders' 
representatives in the boardroom, while Boards could institutionalize their 
involvement in strategy making pracesses, by pramoting norms and cognitive 
representation and by identifying them with the interests of the organization 
(Gopinath et al , 1994). 
2.5.2 Conclusions and implications from the lnstitutional and Stakeholders 
Perspectives 
The lnstitutional perspective gives us an interesting insight on how firm's 
broader environment may affect firm corporate governance, board composition and 
directors' raies. The literature review presented in the precedent section highlighted 
severa! aspects to be considered when analyzing board of directors' enabling and 
constraining factors that enhance or reduce board activeness and involvement in 
strategy making processes. The extent of the reliance on formai and informai rules, 
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their adoption and diffusion, firm diversification, organizational age and historical 
precedents, the strategie context of directors' appointments, the relevancy of 
interlocking directorates and the social capital of individual board members are ali 
significant aspects that may affect board effectiveness and its contribution as an 
active and dynamic component of the firm corporate governance system. 
2.6 Resource-Based View theory 
2.6.1 Literature Review and Previous Research : Board of Directors as Valuable 
Resources and Governance Processes as Dynamic Capabilities 
From a Resource Based perspective, firms are collections of specifie, 
tangible and intangible resources or assets accumulated through firm past decisions 
and actions (Wernerfelt, 1984, Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al , 1997). The Resource 
based view (RBV) considers that firm sustainable competitive advantage results 
primary from the possession of specifie, valuable , imperfectly mobile and costly to 
reproduce key resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; 1989; Barney, 1986; 1991 ; Rumelt , 
1987; Canner, 1991 ). Th us, firms ' heterogeneity results from the specificity of their 
resources and history, while competitive advantage results from market 
imperfections, information asymmetries or/and the ability of firms to access and 
secure, over time, valuable resources that are not available or difficult to replicate by 
their rivais. The RBV rejects, therefore, the assumptions of perfect information, 
resource mobility or divisibility and discards firm homogeneity and the absence of 
above average rents that result from equal access to resources and information 
und er perfect competition (Canner, 1991 ). 
The RBV literature puts forward several concepts that are sometimes used 
interchangeably, such as resources, tangible and intangible assets, capabil ities, and 
core competences. However, some authors (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Dosi et al, 
2000, Dierickx and Cool , 1989) insisted on distinguishing between resources, 
capabilities and competences. Resources are generally defined as available tangible 
and intangible factors, such as patents and licences, in addition to financial and 
physical assets or human capital owned or controlled by the firm (Grant, 1991 ; Amit 
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and Shoemaker, 1993). Capabilities refer, on the ether hand, to the firm ability in 
performing a particular task or activity through specifie and conscious action (Helfat 
et al , 2007; Dosi et al , 2000) , or the ability to deploy a combination of resources 
through the use of organizational processes (involving both its cultural and structural 
components) in arder to achieve a given end (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Collis , 
1994). Capabilities are, thus, usually operational in nature and are generally 
developed in firm functional areas. 
At higher corporate levels, capabilities result from the combination of 
physical , human, technological and reputational resources developed over time 
(Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Winter, 2003; Canner, 1991 ). ln addition , Dosi et al 
(2003) argued that routines and resources, when deployed in a given context, 
constitute the building blacks of capabilities. Capabilities are, therefore, not things 
but ways of doing, or properties of collective know/edge that we recognize through 
action (Dosi et al, 2003). Finally, for Wheleen and Hunger (2005: 1 06), capabilities 
rely on the firm ability to exploit its resources. 
Although the resource based view scholars use the terms Competence and 
Capability interchangeably (Prahalad and Hamel , 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1992), 
some researchers called for a distinction between the two concepts (Stalk et al, 
1992). Thus, for Marino (1996), competences result from firm specifie technologies 
and production skills, while Capabilities are the result of firm specifie processes and 
business routines. Capabilities involve therefore the interactions of individuals and 
firm structural and cultural components, and are complex and difficult to imitate 
phenomena (Marino, 1996). Competences refer to the firm ability to deploy 
combinations of its specifie resources to achieve a given task (Teece et al , 1997; 
McGrath et al , 1995). Thus, competences are generally based on a technological 
foundation , and are functional in nature, while Capabilities are not necessarily built 
on a technological base, and are more rooted in organizational processes and 
practices. 
Far from being exhaustive in reporting ali the variations in definitions and the 
implications of the debates that the concept of Capabilities has sparked off within the 
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strategy field in general, and the RBV literature in particular, and which goes beyond 
the main objective of the present study, we retain for the purpose of our thesis , that 
capabilities are more organizational in nature, and that they tend to encompass 
resources, organizational components (bath structural and cultural) , processes, 
routines and information flows. Furthermore, capabilities could be recognized 
through firm specifie actions and behaviour and tend to be developed over a long 
period of time. 
However, firms tend to evolve in constantly changing environments, 
especially their market environment, and should continually adapt, renew and 
reconfigure their resources, competences and capabilities in arder to match these 
changes (Teece et al , 1997; Grant, 1996; Eisenhardt and Martin , 2000; Zollo and 
Winter, 2001 ), and continuously create a series of new temporary advantages 
(D'aveni , 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin , 2000; Blyler and Coff, 2003) . This capacity to 
alter firm resources, competences and capabilities in arder to match environmental 
change is what the RBV scholars cali Oynamic capability (Helfat and al , 2007) . 
Broadly, Dynamic capabilities include (1) organizational processes, such as 
product development, acquisition and resource allocation capabilities (Eisenhardt 
and Martin , 2000) ; (2) learned and stable patterns of collective organizational 
behaviour (Zollo and Winter, 2002:340) ; and (3) managerial capacity to manipulate , 
create and extend firm resources and capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Teece et 
al, 2002). For Helfat et al (2007: 5) , Dynamic capabilities derive from "the patterned 
experience of individuals involved in the decision making or deployment of the 
capability". Furthermore, and according to these authors, Dynamic capabilities could 
be applied to organizational units, such as a division or a team , as weil as to 
individual decision maker under conditions of change. Thus, Directors' generic, 
industry or fi rm-specific skills , experience, knowledge and expertise represent 
va luable resources that may became sources of firm competitive advantage 
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Castanias and Helfat, 2001 ; Barney et al , 2001 ). 
Applying the RBV to corporate governance implies, therefore, to make a 
distinction between fi rm governance Resources, Competences and Capabilities 
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(both dynamic and non dynamic) . As noted in Chapter 1, a specifie application of the 
RBV concepts is lacking in the corporate governance literature, which requires us to 
define clearly what resources, competences and capabilities should mean from a 
corporate governance perspective. Thus, and for the purpose of the present thesis , 
and in line with the definition adopted by Horner (2006) and Bouzinab (2005, 2006) , 
we define Governance Resources as a set of tangible and intangible resources 
available to perform corporate governance roles . 
ln the same way as proposed by Horner (2006) and Bouzinab (2005; 2006) , 
Governance tangible resources are, on one hand, those that could be identified and 
observed explicitly and formally, such as governance structures (i .e. board 
committees or board structural and formai attributes such as board remuneration and 
financial participation or the extent of linkages and interlocks with other fi rms) while 
intangible governance resources are, on the other hand , tacitly embedded in 
governance practices and processes and could not be easily identified or observed 
but may be inferred through qualitative analysis, such as human capital , relevant 
experience, knowledge, expertise , reputation and valuable information provided by 
board members . 
Yet, and as discussed earlier, governance resources could not constitute by 
themselves sources of competitive advantage if they are not combined with , or 
complemented by governance competences and capabilities. Thus, we define 
Governance competences as the functional part of the corporate governance 
system, which includes the necessary skills to perform the control tasks that the 
agency theory highlights, such as auditing and financial report ing, hiring and 
motivating management, compensation setting and other monitoring tasks. 
Governance capabilities refer to the firm specifie and difficult to imitate, corporate 
governance processes and board capacity to use the governance resources and 
competences available to the firm in order to achieve a competitive advantage by, at 
least, lowering effectively the agency costs, and ideally by contributing to generate 
superior economie rents , through directors' active involvement in firm strategie 
decision making processes (Bouzinab, 2005; 2006). Thus, Governance capabilities 
could be divided in two parts: Board control capability and Board strategie capability. 
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We will discuss these capabilities, along with their formai implications for the present 
study in Chapter 3. 
Finally, and given the dynamic environment that firms generally face , there is 
a need for firms to achieve bath technical fitness (i.e. Quality and cast) and 
evolutionary fitness (i .e. Survival , growth, value creation , competitive and sustainable 
advantage) (Helfat and al , 2007) . ln addition , Corporate governance refers to the 
relationship between the internai management systems and the external 
environment and their implications in determining firms ' strategie directions (Hitt and 
al , 2003), which allow us to define Dynamic governance capabilities as the board 
capacity to manipulate , create and extend governance resources, competences and 
capabilities in arder to achieve technical fitness by enhancing the quality of firm 
corporate governance practices and evolutionary fitness by contributing to create 
firm value and sustainable advantage extracted from its governance processes. 
2.6.2 Conclusions and implications from the Resource Based view theory 
The resource based view complements the agency, the resource 
dependence and the institutional theories by providing additional insights on board 
raies and functions , and while agency theory is a more control oriented perspective 
that focuses primarily on internai mechanisms to reduce agency costs by aligning 
management interest with those of their principals, the RBV complements it by 
highlighting the critical raie of resources that directors bring to the firm , as weil as 
their implications for strategy services provided by boards of directors, and more 
importantly, thei r ability to contribute in seeking and generating economie rents. 
The resource dependence theory is , though , an externally oriented 
perspective that highlights the importance of resources and linkages that external 
directors provide to the firm , and while it fa iled to explain the mechanisms by which 
these resources are effectively used and deployed by the firm, the Resource based 
view provides useful tools to investigate how these resources should be integrated 
with firm internai resources and processes to form governance capabilities and 
enhance board activeness in arder to become a source of competitive advantage. 
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Finally, the RBV complements the institutional theory, as in the case of the 
resource dependence theory, by providing the dynamics by which the resources 
derived from social networks and relational capital , when combined with firm 
organizational capabilities, could contribute to avoid isomorphism and to alter 
governance routines through the firm capacity to implement otherwise common 
governance practices and deviees and build a heterogeneous and hard to imitate 
governance capability that may become a source of firm competitive advantage 
(Barney et al, 2001). 
2.7 The Value creating governance perspective 
2. 7.1 Theoretical background and main propositions 
ln order to deal with the shortcomings and the limitations of traditional 
corporate governance models- such as the fiduciary mode! (in which good corporate 
governance is measured through director's independence, the separation of the 
CEO and the chairman positions along with an active control , by the board , through 
its auditing and remuneration committees) or the shareholders' rights mode! (in 
which good governance is measured by the absence of any impediment or defence 
against takeovers in order to discipline or/and eliminate incompetent managers 
through market forces)- Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2003; 2004) proposed a value-
creating perspective of corporate governance (Figure 2.1 ). 
This approach , being in line with the resource based view and the agency 
theory, does not reject the monitoring role highlighted by the latter and suggests that 
boards of directors should be considered further as active and value creating 
governance mechanisms. Thus, Board legitimacy and credibility constitute the first 
pillar of the value creating governance mode!, while the other pillars refer to the 
effectiveness of the strategy process and dialogue between board members and 
management; the quality of financial and strategie information received and reviewed 
by the board of directors; and finally, an effective and balanced compensation and 
incentive system. 
------------- ----------------------------------------
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Allaire and Firsirotu (2003: pp. 122-123) propose, therefore, the concept of a 
value creating governance, and assert that this perspective shares sorne of the 
characteristics of internai governance in diversified corporations and the type of 
governance adopted by private-equity firms for the privatized firms. They seek to 
answer the question ra ised by Jensen and others, that is , how come boards of 
directors never manage to create the kind of value that private equity firms can 
extract from companies after their privatization? 
Pillarl 
Legitimacy and credibility 
of principals (board 
members) 
Legitimate: who do you 
represent? Who 
appointed or elected 
y ou? 
What do you have a t 
stake? 
Credible: do you 
understand this 
business, its key drivers 
of value, its sh·ategic 
issues? 
Did you invest enough 
time and mental energy 
to gain the respect of 
management for your 
understanding and 
insights about the 
business? 
Does management h·ust 
you and do you h·ust 
management? 
A necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for 
good govemance; 
Weakness here turns the 
other tlu-ee pillars into 
proforma exercises 
Pillar Il 
Strategy process, 
planning, and dialogue 
As principal do you get 
to review and approve 
tl1e strategie planning 
process? 
Does tl1e process 
include an earl y 
discussion of 
orientations with the 
board before tl1e 
sh·ategic plan is 
finalized? 
Is tl1ere sufficien t time 
allocated to strategie 
review and discussion? 
Are key strategie issues 
reviewed and discussed 
with management at 
regular board meetings 
throughout the year? 
Pillar Ill 
Quality of jinancial and 
strategie information 
Is financial information 
relia ble, valid, and 
timely? 
Are significant 
accow1ting judgments 
and h·eatments weil 
w1derstood? 
Has tl1e impact of 
alternative treah11ents been 
assessed? 
Does tl1e board have access 
to relia ble and 
independent information 
on competitive position, on 
client assessment of tl1e 
company? 
Are capital inveshnent 
budge ts and acquisition 
proposals thoroughly 
reviewed 
Pillar IV 
Compensation and 
incelllive system 
Has tl1e board set 
compensation 
principles and 
practices th at are 
optimal for this 
particular company? 
Are management 
incentives linked to 
genuine and durable 
value-crea tion? 
Does the 
compensation 
system keep an 
appropria te balance 
between short-term 
and 
longer-term economie 
perfo rmance? 
Source: Alla1re and F1rs1rotu , 2003 (Reproduced w1th the perm1ss1on of the authors) 
Figure 2.1 The Four Pillars of the value creating governance madel. 
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For Allaire and Firsirotu (2003) , the first pillar constitutes a sine qua non 
condition , given that the effectiveness of the other three pillars is largely dependent 
on the legitimacy and the credibility attributes of the board members. ln line with the 
agency perspective, legitimacy results from an effective and accurate board election 
processes that provide the firm with motivated directors who are willing to represent 
the interests of shareholders and to exert their authority to monitor firm top 
management. According to Allaire and Firsirotu (2009) , Legitimacy flows from two 
sources: (1) the independence of directors from management and the existence of a 
nomination and election process that ensures adequate representation for the 
organization 's stakeholders or ali of its shareholders in the case of exchange-listed 
companies; (2) the existence of important and committed shareholding. For an 
exchange-listed company, the two forms of legitimacy should be combined , and 
while significant shareholders, playing an active role in management and 
governance of the firm , are considered as legitimate board members, their direct 
participation in the board or its committees should be proportional to the percentage 
of their equity participation. According to Allaire (2008) , in the case of the presence 
of significant shareholders or their representative in the board of directors or in one 
of its committees, more than the third of directors should be independent from both 
management and these significant shareholders and should be elected by the 
shareholders miniroty. 
Credibility results from board 's collective expertise and knowledge that are 
relevant to the fi rm industries and businesses, which may require effective training 
and information programs on specifie issues with which the firm should deal, 
especially in regard of its operations and its business model (Allaire , 2003; 2008, 
2009) . Thus, a credible director is generally an engaged and respected individual 
who raises difficult questions during board meetings, and without loosing its 
independence from management, shares his experience with them and offers them 
counsel (Allaire, 2008). This aspect of the value creating governance approach is 
supported by the resource based view theory, the resource dependence theory and 
the socio-cognitive branch of the institutional theory. 
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While legitimacy and credibility are essential and complementary components 
for an effective governance system, they remain however independent variables, 
given that legitimacy tend to give the board the authority to impose its will to 
management while credibility is the attribute that makes a board more effective and 
value creating (Allaire, 2008). However, while Board independence is one of the 
conditions that could ensure board legitimacy, it does not necessarily imply its 
credibility, which could explain the highly mixed and disappointing results of studies 
linking board independence with firm performance (Allaire, 2008). 
Strategy process and dialogue constitute the second pillar of the Value 
Creating perspective (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003; 2004; 2009) and through which 
directors should , as principals, review and approve the strategie planning process, 
include in that process an early discussion with management about firm 's strategie 
orientation before the strategie plan is finalized and ensure that sufficient time is 
allocated to review and discuss firm 's strategie issues. While legitimate and credible 
directors can give full effectiveness to this pillar (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003; 2004, 
2009) we believe that the existence of relevant governance resources and 
governance strategie capabilities, as discussed in the previous section , will further 
improve this strategy process and dialogue. 
The quality of financial and strategie information is the third pillar of the Value 
Creating perspective and, through it, directors should ensure the reliability and 
validity of financial information, show a weil understanding of the significant 
accounting judgement and ensure access to reliable and independent information on 
competitive position, on client assessment of company's products and services and 
on employee's perceptions of the company. Under this pillar, directors should also 
review capital investments, budgets and specifie proposais (Al laire and Firsirotu, 
2003; 2004; 2009) . Here again the effectiveness of this pillar will be ensured by 
credible and legitimate directors, while governance resources and governance 
monitoring capabilities will reinforce tasks such as capital investments review, 
budgets and specifie proposais. 
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A calibrated Compensation and lncentive system constitutes the fourth and 
last pillar of the Value Creating Perspective by which the board should set 
compensation principles and practices that are optimal for the company, link 
management incentives to genuine value-creation indicators and ensure a balance 
between short-term and longer-term economie performance (Allaire and Firsirotu , 
2003; 2004; 2009) . Here again , we think that governance resources and monitoring 
capabilities, such as the existence of an efficient compensation committee with 
experimented members and weil defined processes will enhance this fourth pillar. 
2.7.2 Conclusions on the value creating governance approach 
Value creating governance approach tackles the fundamental agency 
problem of the asymmetric relationship between managers and the board of 
directors, as weil as the consequences of the information advantage possessed by 
management (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003). While correcting for the flaw of sorne core 
agency issues- such as management compensation , shareholders representation 
and interests, and information asymmetry problems- the value creating governance 
approach is in line with almost ali the theories discussed in the previous sections. 
lndeed, while the concept of legitimacy tends to correct sorne ill defined aspects of 
the agency theory's prescriptions, credibility encompasses aspects such as directors' 
knowledge, experience and expertise, which are common aspects found in the 
resource based theory, the resource dependence theory or the social network and 
the socio-cognitive branches of the institutional theory. Hence, the concepts of 
/egitimacy and credibility open the door for potential multi-theoretical integration that 
would enhance and refine our understanding of the complex nature of modern 
corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the second pillar dealing with strategy processes and dialogue 
is also in line with the active school of board role in strategy, itself rooted on a multi-
theoretical perspective (Hendry and Kie l, 2004; Pearce and Zahra, 1991 ; Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001 , Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, Donaldson, 1990). Thus, the Value-creating 
governance does integrate the teach ings of several frameworks embedded in most 
of the theoret ical models reviewed in this section . 
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While the second pillar could be improved by combining governance 
resources to achieve board strategie capabilities, the two last pillars could be 
reinforced by relevant governance resources and monitoring capabilities. We will 
therefore integrate these concepts in the next chapter of the present thesis. 
2.8 Chapter Summary and theoretical implications for the present thesis 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provides a general assessment of 
established theories dealing with corporate governance issues, especially those in 
relation with board of directors' attributes; roles and functions (see Table 2.1 ). 
Although agency theory was the largely dominant perspective during the last 
decades, it has suffered however from serious flaws associated with some of its core 
propositions, while its prescriptions failed to capture the complex nature of the 
corporate governance phenomena. Thus, ill defined concepts, such as directors' 
independence and its outsiderslinsiders proxy, the overestimated impact of some 
governance mechanisms, such as, management compensation and the market for 
corporate control , along with the instrumental conception of the board of directors as 
a monitoring and disciplining deviee, have ali contributed to dysfunctional and flawed 
governance systems. lndeed, by heavily drawing on monitoring and control aspects 
of corporate governance, firms may fall in reinforcing cycles of control oriented 
governance, which lead to board and management polarization , to the restriction of 
information flows, to myopie behaviour that impede risk taking and suppress 
organisational learning, and to clan fights, or impression management 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
Furthermore, the agency perspective have largely evacuated the board of 
directors' potential to contribute in enhancing firm rents (through the resources 
brought by its members and their contribution to firm strategy making processes) by 
focusing, almost exclusively, on the agency costs mitigation as the principal output of 
effective corporate governance systems. 
Corporate governance is, however, a complex phenomenon involving 
resources, actors, relationships, interactions and processes at various internai and 
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external levels in arder to create and sustain firm value and requires, therefore, a 
multi theoretical conception that accounts for its dynamic and systemic nature. 
While , on one hand, the agency theory has provided a solid conception and a clear 
description of the implications emanating from the asymmetrical nature of the 
relationships between principals and agents, it has generated , on the other hand , 
only partial and incomplete solutions to overcome these problems. 
Stewardship theory provides some useful insights on the strategie role that 
insiders may play in governance processes, and outlines the need of some 
collaborative behaviour between directors and managers, however, excessive 
collaborative behaviour, as promoted by the stewardship theorists , may lead to 
reinforcing cycles of collaboration oriented governance such as goupthink (Janis, 
1982), overconfidence, the discounting of environmental change , complacency, 
entrenchment behaviour, consensus seeking or higher commitment to irrelevant and 
suboptimal strategies (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
The managerial hegemony theory pointed out some constraints that impede 
or limit board of directors' activeness, or have a significant influence over firm 
activities and strategies, such as the selection processes of board members, the 
relevance of their skills and experiences to firm reality, their motivations and 
limitations to dedicate more time to firm affairs, their ability to have access to 
relevant information, their predisposition to shape and use their power sources in a 
given structural setting , as weil as their independence vis-à-vis the CEO and other 
top managers. However, Managerial hegemony theory remains descriptive and 
highly deterministic in regard of board-management re lationships, and while its 
proponents seek to prove that management will always have an incontestable 
advantage over the board of directors, they remain silent about how these 
disadvantages could be mitigated. 
The Resource dependence theory provides an additional insight on corporate 
governance by taking in consideration the firm environmental uncertainty and its 
impact on board composition and structure. lt also highlights the critica l role of 
resources- such as information , experiences, expertise, advice and linkages- that 
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directors bring to the firm. However, and as discussed earlier, it fails to describe the 
mechanisms by which these resources are deployed to enhance firm performance. 
The RBV is a more dynamic approach that complements the resource 
dependence and the institutional theories by providing tools for understanding how 
the external resources brought by directors could be integrated with firm internai 
resources and processes to form governance capabilities and to enhance board 
active role as a source of competitive advantage. The RBV complements also the 
other theories by considering rents seeking , in addition to the agency costs 
mitigation highlighted by the agency theories, as an important function of the board 
of directors that may significantly contribute in achieving superior competitive 
advantage. 
The Value Creating Governance aims to correct the pitfalls of corporate 
governance orthodoxy created by the implementation of improper and context-
detached solutions that emanated from flawed and ill conceived agency 
prescriptions, and raises the critical importance of legitimate and credible boards as 
the foundation of any effective governance system . lt complements also the other 
perspectives by providing a sound theoretical model that integrates the internai and 
external realities of the firm , the importance of both the monitoring and service tasks 
of boards, along with the mechanisms that ensure an effective use of governance 
resources and capabilities through pertinent strategy making processes, information 
gathering and balanced incentive systems. 
lt becomes clear from this literature review that corporate governance could 
not be approached by a one dimensional perspective or a single theory, and that the 
integration of several perspectives will provide a more realistic view of how corporate 
governance and board of directors could make a significant contribution in improving 
firm performance. 
As discussed in chapter 1, the present thesis uses M&A as a context for 
studying the impact of board of directors on firm performance. Therefore, a review of 
the literature on M&A through the lenses of the economie, strategie, financial , and 
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organizational perspectives will be presented in chapter 3. An integrated theoretical 
framework that formally links the research questions and hypotheses to some 
significant aspects derived from the theories of corporate governance discussed in 
the present chapter will be also developed in the next chapter, especially, the 
governance attributes that could have a significant impact on the M&A success or 
failure. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPEMENT AND HYPOTHESES: 
M&A CONTEXT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS' 
CAPABILITIES EFFECT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The main objective of this chapter is to develop a conceptual madel showing 
how board of directors monitoring and strategy making competences, when 
combined with other governance resources , could become a corporate governance 
capability and how this capability cou Id contribute to firm performance. 
Thus, we will begin with a brief literature review on M&A's types, motives and 
expected outcomes, followed by the development of hypotheses derived from the 
board of directors implication in M&A decisions, and end with a conceptual madel of 
how board of directors' capabilities , as part of the firm acquisition dynamic capability , 
affect the post-acquisition performance. As explained in section 1.3 of the present 
thesis , M&A contexts provide an interesting setting to assess the effects of 
governance resources, along with board monitoring and strategy making capabilities , 
on firm performance and present, therefore, a unique opportunity to integrate some 
significant aspects of board multifaceted roles and tasks provided by the Agency 
theory, Stewardship theory, Resource dependence and lnstitutional theories, as weil 
as the Resource Based View. 
Given that the Value Creating Governance perspective (see Table 2.1) 
integrates several aspects that stem from the other theories, we will mobilize the fou r 
pillars discussed in chapter 2 to assess how Board /egitimacy and credibility, 
strategie processes based on relevant strategie governance resources and 
capabilities, efficient use of financial and strategie information and a calibrated 
compensation system based on relevant monitoring governance resources and 
capabilities could enhance the firm ability to select successful acquisitions. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-----·--·----~~~~-
86 
3.1 Mergers & Acquisitions: Theoritical Perspectives, Types and Motives 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) have been performed by companies for 
more than a century as means to achieve operational and resource allocation 
efficiencies , strategie fit and economie growth (Sudarsanam, 2003; Gaughan, 2005). 
Since the M&A transactions affect, in addition to the involved firms, a wide range of 
socio-economic actors such as workers, managers, competitors and communities, 
they became a center of greater interest in the economie, legal , financial , 
organizational and strategy fields , and they sparked off a huge volume of academie 
research , regulatory measures and practical approaches crafted and marketed by 
consulting firms. 
Although sorne authors differentiate between Mergers, Acquisitions and 
Takeovers, these terms are generally used interchangeably (Weston et al , 1998; 
Sudarsanam , 2003; Gaughan, 2005) . For instance, Sudarsanam (2003: 2) defines 
Merger as the operation by witch corporations combine resources to achieve 
common objectives and where shareholders of the combined firms remain joint 
owners, while Acquisitions refers to the purchasing by an acquiring company of the 
assets or shares of a target , which generally becomes the subsidiary of the acquirer. 
Other authors define mergers as negotiated deals between friendly parties who 
arrive to a mutually agreed combination of their firms, while takeovers or tender 
offers refer generally to a hostile situation in which the raider makes a direct and not 
sol icited offer to the target's shareholders, bypassing , therefore, its management and 
its board of directors (Weston et al , 1998; Gaughan, 2005). Fo Lar son (1 990) and 
Jensen (1985), M&A refer to the joint agreement between two merging firm 's 
management, submitted to their shareholder approval , and to ali other publicly 
announced takeover bids (i.e. hostile) . For the purpose of the present thesis , M&A, 
acquisitions, mergers and takeovers will be used interchangeably. 
Research in the field of M&A involves many aspects such as their typology, 
the motives behind them, their effect on firm performance and on the economy in 
general, their historical evolution and the determinants of their success and failure . 
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These aspects were investigated from different theoretical lenses, grounded in 
different disciplines such as economies, finance, organization theory and strategy. ln 
the remaining part of this section , we will briefly review the literature on the types and 
motives behind M&A, mainly, those grounded in the economies and the strategie 
management fields . lndeed , and given that the Organizational perspective is 
generally interested on the integration aspects of M&A, rather than its motives and 
types, it turns out to be more relevant to integrate it within section 3.2 of the present 
thesis . Finally, the financial perspective and its implication for M&A will be also 
discussed in section 3.2, while the aspects of corporate governance and board of 
directors' roles will be discussed in section 3.3 . 
3.1.1 The economie perspective of M&A 
The economie perspective suggests that the rationale behind M&A has to do 
with the pursuit of cast optimization and Market power (Goldberg, 1983; Ravenscraft 
and Sherer, 1987; Seth , 1990; Sudarsanam, 2003) . Thus, firms engage in M&A to 
gain a competitive advantage over their rivais by reducing their costs, or/and 
increasing their market power. Cast reductions come under the form of economies of 
scale and/or scope, while Market power is achieved when a firm enhances its 
influence on priees and profits by imposing and sustaining a less competitive 
structure within its industry. 
Economies of sca/e refer to the cast reduction that stems from spreading a 
substantial production or distribution fixed costs component over a large volume of 
outputs. Although economies of scale are generally depicted as any cast reduction 
realized from increasing the volume of production or distribution, these economies 
should be, however, reserved only to situations in wh ich a comparison of average 
unit cast of two systems having different capacities, and operating at their minimum 
efficient scales is possible (Allai re and Firsirotu, 1993; 2004). The leve! of economies 
of scale results , therefore, from the difference between the respective average unit 
costs of two systems having different production and distribution capacities, and 
functioning at their respective minimum efficient scales, which is different from the 
situations in which cast reductions result from the mere increase of volume that is 
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achieved to meet an already existing size and capacity (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1993; 
2004). Thus, economies of scale refer to the reduction in per-unit cast resulting from 
an increase in the size or the scale of a company's operations (Gaughan, 2005) . 
As an alternative to organic growth, M&A provide, at least theoretically, the 
increase in scale that is needed to reduce average cast units by combining the 
assets and capabilities of the acquirer and the target in arder to reach a larger 
volume of output over which the unit fixed costs components could be spread , which 
will result in a dramatically and rapidly reduced cast per unit. 
Economies of Scope refer generally to those situations where the total cast of 
producing and selling two or more products or services by a multi-product firm is less 
than the cast of these products when produced and sold separately by specialized 
individual firms (Seth , 1990; Sudarsanam, 2003; Allaire and Firsirotu , 1993, 2004). 
Economies of scope are also possible when the firm possesses resources and 
capabilities, including tangible and intangible assets, located within or across the 
components of the firm value chain , and which could be applicable on several firm 's 
products, services or/and geographie markets (Teece, 1982; F arrel and Shapiro, 
2001 ; Johnson et al , 2005; Allaire and Firsirotu, 1993; 2004; Sudarsanam , 2003; 
Wernerfelt, 2005). The concepts of economies of scale and scope provided the 
logic behind many related diversification pursued through M&A operations. 
However, as sound as these economie rationales may appear, the ultimate 
success of M&A operations motivated by economie reasons, doesn 't reside only in 
the acquirer's ability to select targets and make deals that have a potential of scale 
and scope economies, it requires , also, integration and organizational skills , in order 
to actually extract these benefits (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2001 ). 
Drawing on the costless nature of the priee mechanism proposed by Coase 
(1937), Transaction Costs Economies (TCE) contends that markets and firms are 
alternative coordinating methods of production (Coase, 1937). This proposition 
provided the ground for the concept of vertical integration as a mean to replace 
costly buying and selling operations. Williamson (1971 ; 1975), considers vertical 
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integration as make or buy decisions by opposing markets to hierarchies as 
alternatives solutions adopted in function of the firm asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency. 
Make decisions imply that the firm seeks to transform costly buyer or seller 
relationships (i .e. characterized as market failure) by integrating them under its 
control through vertical integration in order to achieve cost optimization through the 
enhancement of technical and/or coordinating efficiencies , which could result in the 
raising of entry barriers for potential competitors (Sudarsanam , 2003) . 
However, intensive vertical integration could lead to complexity costs that 
may cancel out the benefits of such operations, especially when the management of 
the acquiring firm lack organizational and integration skills and experience (Allaire 
and Firsirotu , 1993, 2001 , 2004) . These complexity costs find their roots in cultural 
differences between the acquirer and the target; in the existence of internai agency 
problems; in coordinating and control deviees to be set in order to manage a more 
sizeable structure; in the existence of opportunistic behaviour that may lead to 
unbiased performance evaluation or problematic internai transfer priees, or simply, 
because the acquirer's management failure in rapidly and efficiently integrate the 
operations of the acquired entity with in the already existing structure (Allaire and 
Firsirotu , 1993; 2004) . 
Horizontal mergers refer to the combination of firms operating and competing 
in the same kind of business activity (Weston et al , 1998) which generally occur in 
deregulated or consolidating industries (Gaughan, 2005) or in those facing mature 
or declining lifecycle stages (Sudarsanam, 2003) . Related mergers fall also under 
the Horizontal M&A and refer to situations in wh ich the merging companies are 
producing and selling products that are not similar in their end or use, but share in 
common their distribution channels, R&D capabil ities, technology, branding, 
geographical markets, or market segments (Allaire and Firsi rotu, 1987; Sudarsanam, 
2003). Weston et al , (1998) consider related mergers as a special form of 
Conglomera te merger and refer to them as concentric mergers. 
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Pure Horizontal mergers refer to the combination of two direct competitors 
producing and selling similar products and are primarily motivated by scale 
economies and market power (Weston et al, 1998; Sudarsanam, 2003), particularly 
when firm 's industry is in a mature or declining stage and where production capacity 
excess becomes significant due to decreasing demand, technological change, 
deregulation or ongoing global competition (Jensen , 1993). 
Horizontal mergers are, therefore, generally motivated by scale and/or scope 
economies and by revenue enhancement through firm capabilities ' leverage 
(Sudarsanam, 2003). 
Finally, Conglomerate mergers refer to the combination of two non competing 
firms, operating in unrelated businesses and having no buyer or seller relationships 
within a similar industry value chain (Weston et al , 1998; Gaughan, 2005). This type 
of M&A are generally motivated by financial or business risk diversification and by 
the economie benefits that could be achieved through a synergetic corporate 
headquarter that provides the individual operating divisions with generic functional 
and managerial expertise, along with financial flows of funds (Weston et al , 1998; 
Allaire and Firsirotu , 1993; 2003) . 
3.1.2 The strategie perspective of M&A 
Discussing M&A under the strategie perspective commands a brief 
discussion on the dominant theories in the strategie management fie ld . Given that 
the research on the strategy field has been traditionally divided between its content 
and its process components (Schendel and Hofer, 1979), this section focuses on the 
Content, rather than the process component of strategy. 
The S-C-P paradigm and the Resource Based View are the major theoretical 
perspectives that significantly and permanently influenced the strategy field since its 
emergence during the 1970's. We will present therefore a brief review of these two 
perspectives along with their direct implications for the M&A's operations. Although 
Organizational economies, such as TCE and the agency theory have also exerted 
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sorne influence on the strategy field (Hoskisson et al , 1999), these theories will not 
be discussed in this section . lndeed, we found it more salient to discuss TCE and its 
implications for M&A in the previous subsection under the economie perspective , 
while the agency theory's implications will fit better within section 3.3 presented 
hereafter. 
According to Hoskisson et al (1999) , While early strategy researchers (e.g 
Chandler, 1962; Andrews et al , 1965; 1968; Ansoff, 1968) were interested in the 
internai aspects and the best practices that lead to firm success, the Strategie 
management field was, however, highly influenced by the economie perspective , 
particularly through the lndustrial Organization (10) economies during the early 
1970's until later in the 1980's. 10 economies trace its roots in the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm proposed by Masan and Bain (1956, 1968) 
and its focus was essentially directed on the industry and the competing groups of 
firms considered as its central units of analysis (Hoskisson et al , 1999). 
Being fundamentally deterministic, the S-C-P paradigm implies that firm 
performance is dictated by its industry structure and that firm behaviour (i .e. conduct 
or strategy) is constrained and highly influenced by its industrial environment (Porter; 
1981 ). Hence, Structural analysis, especially the popular five forces madel , assumes 
that competitive advantages come from firms ' positions and differentiation abilities 
within a given industry, in which the five forces determine the rules of competition 
and, therefore, the best positioning and differentiation possibilities (Porter, 1980; 
1985). Put simply, firm performance and competitive advantage are more affected 
and better explained by its industry structure than by its conduct, actions or 
resources. 
Therefore, the S-C-P perspective cons iders M&A as a mean by which firms 
could improve their market position or differentiate themselves by turning the five 
forces (i. e. threat of new entrants, supplier bargain ing power, threat of substitutes , 
buyer bargaining power and level of competition) into their advantage and by gaining 
competitive advantage through cost leadership or product differentiation, under/or 
without segment focus (Porter, 1985). Thus, to reduce supplier or buyer bargaining 
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power, firms could perform Vertical M&A (by transforming supplier or buyer 
relationships into hierarchical ones) or Pure Horizontal Merger (by enhancing its 
purchase power through larger volume or its market power through reduced 
competition or substitutes). Pure Horizontal M&A that provide substantial economies 
of scale could also neutralize the threat of new entrants by shaping higher barriers of 
entry. 
Critics of the S-C-P paradigm argue that inter-firm heterogeneity within 
industries explains firm performance better than industry membership (Rumelt, 1991 ; 
Roquebert et al , 1996). Revived by Wernerfelt (1984), firm internai resources 
received a huge interest within the strategie management field , especially when 
these resources were considered as a source of competitive advantage and firm 
performance. Resources' contribution to firm competitive advantage and fi rm 
performance was, however, already highlighted by several early theorists such as 
Selznick (1957) , Andrews (1971) , Ansoff (1965) and more explicitly by Penrose 
(1959) , and the growing interest on internai resources was not due to its newness 
but was motivated , rather, by the search of alternative theories to correct the 
limitations of the then overwhelming S-C-P paradigm. 
The RBV seeks, through an inside-out approach, to explain how resources 
could confer competitive advantage (Hoskisson et al , 1999) and rejects , therefore, 
the deterministic assumption of the S-C-P madel by arguing that firms are not 
completely constrained in their conduct by their external environment, which they 
could proactively shape and manage (Powell , 1996; Sudarsanam, 2003). Barney 
(1991) argues th at only val ua ble, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable resources are 
supposed to generate sustainable competitive advantage. Furthermore, and as 
discussed in section 2.6, resources could constitute, at best, a source of competitive 
advantage and they could not generate competitive advantage by themselves, 
unless they are leveraged through firm 's capabilities. 
Beyond the debate on the differences between competences and capabilities , 
we have retained in section 2.6 that the latter are generally more organizational in 
nature and tend to encompass, resources, organizational components (cu ltural and 
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structural) , processes, routines and information flows. Before moving to the 
discussion of the RBV implications on M&A, it is worth to recall that resources and 
capabilities are accumulated through fi rm past decisions and actions (Wernerfelt, 
1984, Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al , 1997), which inters evolutionary and path 
dependence assumptions. 
The RBV considers M&A as a vehicle through which firms could exchange 
firm-specific resources that are subject to severe market failures and are difficult to 
develop internally in arder to rapidly meet new competitive pressures (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Teece, 1987; Mitchell , 1994). Under the RBV perspective , firms 
engage in acquisitions to enhance value by reconfiguring their resource base 
through acquiring new resources, redeploying existing resources into new uses, or 
by combining new resources with existing or underutil ized ones (Capron et al , 1998). 
Other authors consider that M&A are used by firms to reach distant resources and 
are useful when firms deem to undertake fundamental changes in their businesses 
through overcoming path dependency constraints imposed by their existing routines 
(Karim and Mitchell , 2000; Capron and Mitchell , 1998; Capron and Anand , 2007). ln 
addition , Coff (1999) considers M&A as a mean to acquire knowledge, while 
Harrison et al , (2001) assert that firms engaging in M&A seek to acquire 
complementary resources rather than the accumulation of similar ones. 
Finally, The RBV critics point out the imprecise definitions of its concepts, its 
tautological statements, its assumption of product market stability, and its lack of 
being a theory of competitive advantage due to its marked focus on sustainability 
and not on value creation (Foss et al , 1995; Williamson, 1999; Priem and Butler, 
2001 ). Sirower (1997: 25) considers the RBV concepts as "mere descriptions of what 
has occurred in the past", and which, in his view, " ... give managers little help in 
formulating expectations about the outcomes of future strategie investments". 
Moreover, Synergy has been the main justification to engage in M&A from 
both the economie and the strategie perspectives. Economies of scale or scope and 
market power contribute to create synergistic gains (Seth, 1990) through costs 
reduction or/and revenue enhancement (Gaughan, 2005). ln addition, Re/atedness is 
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considered as a significant precedent of synergistic gains that may come in the form 
of technical, pecuniary and portfolio economies (Lubatkin, 1983). Technical 
economies refer to scale economies, especially from the production and marketing 
operations, while pecuniary economies refer to firm improved market power and 
portfolio economies are about risk reduction through diversification (Lubatkin , 1983). 
However, and according to Sirower (1997), "the concept of synergy remains vague 
and mysterious, with little financial or strategie meaning", while Allaire and Firsirotu 
(2001) described synergy as the "hocus pocus ward of the M&A magic show". 
From an RBV perspective, Barney (2001) argues that if there is no 
synergistic, private, unique and inimitable cash flows that stem from the bidder and 
the target combination, then Relatedness, per se, could not constitute a sufficient 
condition to create value for the acquiring firm . However, unique and inimitable 
synergistic cash flows (i.e. NPV of the combined entity is greater than the sum of the 
individual NPV of the bidder and the target) exist only in imperfectly competitive 
market for corporate control, in which the other bidders could not duplicate the 
uniquely synergistic cash flow gained by a particular bidder when combined with a 
given target, or when the bidder have private information about the existence of a 
synergistic value between him and the target, or where the other bidders and the 
target itself are unaware about this potential synergy. 
Thus, imperfectly competitive markets could be identified by comparing the 
value of the bidder and the target relatedness against the value of relatedness with 
the target for other bidders (Barney, 2001 ). While these propositions seem logical 
and conceptually appealing, they remain highly difficult to apply in practice. Bidder's 
management should, therefore, possess sufficient experience and specifie skills that 
enable them to identify such imperfections in the market of corporate control. The 
implications and challenges of this particular aspect and its impact on the likely 
success of a potential acquisition will be discussed in section 3.3. 
To summarize , M&A activities are motivated by synergistic gains that come 
from scale and scope economies, market power, complementary resources and 
capabilities, resource deployment and transfers, relatedness and unique or difficult to 
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replicate cash flows that stem from this relatedness. M&A could be also motivated by 
the will of undertaking path-breaking changes and may take the form of horizontal , 
vertical , concentric (i .e related) , or conglomerate (i.e unrelated) mergers. However, 
empirical evidence report systematic failures of M&A contribution in creating value 
for the acquirer's shareholders (Gaughan, 2005; Dodd, 1980; Asquith , 1983; Bradley 
et al , 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Malatesta, 1983). We will review and discuss 
the empirical evidence on the nature and the causes of these failures in the next two 
sections. 
3.2 The Puzzle of the Post-merger Performance and the Integration 
Challenges: Empirical Evidence from Previous Research 
Post-acquisition performance, or M&A success and failure , could be 
assessed in different ways and estimated through different proxies depending on the 
perspective under which the impact of these operations are investigated. The 
financial perspective is the most widely used method for measuring post-acquisition 
performance, while the organizational perspective is generally interested in the 
integration challenges of post-acquisition processes and their impact on M&A 
success. From the financial perspective, the objective of M&A decisions is to 
maximize shareholder value (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Weston et al , 1998; 
Gaughan, 2005; Sirower, 1997). However, the evidence on M&A impact on creating 
value for the acquirer's shareholders remains highly inconclusive (Datta et al , 1992; 
Sirower, 1997; King et al , 2004; Gaughan, 2005) . 
Generally, Post-acquisition performance is investigated by integrating bath 
the strategie and the financial perspectives (Sirower, 1997). ln a recent meta-
analysis of Post-acquisition performance, King et al (2004) pointed out that previous 
research investigated the effect of four common variables on post-acquisition 
performance, that is, (1) whether or not the acquisition was made by a conglomerate; 
(2) whether or not the acquisition was of a related firm, (3) the method of payment 
used for acquisition, and (4) the acquirer's prior M&A experience. Furthermore, 
Gaughan (2005) divided previous research on short-term and long-term effect 
studies, where in the former, researchers focus on a narrow time windows around 
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the acquisition by using event studies, while in the latter, they track performance of 
deals over a longer period of time. Empirical evidence on these four variables, as 
weil as, the results reported from the short-term and the long-term post acquisitions 
performance research streams are reviewed and discussed hereafter. 
First , the evidence of the impact of diversification on post-acquisition 
performance is mixed, and while some authors concluded that conglomerate 
acquirers tend to realize higher post-acquisition returns than nonconglomerate 
acquirers (Ravenscraft and Sherer, 1987; Agrawal et al , 1992; Campa and Kedia , 
2002) , others reported a diversification discount in the case of conglomerate 
acquisitions (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Anand and Singh, 1997), a decreasing effect 
on value of unrelated diversification (Amihud and Lev, 1981 ), or an equivalent post-
acquisition performance between related and unrelated acquisitions (Lubatkin , 1987; 
Elgers and Clark, 1980; Healy et al , 1990). 
Second, the acquisition relatedness received a large interest from scholars in 
bath the financial and the strategie fields , and numerous studies support the 
existence of a significant positive effect of relatedness on buyers' returns (Healy et 
al ; 1990; Datta and Puia, 1995; Weech-Maldonado, 2002; Lubatkin and O'Neill , 
1987; Flanagan, 1996; Scanlon et al , 1989; Chatterjee and Lubatkin , 1990). This 
significant effect could be explained by several factors such as the use of the 
acquiring firm 's management knowledge about the company's direct environment 
and their experience in running similar or highly related activities (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986; Hitt et al , 2001 ), or their familiarity with the target firm 's markets 
(Roberts and Berry, 1985). However, relatedness may inflate management self 
confidence and lead to an overestimation of the expected synergistic gains or that of 
their abi lity to extract them once the integration processes begin (Alla ire and 
Firsi rotu, 1993; 2001; 2004; Sirower, 1997). 
Thi rd , the effect of the acquisition's method of payment was widely 
investigated in the finance literature, and the evidence shows that financing 
acquisitions with cash signais that the acquiring firm 's managers expect high and 
strong post-acquisition performance (Travlos, 1987). lndeed, the use of stock to 
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finance an acquisition may signais that the bidder's management believes that their 
company is overvalued , which may create an unfavourable market reaction (Myers 
and Majlouf, 1984). Thus, celeris paribus, cash acquisition should outperform 
acquisitions financed through stocks equity. 
Finally, the organizational perspective highlighted the critical importance of 
previous organizational and managerial experience during the integration phase 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 ; Hitt et al , 1998). Furthermore, a clear and detailed 
integration plan showing clearly how the acquiring firm management intend to extract 
the expected synergies should be elaborated before entering or starting any bidding 
processes (Sirower, 1997). ln the same vein , Hafsi and Toulouse (1994) suggest 
that, contrary to what was observed in practice , formulation (or content) and 
implementation (or process) phases of acquisitions should not be separated from 
one another, and that managers should , at an early stage, assess and perform the 
necessary and intended changes of the beliefs, values , structures, and competitive 
strategies of the two combined entities. 
Furthermore, Allaire and Firsirotu (2001: p.1 0) pointed out that "putting 
together, meshing, two sizeable organizations brings forth al/ sorts of clashes-
clashes of egos, of power groups, of cultures and values, of operating systems, of 
ways of doing and behaving" and that, while any acquisition should deal with these 
issues, their magnitude and effect on the expected benefits of acquisitions will vary 
with the size of the acquired firm , the extent and form of the planned integration, and 
the degree of cultural similarities and differences between the combined entities 
(Allaire and Firsirotu , 2001 ). The authors argued that wh ile "some of the failures 
have to do with the human frai/ties of CEO's: hubris, warped motives, poor 
interpersonal skil/s and inexperience" (2001, p.6), the low success rate of 
acquisitions could be attributed to three main issues: Driving growth through 
acquisitions; Getting the synergies and dealing with complexity (2001, p.?). 
The authors conclude elsewhere that "acquisitions in the pursuit of growth to 
placate financial markets have proven extreme/y cast/y in terms of shareho/der 
wealth. Poorly planned or bad/y executed integration or simply delayed integration 
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have a/ways p/ayed, and continue to play, a significant rote in the value destruction 
of acquisitions by making it impossible to recoup the market premium paid for the 
acquired company. " (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2001 : p.13). However, the fundamental 
challenge, from the perspective of Allaire and Firsirotu (2001 ), remains in the 
acquirers' ability to put in place a sound strategie governance system to extract value 
from the complex structure that results from mergers and acquisitions. For the 
authors, Strategie governance refers to: 
" .. . the forma/ and informa/ processes by which the corporate office, "the 
centre", orients, prads, monitors, and con trots its various businesses ... Strategie 
governance is al/ about simplifying the leading and the operating of a diverse 
company. ft is about creating an environment in which business leaders fee/ and act 
like entrepreneurs and the corporate office shapes their strategie orientations and 
participa tes in key decisions .. .it means re-evaluating and possibly changing the 
corporate architecture of the company, the decision-making process, the rote of 
strategie planning and budgets, the quality and autonomy of business leaders, the 
nature of motivation and re ward systems. " (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2001: p.11-12). 
Finally, they contend that even though the high failure of entrepreneurial , 
innovation and acquisition activities, they remain essential to economie dynamism, 
and that regardless of: 
" ... the general dislike of M&A transactions and universal praise of 
entrepreneurship and innovation in the public at large"... "Should we not consider 
the se three economie activities, entrepreneurship, product innovation and M&A 's, as 
engines of productivity enhancement, of efficient allocation of capital, of adaptation 
to economie contexts?" (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2001 , p. 4) . 
ln an interesting study, Sirower (1997) discussed in length the difficult path in 
the quest of post-merger synergy and proposed four sine qua non (i.e. necessary but 
not sufficient) conditions for any acquirer willing to increase its chances in achieving 
post-acquisition synergy: (1) have a clear strategie vision to share among large 
constituents groups; (2) prepare an operating strategy that clearly identify where, in 
the firm value chain, the synergy is expected, how to make it work and how 
competitors will find it difficult to imitate; (3) conceptualize how systems integration 
will be performed, which refers to the understanding of the target systems and the 
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degree of integration expected from the merger; and finally (4) have a clear vision on 
how the post-merger organization with its structure and culture is intended to work 
and what changes are necessary to make on the compensation systems, the 
hierarchical positions, and to cultural attributes such as the shared set of norms, 
values, beliefs and expectations that have to be embodied in the new organization 
resulting from the acquisition. 
Ali these conditions should be thoughtfully analyzed and carefully determined 
before entering any bidding process , and most importantly, before offering any priee 
for the prospect. However, managers should not fall in the determinism trap and 
should be permanently aware of unforeseen changes that could divert their initial 
acquisition blueprint and be ready to adapt it according to the real issues that may 
arise du ring the integration phase (Haspeslagh and Je mison, 1991 ). 
ln addition , previous M&A experience may also lead to the development of in-
house acquisition capability, which lies in the ability to identify and select targets , to 
negotiate business combinations , to perform post-acquisition integration (Bruton et 
al , 1994; Haleblian and Finkelstein , 1999; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) , and to 
correctly comply with the four cornerstones proposed by Sirower (1997). ln addition , 
the RBV perspective considers acquisitions routines as organizational processes 
that bring new resources to the firm from external sources and portray them 
therefore as Dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin ; 2000; Capron and Anand , 
2007). Acquisition capabilities could also lead to long term competitive advantage by 
allowing the creation of inimitable and hardly to duplicate resource configurations 
that stem from the integration of past acquisitions (Eisenhardt and Martin , 2000) . 
From the fi nancial perspective, the short-term research stream is based on 
two principal assumptions: (1) the capital markets' efficiency, for which share priee, 
genera lly, captures ali the future benefits and costs of an acquisit ion around the 
announcement date (Fama et al, 1969); (2) the abnormal returns around the 
acquisition date are correlated to long term post-acqu isition performance measures, 
and could, therefore, serve as a good predictor for future M&A success (Healy et al, 
1990; Andrade et al, 2001 ). 
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Short-event windows are used, therefore, as a methodology to capture the 
market valuation of an acquisition by assuming that the capital market absorbs 
quickly ali the information and future issues of the announced merger and translates 
it in the stock priee during a short window of time around the acquisition date, and by 
examining the abnormal returns (i.e. the announcement stock returns) during a 
period going from , let say, 5 days before the event (i.e. announcement date) to 5 
days after, we can assess the impact of the acquisition on the acquirer post merger 
performance. 
U.S studies using the short-term event method reported generally bidders ' 
abnormal returns that ranged from 1% (Magenheim and Mue lier, 1988; Jarre! and 
Poulsen, 1989; Bradley et al , 1988; Loderer and Martin, 1990) to 4% (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983) in the case of tender offers, and from 0% (Magenheim and Mueller, 
1988) to 1% (Jensen and Rucback, 1983; Loderer and Martin , 1990) in the case of 
mergers. However, the same studies cited above, reported targets ' abnormal returns 
ranging from 16 to 29% in the case of tender offers, and from 5 to 16% in the case of 
mergers. Thus, it seems that targets ' shareholders enjoy huge returns at the 
expense of the bidders' shareholders. As we will see in the following paragraphs , 
these unbalanced payoffs, between the target and bidder's shareholders, tend to 
become worse when assessed from a long term perspective. 
The long term performance stream uses the same event methodology but 
extends the time windows of the analysis, by covering periods that could exceed 60 
months after the acquisition event. This perspective rests on the assumption that the 
stock market is not completely efficient and continues to react after the event as long 
as new information on the progress of the acquisition and its actual integration is 
realized. However, the assessment of an acquisition impact, using a long-term 
window for analysis, may suffer from disturbances created by other separated 
events, such as the acquirer strategie or operational changes that have nothing to do 
with the acquisition in question (Sudarsanam, 2003) . 
U.S studies using the long-term perspective report quiet different results than 
those from the short-term perspective. Bidders' post merger abnormal returns are 
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found to be negative and ranged from -4% (Franks et al, 1988) to 43% (Loughran 
and Vijh , 1997) in the case of tender offers, and from -28%, -18% and -16% 
(reported, respectively by Magenheim and Mueller, 1988; Franks et al , 1988 
Loughran and Vijh , 1997) to -1% (Loderer and Martin , 1992) in the case of mergers. 
Targets' positive abnormal returns in the long term (from 24% to 60%) were higher 
than those reported by short-term analysis (16% to 32%) no matter if the acquisition 
was a merger or a tender offer. 
Ali in ali , empirical evidence from the U.S is mixed and shows no persistent 
pattern on the positive impact of M&A on the bidders' performance, while in the case 
of the targets , their shareholders appear to constantly experience positive returns, 
regardless of the time window used, or the type of M&A employed. 
Since the present thesis is interested in studying the role and impact of 
Canadian board of directors' governance capabilities on firm performance in the 
context of M&A, a review of Canadian studies becomes necessary to highlight the 
particularities, if there is any, of Canadian M&A activities in comparison to their 
American counterparts . 
Although limited in their number, empirical evidence from Canadian studies 
seems to report different conclusions from those provided by the U.S based 
research . lndeed, the first large study of the impact of M&A on Canadian firms was 
published in 1986 and covered 1, 930 acquisitions performed between 1964 and 
1983. This study reported that in approximately 50% of the cases, bidders' 
shareholders gained a slight 1,17% significant abnormal returns around the 
announcement date, while the targets ' shareholders gained around 3,58% during the 
same period (Eckbo, 1986). 
Another recent study by Eckbo and Thurburn (2000) , despite the use of the 
same sample as in Eckbo (1986), reported that approximately 50% of the Canadian 
acquirers' shareholders averaged 1 ,27 % in abnormal return a round the 
announcement date, while in the same sample, U.S acquirers' of Canadian 
companies experienced no significant abnormal returns during the same period . 
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These researchers found that these results, not only hold for the long term 
performance (measured by the earnings changes over 3 years after the 
announcement date) , but tend to become more contrasted with significant positive 
changes in Canadian bidders' EBIT of about 6,5% during the first two years after the 
acquisition , in comparison to a -25% change for American bidders during the same 
period. 
ln a more recent article , Ben Amar and André (2006) analyzed 327 
acquisitions over the period 1998-2002 and reported that bidders' shareholders 
received significant average abnormal returns of 1 ,06% around the acquisition date. 
However, they noticed that family firms generated a greater abnormal return of about 
2% more than those experienced by non family firms in their sample. Similarly, Yuce 
and Ng (2005) , using a sample of 1361 Canadian acquirers and covering 
transactions for the time period 1994-2000, concluded that acquirers' shareholders 
gained in average 2% cumulative abnormal returns around the event period (-2,+2) . 
Thus, the evidence from Canadian studies seems to systematically report, 
slight, but positive and significant abnormal returns for acquirers, which is not the 
case for the American studies. These differences between Canadian and US 
evidence could be explained by the smaller size of Canadian capital market, 
industries and companies in comparison to their American counterparts , as weil as, 
the level of industry and output concentration in Canada (Eckbo, 1992). ln addition , 
differences in M&A regulations and anti-trust laws could also explain these 
differences since regulations are found to be correlated with acquirer performance 
(Yuce and Ng, 2005). 
ln summary, acquirers post merger performance seems to be problematic 
and the empirical evidence supports the fact that M&A are, by far, more beneficiai to 
targets than to the acquirers' shareholders. M&A failure in creating value for the 
acquirer was largely explained by the existence of corporate governance problems, 
such as managers going unchecked by their boards and seeking to obtain, through 
M&A, private gains, higher compensation, prestige, job security and human capital 
risk reduction (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1986; Fi rth , 1991; Avery et al, 
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1998; Amihud and Lev, 1981 ; Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Wright et al , 2002). 
However, and as discussed through this section, M&A failures could be also 
explained by strategie and organizational weaknesses, such as the lack of a clear 
strategie vision , management overconfidence and/or inexperience in evaluating 
potential synergies, in negotiating and/or integrating efficiently the acquired entities, 
which may, even in the absence of opportunistic behaviours, impede value creating 
for shareholders . 
Traditional corporate governance, particularly in the finance filed , 
overestimated the role of opportunistic behaviour as the only explanation of M&A 
failures, and underestimated the strategie and organizational complexity behind 
these operations. Seing certainly an important part of the problem, corporate 
governance should , however, not only consider disciplining actions as possible 
solutions to impede M&A failures , but should also considers the critical strategie role 
of those who approve these decisions, that of the board of directors. lndeed , boards 
should not only deploy their monitoring ability to oversee management along the 
M&A process, but should , in addition , contribute actively in these processes by 
leveraging their strategie capabilities in arder to support , complement and guide 
managers' efforts to set strategie vision , operating strategy and to identify, select, 
evaluate, negotiate and integrate M&A in arder to extract ali the possible value from 
these operations and, above ali , avoid to engage the firm in winners' curse bidding 
when speculative actions drive priees to levels that render any value creation or 
synergistic gains impossible to achieve. 
Hence, legitimate and credible directors acting in boards possessing strategie 
and monitoring capabilities may better influence management in arder to state a 
clear boundary beyond which the firm should give up and withdraw its offer if the 
bidding priee reaches a leve! with which no value creation could be reasonably 
achieved. 
Consequently, and as a central issue in the present thesis, we hope bring 
evidence th at will support the view th at corporate governance should depart from the 
traditional orthodoxy that considers agency costs reduction as its main concern , by 
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adopting a more active and dynamic role in arder to become also a source of firm 
competitive advantage and contribute, therefore, to the improvement of firm 's rent 
generating potential. 
ln the next section we will discuss the ins and outs of M&A from the 
traditional corporate governance perspective, and how it should be extended to 
involve a more dynamic and strategy oriented role through the board of directors' 
resource and capabilities in arder to become a source of competitive advantage, 
rather than a mere set of disciplining mechanisms aiming to passively achieve some 
formai , fiduciary and monitoring functions. 
3.3 Corporate governance and the Board of directors' role in M&A decisions: 
Theoretical integration , hypotheses and thesis conceptual madel 
As discussed in Chapter 2, corporate governance discourse was largely 
dominated by the agency theory, which is itself a branch of corporate finance 
microeconomies (Tirole, 2006; Baskin et al , 1997). Hence, when corporate 
governance is considered from the agency perspective, its primary general concerns 
are about information asymmetry and moral hazard and their impact on goal conflict 
and congruence between principals and agents and how the formers should ensure , 
through internai and external governance mechanisms, that their interests are 
maximized or, at !east, protected. 
From the target perspective, corporate governance is interested in M&A as 
an external disciplining mechanism where hostile takeovers serve as a deterrent tool 
that impede managers from undertaking suboptimal decisions driven by selfish 
behaviour, or as a mechanism of last resort , activated when internai governance fails 
to prevent and correct management deviations (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Martin and 
McConnell , 1991 ; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Comment and Jarrell , 1995; Berger and 
Ofek, 1996). 
As for the acquirer, corporate governance is interested on the management 
motives behind M&A decisions in contexts where the separation of ownership and 
control have created information asymmetry, diverging interests and opportunistic 
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behaviour, and where mangers are considered as maximizing agents pursuing their 
own benefits at the expense of firm shareholders who should , in turn , set internai 
governance mechanisms to mitigate the agency costs stemming from this conflicting 
relationship (Jensen and Meckling , 1976; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Amihud 
and Lev, 1981). 
Since the present study is concerned about acquirers ' post-acquisition 
performance, we will address only the issues that arise in the case of the bidders 
and not necessarily those that arise from the point of view of the targets. Thus, we 
will first present what the previous literature has to tell us about corporate 
governance implications for M&A, and follow with the development of the hypotheses 
to be tested as part of the present thesis. 
From the agency perspective, Jensen (1986) argued that excessive free cash 
flows may be used by managers to make non value increasing acquisitions, while 
others noted that managers will engage in unrelated conglomerate acquisitions to 
diversify their own risk due to the fact that managers' undiversified risk could become 
severe when equity based compensation is substantial (Lewellen , 1971 ; May, 1995). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence reports a significant positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm size (Baker et al , 1988; Tosi et al , 1989; 2000) , which 
could push management to pursue growth strategies through mergers and 
acquisit ions to enjoy higher salary, perquisites and pay stability (Mueller, 1969; 
Gomez-Mejia et al , 1987; Kroll et al , 1993; Combs and Skill , 2003; Gaughan, 2005) . 
However, other researchers found that managerial ownership was positively 
associated with the interests of shareholders in general , and that managers with 
higher ownership participation undertake more successful mergers (Lewellen et al , 
1985; Khorana and Zenner, 1998; Tehranian et al , 1987), receive positive stock-
market responses for their acquisitions, pay lower acquisition premiums and acquire 
targets with higher growth opportunities (Dutta et al , 2001 ). 
Firm ownership structure could play an important role in M&A. lndeed, Kroll et 
al, (1997) found that owner control led fi rms (i. e. with an external shareholder 
possessing more than 5% of its stock) engaged in acquisitions that were generally in 
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the interests of shareholders, while acquisitions performed by management 
controlled firm (i.e. diffuse shareholding) were primarily driven by managers' 
interests. Conversely, Avery et al (1998) found that CEOs engage in M&A to 
enhance their prestige and reputation , given that those who completed successfully 
severa! M&A deals were more likely to earn directorship in ether companies than 
those who did not undertake such operations. 
As an alternative to the agency motives, hubris or managers overevaluation 
of their ability to manage new businesses, was largely considered as a motive for 
undertaking M&A, particularly when management seek diversification through 
acquisitions (Roll , 1986). Some authors found that hubris was one of the important 
motives of M&A along with synergy and agency problems (Berkovitch and 
Naranayan, 1993), while ethers found that hubris was significantly related to high 
premiums, which generally lead to acquisit ions' failure (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997). However, Merck et al (1990) argued that hubris infects successful managers 
more than the unsuccessful ones, while their results show that bad acquisitions were 
made by bad managers rather than by the successful ones. Furthermore, when 
accompanied with inaccurate valuation processes of targets, hubris will push 
managers to enter winner's curse biddings and end with overpayment and higher 
premiums (Giliberto and Varayia, 1989; Sirower, 1997; Guaghan, 2005). 
Few studies have considered Board role in M&A (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; 
Haunschild , 1993; Beckman and Haunschild , 2002; Wright et al , 2002; Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997). Empirical evidence from these studies showed that (1) Boards 
dominated by outsiders generated higher announcement date abnormal returns than 
ether bidders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) and moderated the effect of Hubris on 
paying higher premiums (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), and that (2) independent 
boards were associated with Jess acquisitions motivated by management self serv ing 
behaviour (Wright et al, 2002). However, ether studies reported a non significant or a 
negative effect of board composition on firm post-acquisition performance 
(Subrahmanyam et al , 1997; André et al , 2006). 
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ln addition, Beckman and Haunschild , (2002) , using a sociocognitive 
perspective, found that firms having interlocks with other similar companies, through 
their directors, paid lower premiums for their acquisitions, while Haunschild , (1993) 
and Westphal et al, (2001) fou nd that interlocking directorate have an impact on the 
type of acquisitions made by the focal firm who tends to replicate the type of 
acquisitions made by its tied-to firms. 
As in the case of the relationship between board of directors and firm general 
performance, previous literature provides little and, at best, mixed evidence on the 
impact of board of directors on post-merger performance. These mixed results could 
be explained by the adoption of single and aggregate measures of board 
independence, such as the proportion of outsiders/insiders as a proxy, or the 
consideration of only the monitoring function of boards without considering their 
strategy role and the implications of other board resources on firm performance. 
Another limitation of the previous studies consists in linking board composition 
directly to post-acquisition performance, without considering intermediate effects of 
firm decision making processes on the acquisition success. 
Furthermore, and as highlighted by the literature reviewed in the present 
chapter, the firm ability to select potentially successful acquisitions is a highly 
valuable capability, where corporate governance, especially the board of directors, is 
called to play an important role . Thus, and according to previous research , 
potentially successful acquisitions cou Id be considered as those: (1) based on sol id 
strategie rationale (Anslinger and Copeland, 1996; Sirower, 1997; Sudarsanam, 
2000) ; (2) incurring lower premiums (Sirower, 1997; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) 
and avoiding multiple bids (Weston et al , 1998); (3) involving related businesses 
(Healy et al; 1992; Datta and Puia, 1995; Weech-Maldonado, 2002; Lu batkin and 
O'Neill , 1987; Loree et al , 2000; Flanagan, 1996; Scanlon et al , 1989; Chatterjee and 
Lubatkin, 1990) ; (4) providing strategie fit between the acquirer and target or having 
simi lar strateg ie characteristics (Hopkins, 1987; Singh and Montgomery, 1987); (5) 
providing the acquirer with complementary resources (Harrison et al , 1991 ; Hitt et al , 
1998); (6) pa id in cash rather than security (Travlos, 1987; Loughan and Vijh, 1997) 
(7) having similarity with previous acquisitions made by the acquirer, and implying a 
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learning effect (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 ; Allaire and Firsirotu , 2001 ); (8) 
where the target Tobin's q is lower than the acquirer's (Lang et al , 1989; Servaes, 
1991 ). 
However, previous studies that attempted to assess board effect on firm 
performance used a direct correspondence between board attributes and post-
acquisition performance, without considering the effect of pre-acquisition processes, 
particularly deal selection and completion. lndeed, the ability to select and complete 
a potentially successful acquisition plays the most determinant role in post 
acquisition success (Sirower, 1997), and its determinants should be investigated in 
order to detect which corporate governance attributes affect these decisions and 
constitute , therefore, a source of the competitive advantage residing in the firm ability 
to systematically select profitable acquisitions. 
Accordingly, we consider in the present thesis that corporate governance and 
board of directors may exert a significant impact on firm performance, through the 
board ability to shape distinctive board capabilities and its capacity to deploy them 
through its influence on the firm resource allocation decisions (Bouzinab, 2005) , 
such as in the case of M&A operations. The Governance value creating perspective 
(Allaire and Firsirotu, 1993; 2003; 2005, 2008, 2009) provides an interesting general 
framework that integrate several concepts that stem from the various theories 
reviewed in Chapter 2, and constitutes therefore the main ground for the theoretical 
development and the hypotheses to be proposed in the remaining part of this section 
in order to answer our research questions presented in Chapter 1, and to serve as a 
theoretical background for the empirical model proposed in the next chapter. ln order 
to link the Value Creating Governance four pillars with Governance resources and 
Board monitoring and strategie capabilities, we consider that the strategy process 
pillar could be enhanced when fi rms possess relevant governance resources and 
Board strategie capabilities, while the efficient use of financial and strategie 
information and the setting of a calibrated compensation system could be enhanced 
through the existence of relevant governance resources and Board monitoring 
capabilities (Figure 3.1 ). 
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As discussed and proposed in section 2.6 of the present thesis , Governance 
resources could be tangible or intangible . Governance tangible resources are those 
that are explicit , such as formai governance structures, board committees, board 
structural and formai attributes such as board remuneration and financial 
participation or directors' linkages and interlocks with other firms (Horner, 2006; 
Bouzinab, 2005; 2006). Intangible Governance resources are tacit and could not be 
easily identified, but may be inferred through qualitative analysis, such as human 
capital , relevant experience , knowledge and expertise , reputation and valuable 
information embedded in the resources provided by board members (Horner, 2006; 
Bouzinab, 2005; 2006). 
ln addition, Governance capabilities were defined as the firm specifie and 
difficult to imitate, corporate governance processes and board capacity to use the 
governance resources and competences available to the firm in order to achieve a 
competitive advantage by lowering effectively the agency costs, and ideally, by 
contributing to the generation of superior economie rents through directors' active 
involvement in firm strategie decision making processes. Thus, Governance 
capabilities could be divided into two parts: Board control capability and Board 
strategy making capability. 
Governance Value Creating Perspective (Allaire and Firsirotu 2003; 2004; 
2009) provides an interesting classification of what was defined as governance 
resources and capabilities , by identifying those contributing to Board legitimacy and 
those that enhance Board credibility, Strategy process, accurate use of financial and 
strategie information, and efficient setting of a calibrated compensation system. 
The Legitimacy dimension of pilla r 1 is considered as a multidimensional 
construct that involves governance issues such as the quality of the selection 
processes and the resources avai lable to the selection committee, board members' 
financia l implications and the nature of the stakeholders and shareholders they 
represent, constituting therefore, the reflection of firm ownership structure. Based on 
a sol id theoretical ground, the legitimacy dimension, integ rates corporate 
governance aspects that stem from agency, resource dependence and institutional 
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theories. Legitimacy should be considered , however, as a sine qua non condition for 
corporate governance effectiveness and its effect on firm performance (Allaire and 
Firsirotu , 2003; 2008) . 
Pillar 1: Board Legitimacy and credibility 
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: Board Legitimacy : 
1 
Operationalization: o-----------------_ -_ -_-_.!_- -----Governance Resource 
1 acquisition 
~-----------------~ 
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L-------------------
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Figure 3.1 : Corporate Governance and Board effect on selecting successful acquisitions: The link 
Between the Value Creating Governance perspective Four Pillars (Allaire and Firsirotu, 
2003; 2004; 2009) 
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However, it may not be concluded that the board has legitimacy because the 
majority of its members are independent directors. As discussed in chapter 2, 
empirical evidence on the impact of board composition on governance effectiveness 
or firm performance is mixed (Daily, 1995; Johnson et al , 1996; Dalton et al , 1998). 
Th us, Daily ( 1995) concluded th at the re is no systematic relationship between board 
composition and its service at discharging its control functions. The independence 
concept , based solely on the existence of a majority of outside directors is not, by 
itself, a sufficient condition for board effectiveness. Furthermore, Beatty and Zajac 
(1994) found a negative association between the proportion of outside directors and 
firm performance, while Bhagat and Black (1 997) found no significant evidence on 
the effect of the proportion of outside directors on firm performance. The positive 
effect expected from the presence on the board of a large majority constituted by 
outside members, is therefore likely to be reversed by an exacerbated information 
asymmetry when these directors are lacking specifie information, expertise and 
knowledge about the company and its businesses (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Allai re 
and Firsirotu , 2003) . Severe information asymmetries suffered by the so called 
independent directors will imply a passive implication of the board in the firm 
decision making processes, in addition to an awkward accomplishment of its 
decision control role , as prescribed and expected by agency theory. Consequently, 
the concept of independence, when defined in terms of board composition based on 
the existence of an outside directors' majority will not contribute to make accurate 
decisions and thus, contribute to select successful acquisition . On the light of the 
previous discussion , we formally state that: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Legitimacy based on the independence of board members is 
negative/y related to success of acquisitions. 
Evidence from previous research has reported that board shares' ownership 
could have a significant positive impact on board independence and firm 
performance (Bothwell , 1981 ; Kesner, 1987; Kren and Kerr, 1997; Bhagat et al , 
1999; Zajac and Westphal , 1995; Morck et al , 1988). Hence, and according to 
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agency theory, board legitimacy will increase when directors have higher interests 
invested in the firm. However, other authors argued that director pay is generally 
influenced by the CEO, which may reduce board independence (Kosnik, 1990; 
Bebchuck and Fried , 2004) , while others reported a negative (although no 
significant) relationship between outside directors' ownership and Board 
independence degree, measured by the fraction of independent directors minus the 
fraction of insider directors (Bhagat and Black, 2002) . Finally, others have found a 
negative relationship between the percentage shares held by outside directors on 
the acquisition committee and board performance measured as Market to book ratio 
(Hayes et al , 2004). Given these mixed results , we suppose that: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) : Legitimacy based on shares owned by outsider Board members 
is not necessarily related to success of acquisition. 
While Board composition and ownership effect on firm performance were 
largely investigated under the agency theory research stream, the quality of board 
selection and nomination processes were not really considered in empirical studies. 
Furthermore, normative statements issued from the managerial hegemony theorists . 
argue that directors ' selection and nomination are largely influenced by managers 
(Mace, 1971 ; Pfeffer, 1972), wh ile others showed some empirical evidence that 
supports this view (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). We argue that nomination 
committees with established working procedures and relevant resources will 
constitute an important institutional mechanism that improve directors' selection and 
independence (Ruigrok et al , 2006) and will positively contribute to firm performance. 
ln formai words: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) : Legitimacy that stems from effective board selection processes 
will enhance the probability of making successfu/ acquisitions. 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4) : ln the case of successful acquisition, Legitimate Boards with 
effective board selection processes will positive/y and significantly impact post-
acquisition economie performance. 
As discussed in chapter 2, Allaire (2008) argue that for an exchange-listed 
company (which is the case for our sample acquirers) , significant shareholders 
playing an active role in management and governance of the firm , should be 
considered as legitimate board members, and their direct participation in the board 
or its committees should be proportional to the percentage of their equity 
participation. Thus, and according to Allaire (2008), in the case of the presence of 
significant shareholders or their representative in the board of directors or in one of 
its committees, more than the third of directors should be independent from both 
management and these significant shareholders . Formally, we then consider that: 
Hypothesis 5 (Hs) : Legitimacy that stems from Boards with financially committed 
shareholder representation will significantly discriminate between successful and 
unsuccessful acquirers. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): ln the case of successful acquisition, Legitimate Boards with 
financially committed shareholder representation will positive/y and significantly 
impact post-acquisition economie performance. 
Credibility, as a multidimensional construct, involves governance resources 
that directors bring to the firm, such as their generic and specifie knowledge , 
experience, organizational and strategie expertise, information and relational capital. 
Thus, the Credibility construct integrates concepts that are in line with the RBV, the 
resource dependence theory and the socio-cognitive branch of the institutional 
theory discussed in chapter 2, and as in the case of Legitimacy, the Credibility 
construct is also a sine qua non condition to effective corporate governance and 
without adequate strategie processes and dialogue, the avai lability for directors of 
timely and accurate financial and strategie information, and balanced incentives for 
managers, even /egitimate and credible boards will exert no significant effect on firm 
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performance (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003). However, and according to Allaire and 
Firsirotu, (2009): "white it is /egitimacy that gives a board the right and the authority 
to impose ifs will on management, it is credibility that makes a board effective and 
value-creating (2009, p. 254). 
Functional backgrounds diversity variables possess the advantage of 
capturing conjointly experience, information, and perspectives relevant to cognitive 
tasks performed by the team members (Simons et al , 1999 p. 663) . Directors with 
different backgrounds bring different perspectives and opinions, complementary 
skills and knowledge (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), which facilitates advice and 
counsel (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hillman and Dalziel , 2003) . Yet, some 
researchers argue that diversity could constitute a double-edged sword (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996) and while it provides boards with valuable resources it could induce 
"higher levels of conflicts , interaction difficulties and lower levels of integration" 
(Hillman and Dalziel , 2003, p.497 -498) . 
Nevertheless, Murphy and Mclntyre (2007) noted that contexts are important 
for valuing the positive effect of diversity: 
"Ciearly, when discussing diversity, the context is the central question, and 
with highly unstructured, camp/ex issues to tack/e, BOO may benefit from being 
comprised of demographical/y and ski// diverse individua/s representing various 
value positions and sources of expertise" (2007, p.215) . 
Accordingly, we could argue that in the context of M&A, Board of directors 
with diversified occupational backgrounds will contribute better in choosing 
successful acquisitions than those composed by directors having simi lar profiles : 
Hypothesis 7 (H7) : Board credibility based on directors ' background diversity will 
positive/y and significantly enhance the probability of se/ecting a successful 
acquisition. 
Hypothesis 8 (Hs): ln the case of successful acquisitions, Board credibility based on 
directors' background diversity will positive/y and significantly impact post-acquisition 
economie performance. 
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lndustry context and specifie strategie decisions in which directors were 
involved in the past contribute in shaping their experience and skills (Biuedorn et al , 
1994). Common and similar or highly related industry experience may, therefore, 
provide directors with accurate and shared cognitive assumptions about the future 
tendencies in the industry and the course of action and alternatives needed to be 
taken (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), including the nature of acquisitions the firm 
should engage in (Hitt and Tyler, 1991 ). 
The nature and the level of human capital- defined as a set of abilities , 
expertise and knowledge acquired by an individual form previous work experience 
(Bailey and Helfat, 2003)- that directors bring to the board will largely affect the 
board credibility , especially if directors' previous experiences are industry-specific. 
These lndustry specifie experiences refer to an individual director's knowledge about 
an industry specifie competitive conditions, consumer needs, technology and 
investment requirements , regulations , suppliers and ether external stakeholders 
(Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Kor and MisanGyi , 2008) . ln a recent empirical study, Kor 
and Sundaramurthy (2008) concluded that: 
"Prior experiential knowledge of the industry helps outside directors to 
develop a sophisticated and tacit understanding of the current and future industry 
dynamics, which in turn enables them to better evaluate manager's strategie 
proposais." (2008: p.17-18). 
Furthermore, outside directors with relevant experiences are, not on ly, more 
likely to give better advice to managers, but are also more able to contest objectively 
management proposais (Carter and Lorsh, 2004) and contribute to reduce their 
information asymmetry disadvantage when their collective average industry specifie 
experience is higher that the average experience of the firm 's top management. 
Another study by Kroll et al (2007) reported that advice and counsel of outside 
directors with industry experience affect positively firm performance. 
However, and as noted by McDonald et al (2008), extant literature "has given 
little consideration of the performance implications of directors ' experience", 
116 
moreover, they argue that " ... there have been few, if any, systematic efforts to 
conceptually e/aborate this basic notion by delineating the nature and sources of 
directors ' expertise, and by describing how that expertise might be linked to the 
relative success of specifie firm strategie actions." (2008: p.1156) . 
We hope that the present thesis will add some additional insights on this 
important issue of outside directors' previous experience and how it will enhance 
board credibility as defined by Allaire (2008) and Allaire and Firsirotu (2009) , and 
how it would , in turn , contribute to the success of acquisition operations, which lead 
us to the following propositions: 
Hypothesis 9 (H9) : Board credibility based on collective board members industry 
specifie experience and knowledge will positive/y and significantly enhance the 
probability of selecting a successful acquisition. 
Hypothesis 10 (Hto} : ln the case of successful acquisitions, Board credibility based 
on collective board members industry specifie experience and know/edge will 
positive/y and significantly impact post-acquisition economie performance. 
Moreover, collective experience could imply that in some cases directors may 
hold multiple directorships and could negatively affect Board credibility. However, 
Ferris et al (2003) examined the effect of busy directors on firm performance and not 
only they found that there is no evidence of a negative impact of directors with 
multiple board appointments on firm performance or on the likelihood of securities 
fraud litigation against firms having busy directors, they went even further by 
concluding that: 
" ... Firms rely heavily on multiple directors to provide managerial oversight 
and monitoring through participation on corporate governance committees" (p.11 05). 
As for Perry and Peyer (2005), their results were consistent with those of 
Ferris et al (2003) , recognizing that: 
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" ... Our findings cast further doubt on the value of limitations on the number of 
directorships that an individual can ho/d' (p. 2087). 
Recently, DiPietra et al (2008) in analysing the relationships between 
directors' busyness and firm performance in ltaly concluded that: 
"the levet of Busyness of corporate directors as a measure of board 
effectiveness in general has a statistically significant and positive influence on firm 's 
market performance" (p. 87). 
ln an interesting study by Harris and Shimizu (2004), in which they have 
investigated the impact of busy Boards upon acquisition decisions , its seems that 
there is evidence of a positive association between busy directors and abnormal 
returns related to acquisitions , which led the authors to state that: 
"busy directors complement inside directors-and no doubt, other outside 
directors as weil- with knowledge on issues such as key M&A obstacles, typica/ 
decision biases and leads on advisors that can help guide management through the 
deaf' (2004: p.792) and to argue that "Companies may pursue active directors 
because they are, in tact, the candidates best equipped to add value ... busy directors 
are busy for good reason- they are good contributors." (p. 793) . 
On the other hand, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) found that firm performance 
was negatively affected when boards are composed by a majority of busy directors 
and that these firms tend to display lower market-ta-book ratios, lower ROA, lower 
assets turnover and lower operating return on sales and concluded that: 
"Collective/y, our results suggest th at boards relying heavily on outside 
directors that serve on severa/ boards are likely to experience a decline in their 
quality of corporate governance" (p.721 ). 
As for Core et al (1999), they reported that directors serving on three or more 
other boards are associated with excessive CEO compensation which may 
subsequently affect fi rm performance, while Jiraporn et al (2009) found that board 
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members with multiple directorships tend to exhibit a higher rate of absenteeism 
from board meetings. 
Ali in ali , it seems from extant research that there is mixed evidence on the 
positive effect of busy directors' impact on fi rm performance, which lead us to the 
following formai proposition : 
Hypothesis 11 (H11) : Boards with a majority of members holding multiple 
directorships are negative/y related to the probability of selecting a successful 
acquisition. 
Board of directors' literature suggests that monitoring and strategy or service 
roles are the most important activities to be performed by corporate directors 
(Johnson et al , 1996; Finckelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
The agency prescriptions, grounded in the fiduciary perspective, consider the 
monitoring of management as the main function of the board and that directors will 
use their authority in determining the CEO and top management pay, along with their 
ability to hiring and firing them, in order to ensure that organizational assets are used 
in appropriate ways (Monks and Minow, 2001 ). However, and wh ile agency theorists 
recognize the strategy role of the board , they settle for a passive role by considering 
strategie control (i.e. strategy ratification) as the main responsibility of the board in 
respect to firm strategy (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Based on this fiduciary conception, Directors' monitoring role consists in the 
preservation of the shareholders and other stakeholders' interests by shaping proper 
control mechanisms such as appropriate incentives for management, information 
mechanisms through auditing and reporting activities, succession planning and other 
fiduciary concerns. 
Furthermore, resource allocation decisions such as acquis itions involve 
active board monitoring that contribute to circumvent the CEO discretionary power 
and to temper his tendency to make hubris based decisions, which could prevent 
acquisition overpayment and ensures that firm capital investments are in line with the 
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shareholders interests (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Gaughan , 2005). Thus to 
ensure efficient allocation decisions, the board of directors should shape monitoring 
capabilities that actively involve board auditing and compensation or other relevant 
committees formed by qualified non executive directors capable to deploy 
governance resources, such as financial and accounting expertise, experience in 
setting CEO compensation , and previous experience in selecting and evaluating 
deals in arder to control management behaviour during the pre-acquisition phase, 
which lead us to the following propositions: 
Hypothesis 12 (H12) : Board of directors monitoring capabilities involving efficient 
audit and compensation committees, the availability of financial and accounting 
expertise, and so/id previous experience in resource allocation decisions through 
board members will significantly enhance the probability of se/ecting a successful 
acquisition. 
Hypothesis 13 (Ht3) : ln the case of successful acquisitions, boards having audit 
committees with higher proportion of directors possessing financial and accounting 
skiffs will positive/y affect firm financial and operating post-acquisition performance. 
Canadian firms exhibit a higher degree of family control and tend to use dual 
share mechanism to control firm decisions. As discussed in section 2.1.2.3 of the 
present thesis , family controlled firms and firm having family members on their board 
of directors may affect their monitoring capabilities. For agency theory, Family 
controlled firms are viewed as inefficient and backdated structures that may hinder 
the efficiency of the takeover mechanism. ln addition, Publ ic-traded family fi rms 
incur, accord ing to agency theorists, higher cost of capital due to the premium paid 
to minority shareholders in arder to compensate them for the expropriated private 
benefits that the controlling owners will , potential ly, enjoy through their control rights 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al , 1999). 
On the other hand, proponents of family held firms put forward that these 
structures tend to exhibit, under sorne particular circumstances (i.e. firms with 
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founder serving as the CEO, with founder as chairman with a non-family CEO or 
family firms with higher board independence) , higher performance than other forms 
of ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 2004; Durand and Vargas , 2003; Miller et 
al , 2005, Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Similar find ings were also reported in studies 
from Western Europe (Maury, 2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). However, Miller et 
al , (2007), conclude that only family firms with lone founders as CEO (i.e firms in 
which no relatives of the founder are involved) outperform the other forms of 
corporations. Furthermore, King and Santor (2008) found that Canadian family firms 
are more profitable than the widely held ones , exhibiting a higher ROA than the 
average in their sample. 
lndividual or family control is generally achieved by separating ownership and 
control rights through pyramidal and cross holdings schemes or through the use of 
dual-class shares (la Porta et al , 1999). The use of dual class shares by family 
controlled firm is common and the CEO in the majority of these firms is the 
controlling shareholder (Gadhoum, 2006) . While some studies found that fi rms using 
dual class shares, cross shareholding or pyramidal structures tend to perform more 
than the widely held firms, we may expect that the use of dual class share will 
contribute to enhance the board monitoring capability (Ben Amar and André, 2006) if 
the controlling shareholder is also a member of the Board. Thus, family firms with 
concentrated ownership, using dual class shares and having a controlling 
shareholder or his relatives on the board will create a monitoring propensity with 
regard to how management chose and evaluate firm acquisitions deals (Carney , 
2005). 
ln their analysis of family controlled firms, Alla ire (2006) and Alla ire and 
Firsirotu (2009: p.236-237) proposed an interesting framework to extract the benefits 
associated with family-controlled firms using dual class shares whi le ensuring the 
protection of minority shareholders and note that: "An appropriate framework shou/d 
conta in sorne of the following prescriptions: 
Al/ classes of shares should be entitled to receive the same terms and 
conditions in the event of a proposed takeover of the company. This 
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stipulation is ca/led a "coattail" provision in Canada and has been enforced by 
the Toronto Stock Exchange since 1987; 
The c/ass of multiple-vote shares shou/d be capped at 4:1, that is four votes 
as compared with one vote for the other class of shares (compared to the 
typical 10:1 observed now); this maximum ratio means th at the contra/ling 
shareholder must own at /east 20% of the equity to maintain an absolute 
control over the votes (i.e. 50% or more). Studies show that too large 
discrepancy between share of votes and share of equity rapidly reduces the 
benefits of control (Gompers, /shii, and Metrick, 2006) . Glass of shares 
without any voting right shou/d be banned; 
The c/ass of shares with inferior voting rights shou/d elect one third of board 
members; 
Whenever a kin or descendant of the contra/ling shareho/der is a candidate 
for the CEO position, independent members of the board must discuss the 
merits of various candidates with the contra/ling shareholder and report fui/y 
at the next annua/ meeting of shareholders on the process by which the 
board arrived at a decision; 
A special committee of the board, made up of members independent from the 
contra/ling shareholder, should review and report on al/ transactions between 
the company and related parties; 
When non family member of the contra/ling shareholder is likely to play in the 
future a significant rote in the management or the governance of the 
company, the board and the contra/ling shareholder should discuss what 
ownership structure wou/d be best to ensure the firm 's success in the future 
and protect ifs founder's legacy. " 
Following this discussion on the impact of family firms, we could note that 
there are opposite views and mixed evidence on the impact of family control on 
board monitoring capabilities. Furthermore, we could expect that family controlled 
firms that no follow the prescriptions above (Allaire , 2006) , which is generally the 
case, may not benefit form their status and contribute to the effectiveness of board 
monitoring capabilities . Thus we could expect for the acquirers in our sample that: 
Hypothesis 14 (H14): Family contra/led firms with board members appointed on the 
board and those using dual class shares will not significantly impact the probability of 
making successful acquisitions. 
-~-, 
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ln reviewing the literature on board role in strategy making, Hendry and Kiel 
(2004) identified two schools of thought that emerged from the evolution of the 
governance field and from the debate on board role in strategy in bath the normative 
and positive streams, that is, the passive and the active schools. The passive school 
is, on one hand, supported by the managerial hegemony and agency theories (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Mace, 1971 ; Vance, 1983; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Eisenhardt, 
1989) which consider boards as instruments of control , having as the principal duty 
to monitor and evaluate strategie options generated by management, generally in a 
post- implementation context. On the other hand, the Active schoo/ is supported by 
the Value-creating governance perspective (Allai re and Firsirotu , 2003, 2004, 2009) , 
the stewardship theory (Donaldson , 1990; Davis et al , 1997), the resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Pearce and Zahra , 1992, Goodstein 
et al , 1994) and other multi theoretical perspectives (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, 
Johnson et al , 1993; Stiles and Taylor, 2001 ), and considers that boards should , in 
addition to monitoring and evaluating the firm strategies, participate in the 
formulation phase (as suggested by some agency theorists), and be actively 
involved in the implementation process (as advocated by the stewardship, resource 
dependence, stakeholders and institutional theories) . 
Furthermore, Forbes and Milliken (1999) argued that the Board service task 
refers to its potential to provide advice and counsel to the CEO and other top 
managers and to participate actively in the formulation of strategy. According to the 
resource dependence theory, and as already discussed in Chapter 2, directors 
provide the organization with val uable resources such as, ski lls, specialized and 
general expertise, strategie and functional advice, working knowledge and alternative 
points of view (Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978; Mizruchi , 1983; Hillman et al, 2000; 
Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986; Johnson et al, 1996). 
From the resource based view, directors are associated with the development 
of critical firm capabilities through their resource and service roles in setting strategie 
directions, bringing together internai and external resources and by having a say in 
the resource allocation process for strategie investments (Krug and Aguilera , 2005) . 
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Thus, directors are involved in the capability building functions and constitute 
firm-specific and costly to-imitate resources that ensure competitive advantage and 
value creation (Barney, 1991 ; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). These firm-specific and 
hard to imitate resources are embedded in the accumulated director's experience 
and knowledge about the firm and its environment (Krug and Aguilera, 2005). The 
processes of development and deployment of these governance resources- when 
combined with other firm resources in order to coordinate, to transform , to 
reconfigurate and to integrate internai and external resources (Teece et al, 1997) -
lead to superior board strategie and dynamic capabilities, such as that of making 
successful acquisitions, constituting therefore a valuable source of competitive 
advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin , 2000) . 
Finally, empirical evidence shows that corporations, whose directors 
participate in their strategie decision making processes, tend to have better financial 
results (Judge and Zeithaml , 1992; Baysinger and Hoskisson , 1990; Pearce and 
Zahra , 1991 ). Board involvement in strategy is associated therefore with firm 
performance, and while resource allocation decisions, such as , acquisitions may 
involve changes in firm strategie directions (Karim and Mitchell , 2000; Capron and 
Mitchell , 1998; Capron and Anand , 2007), management would need board counsel 
and advice provided by experienced directors with an active involvement in the 
acquisition programs. However, Board involvement in strategie decision making 
processes and its dynamics that make efficient use of directors' resources could be 
highly affected by board and management demographie similarity or dissimilarity. 
The Top Management Team (TMT) tradition of the Upper Echelon Theory 
(Pfeffer, 1983; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Cannela and Hambrick, 1993; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; lreland and Hitt, 1999) have extensively studied the 
role of demographies in group dynamics and interpersonal or inter-groups interaction 
within organizations. Rooted in social psychology, demographie similarity may lead 
to interpersonal attraction , consensual validation (Byrne et al , 1966; Westphal , 
1998), self-identity and self-esteem derived from group membership. Thus, and 
according to this perspective, CEO's are more likely to attract directors having simi lar 
- -----·--------------- - ------
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demographie characteristics in order to preserve their influence and power over their 
boards (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
Regarding acquisitions, Hitt and Tyler (1991) found that dissimilarity in 
executives' functional background lead to divergent evaluations of potential 
acquisitions, while Westphal and Zajac, (1995) argued that demographie similarity 
hindered board ability to objectively evaluate CEO decisions or to constructively 
challenge strategies proposed by f irm 's management. Similarity will reflect, therefore , 
the power dynamics between the board and the CEO. ln addition , (Korn et al , 1992 
in Mililken and Martins, 1996) reported a positive relationship between functional 
diversity of the top management team and firm 's performance measured by its ROA. 
Our main argument in linking functional distance with board strategie capabilities and 
therefore with the strategy processes and dialogue of Pillar Il , in the Value Creating 
Governance perspective , is the interesting findings reported by Simons (1995) who 
asserted that functional diversity will only influence positively organizational 
performance when the team uses decision processes that a//ow debate. Thus , 
Functional distance between The CEO and the Board could be used as a proxy for 
Board strategie capabilities that reflect the use of board resources along with 
effective strategy processes and constructive debate between the Board members 
and the CEO. 
However, demographie similarity or disimilarity measures are generally 
conceived as a composite index aggregating three components at the same time, 
that is, functional distance, educational distance, and age distance, which could 
hinder the interplay and sometimes contradicting and relative impact of each one of 
these components. As a result , we prefer to separate the impact of the three 
dimensions, given that while functiona l background distance and age cou ld exert a 
positive effect on strategie making decisions, educational distance (generally 
measured as education level distance and not educational curricula) wil l exert a 
negative effect, while similarity could exert a positive one when boards and CEO 
have the same level of education . Following these arguments we formally state 
th at: 
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Hypothesis 15 (H1s) : Higher functiona/ background distance between the Board of 
Directors ' members and the CEO will positive/y and significantly impact the 
probabi/ity of making successful acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 16 (H16): Higher educational leve/ similarity between the Board of 
Directors ' members and the CEO will positive/y and significantly impact the 
probability of making successful acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 17 (H11): Higher age distance between the Board of Directors ' members 
and the CEO will positive/y and significantly impact the probability of making 
successful acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 18 (H1s): ln the case of successful acquisitions, higher functional 
background distance between the Board of Directors ' members and the CEO will 
positive/y and significantly impact the post-acquisition economie performance. 
Hypothesis 19 (H19): ln the case of successful acquisitions, higher educationallevel 
similarity between the Board of Directors' members and the CEO will positive/y and 
significantly impact the post-acquisition economie performance. 
As discussed in section 2.1.2.3, family firms imply some distinct 
characteristics from the widely held firm and tend to exhibit higher performance than 
the former ones. lndeed, and according to King and Santor (2008) , quoting the 
statement of Stein (1989) : 
"Family firms may make better investment decisions, since ramifies have 
more firm-specific knowledge, are less myopie and have longer investment horizons" 
(p. 2424). 
Furthermore, and following the review of some major empirica l evidence on 
the benefits of family-controlled firm, Allaire (2006) concluded that: 
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"No matter how one slices the empirical evidence, there emerges a 
campe/ling support for the value-creating rote of founders as CEO, chairman and 
contra/ling shareho/der. The benefits of board of directors with very large stakes in 
the company are clearly established. These benefits are enhanced when the 
company can cou nt on independent-minded directors who are conscious of their rote 
as arbiters between the interest of majority and minority shareholders. These board 
members must ensure that no private benefit is extracted from the company by the 
contra/ling shareholders" (2006: p.24). 
On the other hand, while Miller and Miller-Le Breton, (2006) argued that the 
presence of multiple family members on the top management team may correlate 
positively with financial performance, Miller et al (2007) showed that only lone 
founders family firms (i .e firms where the founder is the largest shareholder who is 
also the CEO, the Chairman of the Board or bath , and in which there are no other of 
his relatives involved in the firm businesses) outperform the other forms of ownership 
among the U.S Fortune 1000 companies. 
Furthermore, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) hypothesized that family firms 
run by a family member as the CEO may exhibit "fewer shortsighted acquisitions and 
downsizing decisions and more R&D, training and capital expenditure, and thus 
more distinctive capabilities that produce higher long-term financial retum" (2006, 
p. 79). However, this proposition was not empirically tested by the authors. Following 
this discussion we formally propose that: 
Hypothesis 20 (H2o) : Boards with a Lone Founder as chairman will positive/y and 
significantly impact the probability of making successful acquisitions. 
From the RBV perspective, administrative groups should be considered more 
than a collection of individuals working together, and the experience these 
individuals gain from working with the firm and with each other will enable them to 
provide unique and valuable services within this particular group (Penrose, 1959). 
Furthermore , and as discussed in chapter 2, capabilities result from the combination 
of physical , human, technological and reputational resources developed over time 
(Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Winter, 2003; Canner, 1991 ). 
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ln addition, Oynamic capabilities derive from the patterned experience of 
individua/s involved in the decision making or deployment of the capability (Helfat et 
al , 2007). However, board tenure was associated with weak governance (Vance, 
1983) due ta inertial forces and group conformity to norms (Johnson et al , 1993). 
Heterogeneous tenure is, at the opposite, considered as having a positive effect on 
board activeness and tends to reduce the effect of inertia and groupthink, along with 
providing a greater diversity of perspectives (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Johnson et 
al , 1993). Thus, higher levels of Board heterogeneous tenure may indicate the 
degree of board activeness, which lead us to the following proposition : 
Hypothesis 21 (H21) : Boards with heterogeneous tenure will positive/y and 
significantly impact the probability of making successful acquisitions. 
To select potentially successful acquisitions, bath monitoring and strategie 
capabilities should be involved (Weston et al , 1998; Sudarsanam, 2003) . However, 
the literature of M&A have highlighted only the monitoring role as the most important 
one for the board and considered strategy role as a nice to have and not necessarily 
as an important determinant of acquisition success. At the opposite, we consider 
board of directors as an important determinant of choosing potentially successful 
acquisitions, which lead us to the following proposition : 
Hypothesis 22 (H to}: The effects measured throughout hypotheses (Hts and HtB} will 
be stronger than, or at /east comparable to the effect measured in hypothesis (H12). 
Figure 3.2 depicts the components of our conceptual madel , along with their 
relations and effects as hypothesized herein . The four pillars of the value creating 
governance perspective (Alaire and Firsirotu , 2003; 2009) , that is, Board /egitimacy 
and credibility, along with strategy processes based on relevant board strategie 
capabilities and the use of financial and strategie information and the setting of a 
calibrated compensation system based on relevant monitoring capabilities are 
conceived as governance resources and capabilities that may significantly 
discriminate successful acquisitions from unsuccessful ones. ln the case of 
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successful acquisitions we will assess the relationships between the same 
governance components and firm value creation in the form of economie post-
acquisition performance measured by the improvement in firm ROA following the 
studied acquisition. 
3.4 . Chapter summary 
ln this chapter, we reviewed the literature of M&A activities, their types and 
motives, their impact on firm value and the role that directors are supposed to play in 
the specifie contexts of acquisitions. ln summary, M&A activities, viewed from the 
economie and strategie perspectives, are motivated by synergistic gains that come 
from scale and scope economies, market power, complementary resources and 
capabilities, resource deployment and transfers, relatedness and unique or difficult to 
replicate cash flows that stem from this relatedness. M&A could be also motivated by 
the will of undertaking path-breaking changes and could take the form of horizontal , 
vertical , concentric (i .e. related) , or conglomerate (i .e. unrelated) mergers. The 
literature review shows mixed results on the impact of M&A on the acquirers' post-
merger performance, and the majority of the studies concluded that M&A destroy 
acquirers' shareholder value. However, Canadian evidence seems to be slightly 
different from what is found in the U.S studies, reporting in the most of the cases, 
significant and positive abnormal returns for the acquirer. 
ln addition , we discussed how M&A failure in creating value for the acquirer 
was largely explained by the existence of corporate governance problems such as 
managers going unchecked by their boards and seeking to obtain , through M&A, 
private gains, higher compensation , prestige, job security and human capital risk 
reduction , and how these fa ilures could be also explained by strategie and 
organizational weaknesses, such as the lack of a clear strategie vision, management 
overconfidence and/or inexperience in evaluating potential synergies, in negotiating 
and/or integrating efficiently the acquired entities that may impede value creating fo r 
shareholders, even in the absence of opportunistic behaviour from the part of the 
agent. 
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Furthermore, we concluded that the evidence on the relationship between 
board of directors and firm performance was highly mixed and that these results 
could have been caused by several factors , such as the adoption of a single and 
aggregate measure of board independence or the consideration of only the 
monitoring role of boards, without considering their strategy role and the impact of 
board resources on firm performance. 
To conclude, we will now turn to our research questions, formulated in 
chapter 1 and link them to the hypotheses developed herein . lndeed , we proposed 
four research questions as follow: 
Research question 1 (Q1): 
Q. 1. 1: ls Board Legitimacy related ta acquisitions' success? 
Q 1.2: If Board Legitimacy is related ta acquisitions ' success, how does it affect post 
acquisition- economie performance? 
Research question 2 (Q2): 
Q 2.1 : ls Board Credibility related to acquisitions' success? 
Q 2.2: If Board Credibility is related ta acquisitions' success, how then does it affect 
post acquisition- economie performance? 
Research question 3 (Q3): 
Q3.1: Are Board monitoring capabilities related to acquisitions' success? 
Q3.2: If Board monitoring capabilities are related ta acquisitions' success, how then 
do they affect post acquisition economie performance? 
Research question 4 (Q4): 
Q 4. 1: Are Board strategie capabilities related to acquisitions' success? 
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Q 4. 2: If Board strategie capabilities are related ta acquisitions' success, how th en do 
they affect post acquisition economie performance? 
Research question 5 (Q5): 
What are the relative impacts of board monitoring and strategie capabilities on 
acquisitions' success? 
Therefore , linking the thesis hypotheses with the research questions could be 
summarized as follow: hypotheses H 1, H2, H3 and H5 address the research question 
Q 1.1, while hypotheses H4 and H6 address the research question Q 1.2 and H7, H9 
and H11 address research question (Q 2.1 ). Hypotheses Ha and H10 are related to 
research question Q 2.2. Hypotheses H12, H14, address research question Q 3.1 and 
H13 is related to research question Q 3.2. 
As for Hypotheses H1s, H16, H17, H2o and H21, they address research question 
04.1, while Hypotheses H1a and H19 aim to answer research question Q 4.2 and 
Hypothesis H22 addresses research question Q 5. 
Finally, the link between the theoretical dimensions of our framework, the 
research questions and the hypotheses formulated in this chapter and the theories 
from which they are derived are presented in Table 3.1. 
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CHAPTERIV 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION, METHODOLGY AND 
MEASURMENT MODELS 
ln this chapter we will precise our epistemological ground , describe our data 
collection and sampling methods, the variables and the statistical models to be used 
for testing ou r formai hypotheses presented in chapter 3. 
4.1 Epistemological Position : 
Our research is grounded in the post-positivist tradition (Popper, 1972; Kuhn , 
1962), more specifically, in the Scientific Realism movement (Putnam, 1990; Boyd, 
1984; Hunt, 1991 ; 2005; Corman, 2005). This epistemolog ical choice was based , 
first, on the tact that our theoretical model contains latent dimensions such as 
Legitimacy, Credibility and Capabilities which cannot be accommodated in a strict 
Logical Positivist tradition (Hempel, 1965). Furthermore, several authors consider 
that post-positivism provides a suitable framework to develop a useful social science 
(Alexander, 1995; Allaire, 1984}, wh ile Merton (1967) claims that both grand-
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theories, middle range theories and working hypotheses can be included and tested 
by the normative standards of post-positivism . 
The second argument for the adoption of the Scientific Realism as an 
epistemological ground was based on the nature of our research questions and our 
theoretical model derived from the Value Ceating Governance perspective (Allaire 
and Firsirotu , 2003; 2004; 2009) that integrates and reconciliates various concepts 
encountered in theories such as the agency theory, the resource dependence 
theory, the Resource Based View perspective and the institutional theory which from 
a strictly logical positivist view could not be even considered as theories because 
their key constructs are largely based on unobservable factors (Godfrey and Hill , 
1995). 
The third argument was the fit between our research conceptual madel and the 
principles of scientific realism advanced by Hunt and Hansen (2008): 
(1 ) The correspondence between the observable and the unobservable terms is 
suitable to our attempt in assessing our theoretical dimensions with 
measurable variables, what the authors cali inductive rea!ism; 
(2) Without discarding the falsificationism advocated by Popper ( 1972) and 
consisting in the irrelevance of positive results for science, we consider as 
Hunt and Hansen (2008) stated that "the positive results of empirica/ tests-not 
just falsifications-provide evidence as to the truth content of the theories 
tested" (2008: p: 16); 
(3) By adopting scientific realism , we accept the fallibility of scientist's perceptual 
and measurement processes in the testing for the truth-content of 
knowledge-claims; 
(4) The adoption of a fallibilistic realism that rejects the concept of " know with 
certainty'' and the confusion between what is true and what is certain in the 
scientific inquiry. 
Put together, these arguments make Scientific Realism a relevant 
epistemologica l ground that supports our conceptual model presented in the 
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precedent chapter, and which will serve as the reference for our empirical models 
and the interpretation of our results and their theoretical implications. 
4.2 Data Collection and sample: 
The sample for the present study was derived from the Crosbie and co 's 
FPinformart database and covered the period beginning in January 2000 and ending 
in December 2006. 
The selection procedure was as follow: To begin, only acquiring firms 
meeting the following criteria were retained in our sample: (1) Public deals made 
between Canadian publicly traded companies; (2) large deals with a value of more 
than $10 million ; (2) acquisitions aiming a majority control ; (3) acquisitions that do 
not involve share buybacks operations, operations made by or involving mutual 
funds, real estate assets, trusts or other type of financial or real estate funds; (4) 
acquisitions that have been completed within this time frame. A sample of 374 
transactions was initially identified, from which we retained only the transactions 
fulfilling the conditions above and where the total sales of the target represents 10% 
of the acquirer's total sales (Franks et al , 1991 ; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wright 
et al , 2002) and/or the target market value represents at least 10% of the acquirer's 
value. We ended with a sample of 133 acquisitions that fulfilled ali the criteria 
discussed above. 
Data on the variables included in the empirical madel proposed in the next 
sections were hand col lected from company proxy statements avai lable on the 
Sedar Oatabase and other public documents for information on directors, executives , 
firm activities, Businesses and strategies, while financial and accounting data were 
gathered by using Mergent online Oatabase, Stockguide, Chass@TSX, Dun & 
Bradstreet database. Information on acquisitions was also gathered from Financial 
Post Crosbie Mergers and Acquisitions in Canada. 
Biographical data on some 1084 Directors and about 398 Executive 
managers composing our sample (excluding multiple occupations by managers and 
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directors if any) were hand collected , then carefully analysed and cross checked 
from various sources such as Companies' Management Information circular 
available in Sedar, Business Week, Reuters, Zoominfo.com, NNDB and 
Marketvisua/. com. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main objective of the present thesis is to 
identify which governance attributes or capabilities will predict better a success of an 
acquisition . The first conceptual model presented in figure 5 (plain arrows), wh ich is 
based on Allaire and Firsirotu (2003; 2004; 2009) Value-Creating Framework of 
Governance, ai ms to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5, H5, H7, H9, H11 , H12, H14, H15, 
H16, H17, H2o, H21 and could be expressed through the following empirical 
relationships : 
(1) Probability(Se/ecting Successful acquisitions)= f{[Board Legitimacy};[Board 
Credibility]; [Board monitoring capabilities]; [Board strategie capabilitiesj) 
The second model presented in figure 5 (dashed arrows) aims to identify the 
impact of governance attributes and capabilities on the financial and operating post-
acquisition performance within the group of successful acquirers through the 
assessment of hypotheses H4 , H6, Ha, H10 , H1 3, H1 a. H1 9 and H22 , and could be 
expressed by the following empirical relationships: 
(2) Post-acquisition performance = f {[Board Legitimacy];[Board Credibility]; 
[Board monitoring capabilities}; [Board strategie capabilitiesj) 
4.3. Theoretical dimensions, Variables definition and empirical models: 
4.3.1 lndependent variables 
For our study, the first dimension is Legitimacy and as described in chapter 3, 
it reflects how directors are selected and nominated, what interests they hold in the 
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firm and whom interests they represent in the board of directors (Allaire and Firsirotu, 
2003) , which may indicate their degree of motivation to actively involve themselves, 
at least, in the fulfillment of their fiduciary role . To capture board legitimacy we rely 
on four indicators: (1) Quality of the selection and nomination processes (Qualsnp) ; 
(2) Non-Executive Directors ownership (NEOown) ; (3) Shareholder representation on 
the board: (SignShareholder) and (SignShareholderRep); (4) Board composition 
(Boardcomp); (5) NEO ownership relative monetary value (NEDownvalue) 
Quality of the selection and nomination processes (Qualsnp) : 
To assess the quality of selection and nomination processes (Qualsnp) we 
use a multidimensional scoring based on the examination of the attributes and 
practices of the nomination committee. Nomination committees with established 
working procedures are seen as important institutional mechanisms that improve 
directors' selection and independence (Ruigrok et al , 2006) . Although the nominating 
committee is not required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act , such as the case of the Audit 
Committee, Carver (2006) considers it a " ... a proper governance committee" and as 
"the on/y board committee that may need to be described and empowered in the 
bylaws" (2006, p.235). 
Therefore, and based on the recommendations on the disclosures regarding 
nominating committee functions and communications between security holders and 
Board of Directors (SEC, 2004), we retained the ones widely used by Canadian 
companies and fo r which there is some degree of variance for the Qualsnp variable , 
and we score them as follows: 
1. Existence of a nominating (or governance committee) with a clear mandate 
and specifie charter (0 none- 1 if there is one) 
2. Existence of a clear description of the selection process (0 none- 1 
depending on the clarity and the extensiveness of the reported details related 
to the process) 
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3. The majority of the Committee members (more than 51%) seat on other firms ' 
nomination committees (0 when the proportion is less than 51% and 1 
otherwise). 
4. Existence or divulgation of an annually updated long-term plan for the 
composition of the board that take into consideration the strategie direction of 
the corporation , its risks and its opportunities and define the ideal mix of 
director's qualifications (0 none- 4 (1 for each of the four characteristics)) 
5. The majority of the committee members are outsiders independent directors 
(0 if < 51%; 1 if the proportion fall between 51% and 75% and 3 if it falls 
between 75% and 1 00%) 
6. The CEO is a member of the nominating committee (0) otherwise (1 ). 
7. The nominating committee use the services of external advisers ( 0 if there is 
no advisers- 1 otherwise) 
The final measure is obtained by adding the scores of the seven items. 
Higher values represent a higher quality of the selection and nomination processes. 
Shareholder representation on the board 
Canadian companies are known for having a controlled shareholding 
structure and according to a recent study by Allaire (2008) , 53% of the corporations 
listed in the S&P/TSX, from which our sample is drawn, have at !east one 
shareholder with 1 0% or more of the votes. These votes come generally from direct 
control or through dual-class structures. 
As discussed in chapter 2, significant shareholders should be considered as 
legitimate directors that may play an important role in the firm corporate governance 
by imposing their authority on management (Allaire, 2008). To measure this 
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indicator, we used two dichotomous variables: (1) Existence of a Significant 
shareholder other than an investment fu nd SignShareholder (0/1 ); (2) Existence of a 
significant shareholder (controlling 10% or more of the firm equity) with a 
representative on the board SignShareholderRep (0/1 ). 
Board composition (Boardcomp) 
Although shareholder representation on the board could constitute an 
important governance attribute, for board members to be really independent, it is 
recommended that more than the third of directors should be independent from bath 
management and the controlling shareholders (Allaire, 2008) . That is, if there is a 
controlling shareholder, the third of the board members should be elected only by the 
minority shareholders. 
Thus, the Boardcom variable was computed as the number of board 
members that are independent from the management and from any significant 
shareholder divided by the total number of board members. Higher values indicate 
that the board possesses sorne significant degree of independence. 
NED ownership (NEDown) 
Empirical evidence reports a significant positive impact of board share 
ownership on board independence and firm performance (Bothwell , 1981 ; Kesner, 
1987; Kren and Kerr, 1997; Bhagat et al , 1999; Zajac and Westphal , 1995). Hence, 
board legitimacy will increase when the board members have higher interests 
invested in the firm. To measure th is indicator we used the number of shares owned 
by ali the acquirers ' Non- executive directors (excluding the CEO) during the 
acquisition year divided by the total number of shares outstanding during the same 
year. 
-
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NED ownership relative value to total compensation (NEDownvalue) 
To complement the board ownership indicator introduced previously, we 
should take in consideration the relative value of this shares ownership for directors. 
Some authors argue that director pay is generally influenced by the CEO, 
which may diminish board independence (Kosnik, 1990; Bebchuck and Fried, 2004) . 
ln the same vein, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) concluded that: 
" ... entrenched CEOs use their position to influence board of director 
compensation to consist more of cash than of equity-based awards, which reduces 
the incentives for directors to monitor the CEO's actions" (2004, p.522) . 
Conversely, Board ownership dollar value could constitute a powerful 
incentive for outside directors to exercise their authority over the management given 
that their interests are more aligned with those of their shareholders (Bhagat et al , 
1999), especially if their stakes in the company represent for them a substantial 
direct investment at risk (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003; 2006). Thus, we computed the 
NED Ownership relative value variable by dividing the monetary value of the 
acquirers' non-executive directors purchased and held shares on the total 
compensation they receive during the acquisitions year. Monetary value of 
purchased and held shares is measured by multiplying the number of shares actually 
received and paid by non-executive directors during the acquisition year by the 
average stock priee during the same year. Total compensation includes generally the 
annual cash retainer, meeting fees, stock options, restricted stocks and deferred 
share units. 
The second dimension in our madel is Board Credibility and it refers to the 
availability of experienced and competent directors with a deep understanding of firm 
activities, contexts and specifie issues (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003; Allaire , 2008; 
Allaire and Firsirotu , 2009) . To measure this construct, six indicators were adopted: 
(1) Board general occupational diversity (Boarddiv); (2) Board lndustry-specific 
relative experience (BoardSpecExp); (3) Board and Directors Busyness (BoardBus) 
and (OverBoarded); 
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Board occupational background diversity (Boarddiv) 
Board with diversified backgrounds, expertise and knowledge are more likely 
to enhance board credibility as defined by Allaire and Firsirotu (2003; 2009). For 
Simons et al (1999, p. 663) , functional backgrounds diversity variables possess the 
advantage of capturing conjointly experience, information, and perspectives relevant 
to cognitive tasks performed by the team members. Directors with different 
backgrounds bring different perspectives and opinions, complementary skills and 
knowledge (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), which facilitates advice and counsel 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hillman and Dalziel , 2003) . Yet, some researchers 
argue that diversity could constitute a double-edged sword (Milliken and Martins , 
1996) and while it provides boards with valuable resources it could induce "higher 
levels of conflicts , interaction difficulties and lower levels of integration" (Hillman and 
Dalziel , 2003, p.497-498) . 
Nevertheless, Murphy and Mclntyre (2007) pointed out that contexts are 
important for valuing the positive effect of diversity: 
"C/early, when discussing diversity, the context is the central question, and with 
high/y unstructured, camp/ex issues to tackle, BOO may benefit from being 
comprised of demographical/y and ski// diverse individua/s representing various 
value positions and sources of expertise" (2007, p.215). 
Thus, we could argue that in the context of M&A, Board of directors with 
diversified occupational backgrounds will contribute better in choosing successful 
acquisitions than those composed by directors having similar profiles . 
To measure Boarddiv variable, we considered eleven occupational categories 
that is, CEO, other executive functions, retired CEO, other retired executive, lawyer, 
banker, consultant, chartered accountant (or CGA, CMA}, academie, former 
politician and former state functionary (civil servants) . We then computed the 
heterogeneity index proposed by Blau (1977) , that is, a variation the Herfindahl 
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index. This indicator is widely used to measure group diversity in social sciences 
(Finkelstein an Hambrick, 1996; Carpenter, 2002). 
The heterogeneity index (Hl) was obtained by using the following 
calculations: 
k 
HI= 1-Œ (ni!N)2) 
i= 
Where: 
ni= number of directors composing the occupational category (i) 
N= number of directors composing the entire board . 
k= number of occupatuonal categories 
ln arder to eliminate the effect of extreme values, and to ensure a normal 
distribution for the BoardDiv variable, the third step consisted in creating a modified 
index from the one used by Finkelstein and Hambrick, by taking the inverse of Hl 
computed above (1/HI) and substracting it from the highest value in the sample. 
Higher values of BoardDiv will indicate therefore a heterogeneous and weil 
diversified board. 
Board relative lndustry-Specific Experience (BoardSpecExp) 
ln addition to Board members' background diversity, Board credibility is 
largely attributable to the previous experiences of its members. lndeed, the nature 
and the level of human capital - defined as a set of abilities, expertise and knowledge 
acquired by an individual form previous work experience (Bailey and Helfat, 2003)-
that directors bring to the board will largely affect the board credibility, especially if 
directors' previous experiences are industry-specific. These lndustry specifie 
experiences refer to an individual director's knowledge about an industry specifie 
competitive conditions, consumer needs, technology and investment requirements , 
regulations, suppliers and other external stakeholders (Bailey and Helfat, 2003; Kor 
and MisanGyi, 2008). ln a recent empirical study, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2008) 
concluded that: 
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"Prior experiential knowledge of the industry helps outside directors to deve/op a 
sophisticated and tacit understanding of the current and future industry dynamics, 
which in turn enables them to better eva/uate manager's strategie proposa/s." (2008: 
p.17-18). 
Furthermore, Directors' experiences are shaped by the industry context and 
specifie strategie decisions in which these directors were involved in the past 
(Biuedorn et al , 1994). Thus, common and similar or highly related industry 
experience may provide directors with accurate and shared cognitive assumptions 
about the future tendencies in the industry and the course of action and alternatives 
needed to be taken (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), including the nature of 
acquisitions the firm should engage in (Hitt and Tyler, 1991 ). 
Moreover, outside directors with relevant experiences are, not only, more 
likely to give better advice to managers, but are also more able to contest objectively 
management proposais (Carter and Lorsh, 2004) . Another study by Kroll et al (2007) 
reported that advice and counsel of outside directors with industry experience affect 
positively firm performance. However, and as noted by McDonald et al (2008) : 
" ... extant literature has given little consideration of the performance implications 
of directors ' experience", moreover, they argue that " .. . there have been few, if any, 
systematic efforts to conceptually elaborate this basic notion by delineating the 
nature and sources of directors ' expertise, and by describing how that expertise 
might be linked to the relative success of specifie firm strategie actions." (2008: 
p.1156). 
Here again, we hope that the present thesis will add some additional insights 
on this important issue of outside directors' previous experience and how it will 
enhance board credibility. 
ln arder to measure outside directors ' industry experience, previous research 
used the average number of managerial positions directors previously held in the 
same industry as the focal firm (Kor and Misangyi, 2008; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2008) . However, Kor and Misangyi (2008) noted that "Y et the amount of advice and 
guidance that managers need from outsiders is likely to be a function of the 
avai/ability of industry experience in the top management team" (p. 1347) and given 
- ----------·----·- --- ------
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that credibility deals with questions such as "Do members of the management team 
believe that discussions with the board are fruitful, bring new perspectives and 
viewpoints, add value to the decision process? Does management believe the board 
members real/y understand the business, its key metrics, and its success factors? 
(Allai re and Firsirotu , 2009: p.253-254), it is more fruitful to adopt a measure that 
captures the relative experience of the board vis-à-vis its management's experience. 
lndeed, we can logically infer that boards with more or equivalent collective industry-
specific experience, when compared to their management team, will possess more 
credibility than other boards with members having less or little industry experiences 
than their managers. 
To measure Board relative industry-specific experience (BoardSpecExp) , we 
used an alternative measure to the one used in the recent studies by Kor and 
Misangyi (2008) and Kor and Sundaramurthy (2008) , by dividing the average of the 
number of previous managerial and Board positions held by outside directors in 
other firms having the same 2-digit NAIC industry code as the acquirer by the 
average of the number of the CEO and the three top managers' previous positions 
held in the focal firm and/or in other firms having the same 2-digit NAIC code as the 
acquirer. Therefore, values higher than (or equal) to one will indicates more credible 
boards while values less than one will indicates a less credible board . 
Board and directors Busyness: (BoardBus) and (OverBoarded) 
While the BoardSpecExp variable defined above aims to measure the effect 
of board collective relative experience in discriminating between successful and 
unsuccessful acquisitions, it would implicitly suppose that experienced directors 
holding at the same time multiple seats in different firms in the focal firm 's industry 
would have a positive effect on firm decision making processes and, ultimately, on 
firm performance. However, the effect of busy directors (i.e. directors having multiple 
directorships) on fi rm performance is not clear, and extant research have yielded 
contradictory conclusions. 
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We have included two variables that would factor for the effect of board 
busyness on the success or the failure of acquisitions. lndeed, there is a 
disagreement between researchers on the suitable way to measure directors' 
busyness. Thus, to test directors' busyness effect on firm performance, Ferris et al 
(2003) used the variable Directorships by directors measured as the total number of 
directorships held across ali the directors on the Board divided by board size, while 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) proposed a dichotomous indicator that take the value of 
one if 50% or more of the board's outside directors are busy (i .e. holding three or 
more board seats) , and zero otherwise. The latter researchers showed that their 
indicator highlighted a stronger link between busy Boards and firm performance than 
the use of the average number of board seats as proposed by Ferris et al (2003) . 
Finally, Harris and Shimizu (2004) used the number of busy directors (i.e. holding 
four, five, six or more board seats) divided by total board size to measure board 
busyness. For the purpose of our study we chose to use two other complementary 
indicators to account for the effect of multiple directorships: 
(1) Board Busyness (Boardbus) : a dichotomous variable as the one used by Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) as described above; 
(2) Director Busyness (Overboarded): a continuous variable as the one used by 
Harris and Shimizu (2004) , that is, the number of busy directors holding 5 or more 
board seats divided by the total board size. 
The third dimension in our model is Board monitoring capabilities. 
Organizational capabil ities could be considered as the outcome of complex, team 
based productive activities that cohesively integrate the knowledge of many 
individual specialists (Grant, 1996). Furthermore, Governance capabilities was 
defined as the firm specifie and difficult to imitate, corporate governance processes 
and board capacity to use the governance resources and competences available to it 
in arder to achieve a competitive advantage by, at least, lowering effectively the 
agency costs, and ideally, by contributing to the enhancement of the firm 's value 
creation . We may consider, therefore, that Board monitoring capability, as a subset 
of governance capabilities, is the outcome of complex, team based control activities 
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that integrate the knowledge of many directors having experience in monitoring 
management, and particularly the CEO, which may contribute to agency costs 
reduction. The efficient use of financial and strategie information along with setting a 
calibrated compensation system for management, which constitute the third and the 
fourth pillars of the value creating governance perspective (Allaire and Firsirotu , 
2003; 2004; 2009) are highly improved by the existence of efficient Board monitoring 
capabilities, which ultimately contribute to create more value for firms that use them 
saliently. 
Committees tend to play an important role in corporate governance (Losrsh 
and Maclver, 1989, Canyon and Peck, 1998). ln addition to help the board overcome 
the constraints of time and complexity (Waldo, 1985; Lorsh and Maclver, 1989); 
committees deal with specifie demains and tend to develop specialized expertise 
(Vafeas, 1999). ln line with those considerations, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) 
observed that: 
" ... a good deal of the detai/ed examination of issues is done by board 
members at the committee leve!." (p.55) . and "an ever increasing amount of the 
important work of the Board of directors is done by committees of the board. lndeed, 
being chair of the audit, compensation and the nomination committee involves the 
acceptance of great responsibilities and with the increasing regulations of companies 
an enormous amount of time" (2005: p.91 ). 
Moreover, Monks and Minow (2004) stated th at: 
"ln developed nations, it is fair/y weil accepted that many board functions are 
carried out by board committees. For example, a nominating committee, an audit 
committee, and a remuneration committee are recommended in Australia, Belgium, 
France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. " 
Furthermore, a recent survey by Korn/Ferry (2008) on Canadian boards 
indicates that the compensation and the governance/nomination committees were 
present in almost 93% of the 287 Canadian companies included in their survey, 
while the audit committee is present in ali the surveyed companies. As for Charan 
(2005) : 
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"Board committees play two vital roles: the first is to dig into camp/ex subject 
matters, and the second is to keep the rest of the board up to speed in those 
areas ... Committees bring recommendations to the full board, but the full board is the 
true decision maker" (p.59) . 
On the other hand, and in relation to empirical evidence on the effect of board 
committees on performance, Finegold et al (2007) noted in their extensive review of 
the literature on board committees that: 
"With few notable exceptions (Xie et al, 2003 and Park and Shin, 2004) there 
has been very little work examining the operation and effect of board committees." 
(p.872) , and that: "There has been very little analysis of how committee structure and 
operation relate to firm performance" (p. 873). 
Audit and compensation committees are considered as the most important 
mechanisms of the Board monitoring function (Vance, 1983; Braiotta and Sommer, 
1987; Kesner, 1988; LeBlanc and Gillies, 2005, Monks and Minow, 2004 ). Th us, we 
have used resources possessed by these two important committees to proxy the 
Board monitoring capability construct: (1) Audit committee resources (Auditcom); (2) 
Compensation committee resources (Compcom). 
Finally, and following our discussion in section 2.1.2.3 on the specifie 
governance features of family firms, we have also assessed if the presence of a 
controlling family member on the board enhances its monitoring capability and 
contribute therefore to discriminate significantly the successful acquirers from the 
unsuccessful ones. Thus, three other variables will be computed for that purpose: 
FamilyControl; Dua/Shares and FamilyBoard. 
Audit committee resources (Auditcom) 
From an agency perspective, audit committees oversight and intermediate 
the fi rm reporting activities that involve management and external auditors (Klein , 
2002) , which is supposed to enhance the integrity of firm 's financial reporting 
(DeAngelo, 1981 ; Daily, 1996; Ellstrand et al , 1999). 
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Recent corporate governance reforms require audit committees to include 
members having financial literacy (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) . Furthermore, 
acquisitions rely heavily on accounting information for evaluating the potential of 
acquiring a target (Harrisson et al, 1991 ). 
During the 1990's, research on Audit committees were interested on how the 
existence and the voluntary adoption of audit committees affected the quality of firm 
financial reporting while during the 2000's, the focus was more on the effect of some 
characteristics, such as the expertise and background of committee members on 
firm financial reporting (Turely and Zaman, 2007) and on earnings management 
(Davidson et al , 2005; Vafeas, 2005, Koh et al , 2007). 
Some prior research reported the existence of a significant association 
between the accounting and financial expertise of the Audit committee members and 
the firm's earnings quality and smaller discretionary current accruals (Xie et al , 2003; 
Dhaliwal et al , 2006) , while others found that the appointment of a financial expert 
with accounting-related experience to the audit committee was associated with a 
positive cumulative abnormal returns (DeFond et al , 2005) . To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no published study that investigated the effect of audit 
committee member's expertise on acquisition success or on post-acquisition 
performance. 
However, we may suppose that audit committees with members having 
significant financial and accounting backgrounds and previous acquisition 
experience, developed through their participation in the boards of other firms, will 
enhance the board capability to actively monitor management decisions, including 
those related to acquisitions. 
This indicator was measured as the number of the focal firm's audit 
committee members having financial , accounting and acquisition experience (The 
latter wi ll be determined by examining each director's previous occupations and if he 
was in function when one of the firm involved made at least one acquisition) divided 
by the number of directors forming the entire committee. 
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Compensation committee resources (CompCom) 
According to the agency perspective, effective monitoring by boards should 
lead to the alignment of the management and shareholder interests through 
adequate pay packages and compensation policies (Jensen and Meckling , 1976; 
Fisher, 1986; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Zajac, 1990). Although it is the full 
board that ultimately decides on how management will be compensated, it generally 
relies on the recommendations submitted by its compensation committee to make its 
final decision (Lorsh and Maclver, 1989; O'Reilly et al , 1988; Daily et al , 1998; 
Vafeas, 2000; Bebchuck and Fried, 2006; Canyon, 2006; Canyon et al , 2009). 
lndeed, Main et al (2008) noted that: 
"Whereas remuneration committees were once se en mere/y as an arms-length 
administrative deviee to ensure an acceptable degree of integrity in the setting of 
executive reward, they are now seen as key agents in the strategie human resource 
management process of choosing a remuneration package and arranging that it is 
calibrated in a way that ensures that it motivates the executive towards those 
decisions and actions necessary to best deliver the company's chosen strategy" 
(2008: p.227) . 
Thus, while the board decides ultimately on the top management 
remuneration , the compensation committee remains the king pin of the management 
pay process. ln the light of the previous discussion, it seems meaningful to assess 
the monitoring capability of boards by examining the structure of these committees 
and by assessing the quality of the resources and processes embedded in them . 
Several studies attempted to identify the determinants of an effective 
compensation committee and how some characteristics such as the composition of 
these committees, their size or their structure affect the level or the nature of the 
management pay (Daily et al , 1998; Newman and Mazes, 1999; Anderson and 
Bizjak, 2000; Cyert et al, 2002; Sapp, 2008; Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
For the agency theorists, compensation committee members should be 
independent from the CEO and should have sufficient power to monitor managers 
through the pay mechanism (Core et al, 2003; Chatterjee et al, 2003; Jensen et al, 
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2004) , while the managerial power theory advanced by Bebchuck and Fried (2004) 
argues that CEOs tend to neutralize this influence through their intervention (directly 
or indirectly) in the directors' selection and nomination processes, especially when 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Daily et al , 1998; Benchuck et al , 2002 ; 
Bebchuck and Stiles, 2004) . Thus , directors appointed during the incumbent CEO 
period could be more influenced by the latter than those appointed before this period 
(Wade et al , 1990). Compensation committee with a large proportion of directors 
appointed during the incumbent CEO mandate is, therefore , likely less independent 
(even if there is no material relationship between the directors and the firm or its 
CEO, as suggested by the recent governance reforms) from the CEO and will poorly 
monitor him through adequate compensation packages (Daily et al , 1998; Bebchuck 
and Fried , 2004) . 
Given that our interest focuses on the governance factors that may 
discriminate between successful and unsuccessful acquisitions, assessing 
compensation committee effectiveness commands a further discussion on how the 
different compensation packages ' components granted to top management affect the 
post-acquisition performance. lndeed, the committee members are those who 
recommended the remuneration package of the CEO, which provide him with the 
incentives to look for acquisitions and to make deals. lndeed, Datta et al (2001) 
concluded that CEO's with compensation packages characterized by low equity 
based components provided fewer incentives for managers to make value-
maximizing decisions and induced them to acq uire low-growth targets with high 
prem iums. 
For Hartzell et al (2004) , managers rece1v1ng higher proportions of equity 
based compensation are more likely to make successful acquisitions than those who 
receive less equity based compensation, while Williams et al (2008) concluded their 
recent survey of the literature on the link between managers incentives and 
acquisitions by asserting that: 
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"Aithough the resu/ts are mixed, it also appears that managers with higher 
equity based compensation make better decisions regarding the wealth of 
shareholders and the merger strategy of the firm" and that " ... Long term post-merger 
performance may be a function of managerial compensation" (2008: p.339) . 
ln a more recent Canadian study by Bodolica and Spraggon (2009) on the 
relationship between the adoption of Long term incentives plans (L TIPs), and some 
other protection components (employment agreements, severance provision and 
golden parachutes clause) and post-acquisition performance, the authors argue that 
while the long term incentives plans (excluding stock options and restricted shares) 
push managers to make less risky acquisition decisions, the adoption of protection 
clauses tend to encourage them to do so , suggesting a substitution between the two 
components , which may lead boards to implement significant protection components 
on pre-acquisition period and moreL TIPs on the post-merger period. 
Although the authors attempted to identify the effect of acquisitions on the 
adoption of the one or the other form of compensation , which constitutes the reverse 
of what the present thesis aims to investigate, their conclusions imply however that 
the adoption , during the pre-acquisition period , of a balanced pay package in terms 
of bath the LTIPs and the protection components could lead to a more balanced 
behaviour of the CEO and induce him to take decisions based on a reasonable level 
of risk, that of the equilibrium between his persona! downside risk and upside 
potential incentives. Hence, we could argue that to induce the CEO to undertake a 
value creating deal , his pay package should contain a significant amount of the 
L TPI 's components along with some protection features. lndeed, according to 
Milkovich et al (2007) (drawn from Bodolica and Spraggon, 2009), around 40% of the 
executive compensation in Canada is granted in the form of LTIPs. Buck et al , 
(2003) defined Long term performance plans as grants of cash or shares (usually the 
latter) with performance conditions. 
Nevertheless, the problem with LITPs resides in the nature of the metrics 
used to assess the conditional performance. lndeed, if the company base its 
conditions on the Earnings per Share (EPS) growth on a short period (less than 
three years), the manager will be induced to maximize stock priee rather than 
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sustained firm economie value added (Allaire and Firsirotu , 2004; 2009) and as 
Allaire and Firsirotu (2009) pointed out: 
"White investors and boards of directors general/y believed that 
compensation systems are good at creating short-term value for shareholders, they 
saon realized that incentive systems are very tricky to design; even in the best of 
cases, compensation programs cou/d enrich managers fortuitously and trigger exit 
strategies that are optimal for them but disruptive to the company" (p.91 ). 
Some authors distinguish L TIPs from stock options and restricted shares 
(Kumar and Sopariwala , 1992; Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Burns and Kedia , 2006) 
arguing that while L TIPs reward managers when accounting performance goals are 
achieved in a period of three to five years, options could be exercised regardless of 
firm performance . Moreover, Kumar and Sopariwala , (1992) assert that: 
" ... Compensation from performance plans, being more direct/y linked to 
managerial performance than stock options plans, encourages managers to redirect 
their attention toward /ong-term profitability" (p. 563) . 
Therefore, we should expect that firms having a significant portion of the CEO 
pay tied to long-term accounting or economie performance (ROE, ROA, EVA, Sales 
growth ... etc.) during the acquisition year will induce managers to make more 
successful acquisitions. 
On the other hand, Directors' power and willingness to monitor top 
management could also come from their professional profile, business experience, 
compensation and tenure within the board (Westphal, 1998; Vance, 1983; Vafeas, 
2003). Thus, committee members with large shareholding interests are likely to be 
more motivated to monitor tightly the management pay (Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999; Cyert et al , 2002, Canyon and He, 2004). 
ln addition, committee members with extensive experience in setting 
management remuneration will enhance the monitoring quality of the compensation 
committee (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Fama, 1983; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; 
Harford, 2003). Thus, a large proportion of the compensation committee members 
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that have (or had) also a seat in other firms ' compensation committees will more 
likely enhance the quality and the effectiveness of the incumbent firm compensation 
committee. 
Finally, Director Seniority could also add sorne effectiveness to the 
compensation process (Vafeas, 2003, Sun and Cahan , 2009) suggesting that a 
larger proportion of senior directors (i.e. being for a long period of time as a director 
in general) will enhance its ability to monitor managers through the pay processes 
and packages. 
Through the lens of the previous discussion , we may expect that an effective 
compensation committee will contribute to the board monitoring capabilities , and 
therefore contri bute to induce managers in seeking successful acquisitions , if it is 
characterized by: 
1- A majority of members appointed before the incumbent CEO takes his 
position; 
2- A current pay package of the CEO that comprise a substantial amount 
tied to the long term firm accounting and economie performance 
achievements, which signais the soundness of the committee's 
propositions and its effective influence on the pay process; 
3- The existence of sorne protection components such as severance 
provisions, employments agreements and golden parachute clauses; 
4- Members having large shareholding interests ; 
5- Directors sitting (or have set in the past) in other firms' compensation 
committees; 
6- A majority of senior members with experience as board directors in 
general. 
ln our attempt to assess the monitori ng effectiveness of the compensation 
committee, we have used a composite score following a similar approach to the one 
used by Sun and Cahan, (2009), but it differs in term of the nature of the 
components to be used in the computation of the final score. lndeed, and on the 
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basis of the arguments presented in the previous discussion, the second composite 
measure that reflects the effectiveness of the board monitoring capability through the 
quality of its compensation committee, CompCom score, will be computed for each 
acquirer as follows : 
1- A score of 1 will be assigned if the number of directors appointed to the 
compensation committee during the incumbent CEO period divided by the 
total committee members is less than the sample median value of this 
measure, otherwise the score is O. 
2- A score of 1 will be assigned if the value of the L TIP component linked to long 
term accounting and economie performance measures such as ROA, ROE, 
EVA, Sales Growth , ... etc. (Excluding short term bonuses, salary, stock 
options , restricted shares and other components based on share priee 
performance) divided by the CEO total pay is greater than the sample median 
value of that measure, otherwise the score is 0; 
3- A score of 1 will be assigned if the CEO pay package of the acqu1nng 
company contains at least one of the following protection components: 
severance provision(s) , employment agreement(s) or golden parachutes 
clause (s) otherwise the score is O. If the company use at least one of the 
aforementioned protection components while having a score of 0 in #2 
above, then the score for the present variable will be O. 
4- A score of 3 will be assigned if the number of shares actually purchased and 
held by the committee members divided by the total shares actually 
purchased and held by the entire board members is greater than the sample 
median value of that measure, otherwise the score is 0; 
5- A score of 3 will be assigned if the number of committee members sitting on 
other firms ' committees divided by the total committee members is greater 
than the sample median value of this measure, otherwise the score is 0; 
6- A score of 1 will be assigned if the number of committee members having at 
least 10 years ' experience as directors in general is greater th an the sample 
median value of this measure, otherwise the score is O. 
The final composite measure of the CompCom variable will be computed as 
the sum of the six individual scores. Thus, higher values of the CompCom will 
indicate a higher qualitative contribution of the compensation committee in 
-~------
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enhancing the board monitoring capabilities, and consequently , its ability to induce 
managers to make successful deals. 
As discussed in section 2.1.2.3 of the present thesis , the use of dual class 
share by family controlled firm is common in Canada (Gadhoum, 2006) . While some 
studies found that firms using dual class shares, cross shareholding or pyramidal 
structures tend to perform more than the widely held fi rms, we may expect that the 
use of dual class share will contribute to enhance the board monitoring capability 
(Ben Amar and André, 2006) if the controlling shareholder is also a member of the 
board . Thus, family firms with concentrated ownership, using dual class shares and 
having a controlling shareholder or his relatives on the board will create a monitoring 
propensity with regard to how management chose and evaluate firm acquisitions 
deals (Carney, 2005) . 
Three other dummy variables were used therefore to proxy the board 
monitoring capability : (1) (Fami/yControl) take the value of one when there is a family 
controlling more than 10% of firm voting shares and zero otherwise , (2) Family 
control with dual shares (Dual Shares) that takes 1 when the controlling family use 
also dual class shares and zero otherwise and (3) Family control with a 
representative on the board (FamilyBoard) that takes 1 if the controlling family has at 
least one of its members sitting on the company board of directors and zero 
otherwise. 
The fourth and last dimension is the Board strategie capabilities. lndeed, and 
as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the board of directors- according to the value 
creating perspective, the stewardship theory, the resource based view, the resource 
dependence and the institutional theories- is called to play an important and active 
role in firm strategy. Furthermore, the Board of directors should directly participate in 
the resource allocation decisions (Judge and Zeithaml , 1992; Shmidt and Brauer, 
2006) and while these decisions reflects generally intended or unintended fi rm 
strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Nada and Bower, 1996), it wi ll also reflect the 
board capability added by the firm strategy making decisions. Board strategie 
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capability is generally embedded within firm processes, which are difficult to observe 
and measure by simple board attributes. 
However, using relevant determinants that proved to contribute and positively 
affect group dynamics and strategy making processes could overcome this limitation. 
Thus, relying on previous studies using fine grained demographie dimensions based 
on social structural analysis (Pfeffer, 1983; Westphal , 1998) will help us to proxy the 
board strategie capability and its impact on the firm ability to select, negotiate and 
complete potentially successful acquisitions. Accordingly , we used six indicators to 
measure this construct: ( 1) Functional distance between the Board and The CEO 
(CEO-Board FuncDist) ; (2) Educational similarity between the Board and the CEO 
(CEO-Board EducSim) ; (3) Age distance between the Board and the CEO (CEO-
Board Age distance) ; (4) Lone Founder (LoneFound); (5) Lone Founder Chairman 
(LoneFoundChair); and (6) Board heterogeneity tenure (Boardten) . 
Functional distance between the CEO and the board of directors (CEO-Board 
FuncDist) 
To estimate this indicator, we will use the same procedure as described in 
Westphal and Zajac (1995). However, and instead of using a composite continuous 
indicator of similarity integrating functional background, age and education , we will 
adopt three separate indicators to measure functional distance, educational level 
similarity and age distance. 
The first step for computing the functional distance between Board members 
and the CEO consisted in creating categorical measures of functional backgrounds. 
Th us, three core categories were considered : (1) output functions: marketing and 
sales; (2) throughput functions : operations, R&D and engineering; (3) support 
functions: finance, accounting, primarily law, human resource and other 
administrative functions. Next, a categorical measure of functional backgrounds of 
each director is created and coded 1 if the director had primary experience in 
marketing and sales, 2 if the director had primary experience in operations, R&D or 
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engineering and 3 if the director primary experience is in finance , accounting , law, 
human resources or ether administrative functions. When a director has experience 
in two functions falling in different categories, he was classified in the one in which 
he had the most experience. The same procedure is applied to the CEO of each 
acquiring firm . Data on this first measure was hand collected for about 1084 directors 
and CEOs by using multiple sources such as The Financial Post Directory of 
Directors Database, web multi-engine research using the Copernic Agent 
Professional software , Zomminfo.com database, NNDB.com, and Business Week to 
gather, to cross-check and to validate ali the relevant biographical information 
available on a particular persan . 
The second step consisted in creating a dichotomous measure for each 
(Director-CEO) dyad based on the coding realized in the previous step. Thus, 
functional background similarity between a director and the CEO, (CEO-Oirector) 
functional similarity, will be coded 1 if the director and the CEO shared experience in 
the same functional area defined above and 0 otherwise . 
ln the third step we have computed the functional background similarity 
between the CEO and the whole board of directors (CEO-Board) functional similarity, 
as follow: 
(1) For each category of the functional background i (i= Output, throughput or 
support functions ), a proportion of (CEO-Director) dyads sharing the ith 
category will be determined (i.e Pfbi (CEO-Dir)=l: (CEO-Director) dyads 
sharing the ith Category)/ total of dyads); 
(2) A heterogeneity index similar to the Herfindhal measure will be computed as 
follow: 
CEO-Board functional Similarity index = l: (Pfbl)2 
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The final step consisted in computing the CEO-Board Functional distance 
variable, to be used in our empirical models, which was obtained by subtracting the 
(CEO-Board) functional similarity computed in the previous step from the highest 
value in the sample. Thus, higher values indicate higher distance, which is 
hypothesized as being a source of the board ability to objectively evaluate CEO 
decisions and challenge strategies proposed by management, including the 
decisions about acquisitions (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Westphal , 1998). 
Educational Similarity between the CEO and the board of directors (CEG-
Board EducSim) 
As in the case of the Board-CEO functional similarity, the first step in 
computing the Educational Similarity between Board of directors and the CEO 
consisted in defining a categorical measures coded as (1 ), when the director has 
less than a bachelor's degree; (2) if he has less than a master degree; (3) if he has 
less than a doctoral degree and (4) if he owns a doctoral degree. A similar measure 
will be created for each acquirer's CEO. 
For educational level similarity, the same procedure as the one used for the 
CEO-Board functional similarity will be performed to determine the CEO-Board 
educational similarity index: 
CEO-Board educational Similarity index = :L (Peb,Y 
Where: 
Pebi = the proportion of CEO-Board dyads sharing the sa me educational level i 
i= less !han a bachelor degree, less !han a master degree, less !han a doctora l degree or a doctoral 
degree. 
lnstead of using the educational distance as, for functional background, we 
used the CEO-Board educational Similarity index as the variable to be used in our 
empirical models. lndeed, and given that our categories reflect the level of education 
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rather that the academie disciplines, we consider that educational level similarity , 
rather than educational level distance, will have a positive effect on strategie making 
decisions through the positive influence on the CEO (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; (see Westphal and Zajac, 1995); Judge and Ferris, 
1993; Tsui and O'Reilly, 1989 
Age Distance between the CEO and the board of directors (CEO-Board Age 
Distance) 
For age distance, the index was computed as the Eucl idian distance measure 
commonly used in research on organizational demography (Westphal and Zajac, 
1995; Westphal , 1998; O'Reilly et al , 1989): 
Age distance (CEO-Board) 
= 
(-Y,) 
[l:(CEO age-Board member i age)/number of board members] 
ln arder to assess the effect of the family firms , prevalent in the Canadian 
context , we used two additional binary variables to proxy for board strategie 
capabilities, which we expect to discriminate in a significant way successful from 
unsuccessful acquisitions: (1) Lone founder variable (LoneFound) which take the 
va lue of one when the founder sits on the board of the family fi rm and in which no 
one of his relatives is involved in the firm top management or as a board member 
and zero otherwise ; (2) Lone founder Chai rman variable (LoneFoundChair) which 
takes the value of one when the firm has a founder as the Chairman of the board 
with no other relatives involved in the firm top management or as board members , 
and zero otherwise. 
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Board heterogeneity tenure (Boardten) 
This indicator will be measured by the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation divided by the mean) of the number of years served by the non-executive 
board members (Johnson et al , 1993), which could be formulated as follow: 
Boardten =(cr of board tenure 1 board tenure mean) 
Higher values indicate higher levels of heterogeneous tenure and therefore a 
higher activeness of the board . 
4.3.2 Dependent variables 
Our first dependent variable to be used for the conceptual madel presented in 
figure 5 (depicted with plain arrows) is the probability to select successful 
acquisitions (A cquSuccess). lndeed, efficient resource allocation decision processes 
will lead to select successful acquisitions and to maximize the chances for achieving 
post-merger performance and create value for the acquirers' shareholders (Sirower, 
1997). However, what constitute a successful acquisition is not always that simple. 
As noted in chapter 3, post-merger performance is puzzling and the evidence 
on the post-merger performance of the acquirer yielded highly mixed results . 
Furthermore, the Canadian evidence seems to be somewhat different from the one 
that stems from US studies, suggesting a slight positive and significant post-
acquisition performance for Canadian acquirers. ln addition , the use of short-te rm 
and long term perspectives, along with the use of market based or accounting based 
measures, rendered difficult the comparisons between resu lts and the adoption of 
the most suitable one. Consequently, and rather than linking direct ly the level of the 
post-performance outcomes to the governance attributes, we will assess which 
governance attributes are more likely to discriminate successful acqu isitions from the 
unsuccessful ones. 
Furthermore, and as discussed previously, retention and divestment of a 
recently acquired firm reflects acquisition success or failure (Porter, 1987; Bergh, 
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1997; Boat, 1992; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). Others authors reported that 
divestment of recently acquired targets is generally considered by the business 
community and the stock markets as a strategie failure (Alexander et al , 1984; 
Montgomery et al , 1984). 
Another indicator that may also signal the success or failure of an acquisition 
is its post-merger goodwill write-off. lndeed, goodwill amounts reflect the difference 
between the fair value (i.e. originally the priee paid for them) of the assets acquired 
and their net book value. Under the accounting standard (SFAS 142), the 
amortization of Goodwill was replaced by the annual impairment method, forcing 
managers to review their estimates of the Goodwill and to disclose ali the information 
related to this evaluation. When an acquisition is no longer worth what the acquirer 
has paid for it, managers should proceed to the reduction of the previous estimate of 
its Goodwill. Thus, the annual goodwill impairment test highlights whether an 
acquisition is still supporting its purchase value, otherwise , auditors will put pressure 
on the acquirer to write down the value of these intangible asset. Significant change 
in the value of the goodwill related to an acquisition will signal overpayment and 
winner's curse problems (Ruback, 1983; Giliberto and Varaiya , 1989) and could be 
used to assess the success or the failure of an acquisition (Henning and Shaw, 
2003) . However, when the acquirer does not divest the target and does not 
undertake significant goodwill write-offs in the years following the acquisition, it 
should indicate that the acquisition is performing more or less as anticipated. 
lndeed, several past and recent studies used profitability measures, such as 
ROA, to estimate the post-merger abnormal performance related to an acquisition 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Cosh et al , 2006) or to classify an acquisition as a 
successful or an unsuccessful one (H itt et al, 1998). ROA is widely used in strategie 
management research (Bettis, 1981 , Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt, 1991; Allai re and Firsirotu, 1993; 2004) and it is highly correlated with 
other return measures (Bettis, 1981 ; Sarton and Gordon, 1988). Furthermore, Return 
measures such as ROA are more suited to capture the effect of private synergistic 
cash flows associated with acquisitions (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al , 1991 ), which , 
according to Barney (1988), may exist "when a target is worth more for a bidder than 
168 
it is to any other bidders" (p.74) and when " ... other bidding firms will be unable to 
duplicate the unique/y valuable combined cash flow of one bidder and targets when 
the relatedness between bidder and targets stems from some non-imitable assets or 
skil/s contra/led by this bidding firm (p. 76). 
To estimate the ROA-adjusted measure of an acquisition success, we will 
proceed as follow: 
First, a pro-forma pre-acquisition performance (ROApre i,t) of each 
transaction in the sample will be determined for the target and the acquirer 
for the three years prior to the acquisition: 
ROApre i,t = [Acquirer's NOPAT/Acquirer's Employed Assets]*[Acquirer's Economie 
Assets/(Acquirer's economie assets + Target's economie assets)]+[Target's NOPAT/Target's economie 
assets]*[Target's economie assets/(Target's economie assets + Acquirer's economie assets)] 
Or 
Acquirer's NOPAT + Target's NOPAT 
A- ROApre i,t= - Sample average ROApre i,t 
Acquirer's economie assets + Target's economie assets 
Where: 
NOPAT = EBIT*(1-Tax rate) 
Economie Assets = Current assets- Current liabilities + Book value of long-term assets . 
t =the financial year (t= -3 ... ,-1 ). The year of the merger (t=O) is excluded to avoid bias due to additional 
expenses caused by the acquisition and the consolidation timing differences due to the acquisition 
(Healy et al , 1992). 
Second, the acquirer's post-acquisition performance measure (ROApost i,t) 
was computed as: 
Adjusted ROApost i,t = 
Where: 
NOPAT = EBIT*(1 -Tax rate) 
Acquirer's NOPAT 
------------ - Sam pie Average ROApost i,t 
Acquirer's economie assets 
Economie Assets = Current assets- Current liabil ities + Book value of long-term assets. 
t =the financial year (t= 1 .. . ,3) . The year of the merger (t=O) is excluded to avoid bias due to additional 
expenses caused by the acquisition and the consolidation timing differences due to the acquisition 
(Healy et al, 1992). 
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Finally, to qualify as a successful acquisition in terms of ROA, the 3 years 
average of the post-acquisition performance should be higher than the 3 years 
average of the pre-acquisition performance as follow: 
Successful acquisition = 
3 
I A-ROApost i, t 
t= 1 
3 
-1 
I A-ROApre i,t 
t= -3 
> --------------------
3 
Following the above discussion on divestiture, goodwill write-offs and 
acquisition performance based on the ROA measure, we will ultimately classify an 
acquisition as a success if three conditions are fulfilled as follow: 
1- Absence of any divestiture related to the acquisition under study during the 2 
to 5 years after its completion ; 
2- No goodwill write-off related to the acquisition under study that exceeds 10% 
of the original value du ring the 2 to 5 years after the acquisition date; 
3- Ali the acquisitions satisfying the criteria 1 and 2, should respect the following 
additional condition : 
./ The 3 years Average post-acquisition Adjusted-ROA > 3 years 
Average pre-acquisition Adjusted-ROA. 
The dependent variable in the equation (1) related to the first conceptual 
model (plain arrows) in figure 5 presented at the beginning of the present chapter, 
and reflecting the probability of an acquisition success AcqSuccess is therefore a 
dichotomous variable that takes 1 if the three conditions are observed, and 0 
otherwise. 
For the equation (2) in relation to the second conceptual model presented in 
figure 5 (dashed arrows), the dependent variables is the continuous and quantified 
values for the successful acquisitions identified in the previous step, and which 
reflects the improvements in average Adjusted-ROA after the acquisition 
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4.3.3 Control variables 
ln order to control for sorne effects not considered as corporate governance 
components , and reported in the literature as significant factors that may contribute 
in acquisition success or failure , we will consider five control variables: (1) Premium 
Index; (2) Acquirer and Target degree of relatedness ; (3) Tobin 's q gap between the 
acquirer and the target; (4) Acquirer's relative size and (5) The payment mode. 
Premium paid (PremiumPaid) 
As discussed in chapter 3, higher premiums may signal agency problems , 
winner's curse and managerial hubris and could lead to acquisition failure (Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997; Giliberto and Varayia , 1989; Sirower, 1997; Guaughan, 2005) . 
As generally reported in the literature (Haunschild , 1994;Varaiya, 1987; Datta et al , 
2001 ), this indicator will be computed as the priee actually paid by the acquirer 
minus the target's pre-announcement market value (30 days before the 
announcement date) divided by the target's pre-announcement market value (30 
days before the announcement date) . 
Acquirer-Target degree of Relatedness (A-T Relatedness) 
Although mixed , evidence on the significant impact of relatedness on the 
post-merger performance has received sorne degree of support from previous 
research (Healy et al ; 1992; Datta and Puia, 1995; Weech-Maldonado, 2002; 
Lubatkin and O'Neill , 1987; Loree et al , 2000; Flanagan, 1996; Scanlon et al , 1989 ; 
Chatterjee and Lubatkin , 1990). 
To measure this indicator, we will use the same procedures as in Morck et al 
(1990) and Halebl ian and Finkelstein (1999), which consist in developing a 
continuous measure that take in account the degree of relatedness between the 
acquirer and the target and which will be computed as follow: 
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First, for acquirers and targets having multiple 4-digits SIC codes, we have 
classified the main SIC codes in which they operate according to sales importance in 
every business segment. Second, we compared the six principal 4 digit SIC codes 
of the acquirer and the target , and assigned 0 if no 4 digit SIC primary codes 
matched between the acquirer and the target during the year of acquisition and 1 if 
at !east one primary 4 digit SIC codes matches. Third, for those that share at !east 
one primary 4 digit SIC code, a weight was assigned for other matches than the 
primary one, as follow: 1 if 2 digit SIC are shared , 2 if 3-digit SIC are shared , 3 if 4-
digit SIC are shared. Finally, the primary matches were weighted as follow: 2 when 
2-digits primary SIC codes are shared , 4, when 3-digits are shared and 6 when the 
4-digits are shared. 
Tobin 's q gap between the acquirer and the target. (Tobins 'qGap) 
Severa! researchers have found that acquisitions are likely to succeed when 
the acquirer's Tobin' q is higherthan the target's (Lang et al , 1989; Servaes, 1991). 
To measure this indicator we will use the following : 
Tobin 's q Gap= Acquirer Tobin 's q 1 Target Tobin 's q 
Where: 
Tobin 's q =[Market Value of equity +market value of long term debt]l [Book value of equity+ 
book value of long term debtr (Allaire and Firsirotu, 2003) . 
Other control variables identified in the literature as having an impact on 
acquisition performance include: (1) Acquirer's relative size (Asquith et al , 1983; 
Seth , 1990) measured as the target's assets divided by the acquirer's assets at the 
acquisition date and to be designated as (AcquSize) , and (2) PaymentMode 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Ben-Amar and André , 2006) which is computed as 
the fraction of the priee paid by the acquirer in form of common stocks. 
1. As a simplification (or when no market value of debt is available) , the book value of long-term debt is used in both 
numerator and denominator. 
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A summary of ali our dependent, independent and control variables could be 
found in Table A.1 , Appendix A. 
4.4 Empirical models and Statistical Methods 
ln this section , we will present a set of two empirical equations along with a 
discussion of the statistical methods used to test them . The first equation refers to 
the measurements of the conceptual madel presented in figure 5 (plain arrows) . ln 
arder to test the hypotheses H1 , H 2, H 1b, H 3, H5 , H7, H9, H11 , H12 , H14 , H 15, H1 6, H17 , 
H2o and H21 our initial equation was: 
(1) Prob (AcqSuccess;,t)= j3o + j31 Qualsnp; + j32 NEDowm + j33 SignShareholden + 
!34 SignShareholderRep + j3s Bcomp+ j3s NEDownvalue; + j31 Boarddiv; + j3a 
BoardCoi/Exp+ j3g Boardspec; + j31o BoardBus + j3110verBoarded + j312 Auditcom; + j313 
Compcom; + j314 FamilyControl + j31s Dua/Shares + j31s FamilyBoard + j311 CEO-Board 
functional distance + j31s CEO-Board educational similarity + j319 CEO-Board age distance 
+ j32o LoneFound + j321 LoneFoundChair + j322 Boardten; + j3243 Premium; + j324 A-
TRelatedness; + j32s Tobin 'sqGap; + j32s AcqSize; + j321 PaymentMode + ui 
Our research seeks to investigate which governance attributes of our 
theoretical model, may discriminate better between successful and unsuccessful 
acquisitions and how these governance attributes contribute in creating value in the 
case of successful acquisitions. The first empirical madel is based on a limited 
dependent variable AcqSuccess, which takes the va lue of one if the three criteria 
discussed in section 4.2.2 are fulfilled or zero otherwise. To assess how our 
predictor variables discriminate successful acquirers from unsuccessful ones, we 
opted for the binary logistic regression method which is widely used in strategie 
management research (Bowen and Wiersema, 2004) and it is always the first choice 
when a probability is to be estimated (Kieinbaum and Klein, 2002), as in the case of 
acquisition success or failure . 
Accordingly, we consider that the binary logistic regression is an appropriate 
statistical approach for assessing which corporate governance variables may 
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enhance the likelihood of making successful acquisitions rather than unsuccessful 
ones, and also for describing how successful acquirers differ from unsuccessful ones 
on key corporate governance attributes, such as board legitimacy, board credibility 
and board monitoring and strategie capabilities. 
Logistic regression consists in transforming the probability of a given event 
(dependent variable) in order to predict its occurrence by relevant predictor 
variables. Thus , if the probability to make a successful acquisition p is constrained 
between 0 (unsuccessful) and 1 (successful), the corresponding Odd is p 1 (1-p) , or 
the probability of belonging to the successful group divided by the probability of 
belonging to the unsuccessful one. While the probability is constrained between 0 
and 1, Odds could range from 0 to extremely high values. Logistic regression models 
consist then to predict the probability of the occurrence of an event and are 
expressed as the naturallogarithm of the corresponding Odds: 
Ln [p/ (1-p)]= J3o + J31 Xt+ J32X2 ..... .. + J3n Xn 
With 
p= exp (J3o + J31 Xt+ J32X2 ...... + J3n Xn)/ [1 +exp (J3o + J31 Xt+ J32X2 ...... . + J3n Xn)] 
Where: 
p= probability of an event (in our case to make a successful acquisition) 
pl(p-1)=0dds ratio 
X1, X2 .... Xn= predictors variables . 
Hence, our regression equation (1) actually refers to the probability for a case 
of belonging to the successful Acquirers' group and could be expresses as: 
(1) Ln [p(AcqSuccess;,t)/(1- p(AcqSuccess;,t)} = l3o + l31 Qualsnp;+ I32NEDown;+ l33 
SignShareholden + l34 SignShareho/derRep + l3s Bcomp+ l3s NEDownvalue; + l31 
Boarddiv; + l3a BoardCoi/Exp+ l3s Boardspec; + l31o BoardBus + l311 OverBoarded + l312 
Auditcom;+ l313 Compcom;+ l314 FamilyControl + l31s Dua/Shares + l31s FamilyBoard + l311 
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CEO-Board functional distance + J31 a CEO-Board educational similarity + (319 CEO-Board 
age distance + J32o LoneFound + (321 LoneFoundChair + (322 Boardten; + (323 Premium + 
(324A-TRelatedness; + J32s Tobin 'sqGap; + J32s AcqSize; + (321 PaymentMode+ Ui. 
This conceptual model will not be necessarily tested as presented above and 
we may adjust it in order to discard variables with incomplete data, variables heavily 
loading in a common factor or variables that have no real impact on acquisition 
success. The retained model will be presented in the next chapter along with data 
analysis and logistic regression analysis and results . 
ln order to assess the ability of the entire set of independent variables in 
predicting the probability of cases in our sample in belonging to the successful or the 
unsuccessful acquirers ' groups, we will enter in the first step, ali the variables 
simultaneously. However, to identify which set of variables will efficiently discriminate 
between successful and unsuccessful acquirers, we will remove in a manual 
stepwise procedure those variables that have a significant p-values higher than 0,50 
as recommended in (Hosmer and Lameshaw, 2000) to keep only the predictors' 
variables with the highest power of discrimination and those who enhance the model 
fit (While Hosmer and Lameshaw recommend to remove variables with p-values 
higher than 0.25, we prefer 0,50 in order to not remove variables that could 
potentially improve the model) . 
ln standard multiple regression , assumptions such as the linearity between 
the dependent and the independent variables, constant va riance of the error terms, 
independence of the error terms and the normality of the error term s distribution 
shou ld be observed (Hair et al, 1997) . Conversely, logistic regressions remain robust 
even if many assumptions of the regression analysis are violated. lndeed, in logistic 
regressions the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables 
is nonl inear, the error term follows a binomial rather than a normal distribution while 
the variance of the dichotomous variable is not constant (Hair et al , 1997, p.277). 
Finally, the collinearity and multicollinearity among predictor variables, remains 
problematic in that they may reduce discriminatory power of the involved 
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independent variables. As for the case of logistic regressions, and according to Hair 
et al (1997, p.321) "collinearity among the variables can make the discriminatory 
power redundant among variables, but redundancy does not make variables 
irrelevant from a perspective of explanation". 
Nevertheless, and given the presence of several dummy variables used for 
the purpose of the present study, multicollinearity remains an important issue to 
consider in the case of logistic regression models. According to Kutner et al (2005) 
multicollinearity diagnostics could be classified as formai and informai. Informai 
multicollinearity diagnostics include the assessment of the following situations: (1) 
large changes in the estimated regression coefficients when a predictor variable is 
added or deleted; (2) predictor variables coefficients that are non-significant in 
individual test of important independent variables; (3) regression coefficients with 
unexpected algebraic sign ; (4) large coefficients of the pair-wise correlation matrix of 
the predictor variables and (5) wide confidence intervals for the regression 
coefficients of important independent variables (Kutner et al , 2005; p. 407). 
Elsewhere, the authors point out that: "The informa/ methods .. . have important 
limitation. They do not provide quantitative measurement of the impact of 
multicollinearity and they may not identify the nature of the multicolinearity. For 
instance, if predictor variables X1, X2 and X3 have law pairwise correlations, then the 
examination of simple correlation coefficients may not dise/ose the existence of 
relations among groups of predictor variables, such as a high correlation between X1 
and a linear combination of X2 and X3 (Kutner et al , 2005, p. 407) . As for formai 
diagnostic, the use of the Variance inflation factor (VIF) is the widely accepted 
method for detecting the presence of multicollinearity problems. 
The VIF measures how the variances of the estimated regression coefficients 
are inflated in comparison of the coefficients obtained when no linear relation exist 
between the explanatory variables. This formai method is also recommended by Hair 
et al (1997). To assess the multicollinearity among our predictor variables, we will 
analyse the matrix of pair-wise correlations between ali our independent variables to 
identify higher correlations and check the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and specify 
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the eut-off or the tolerance value of this coefficient at the (0.1 0) level , that is, when 
the VIF value is a bave 10 (Hair et al, 1997; Kutner et al , 2005). 
ln arder to deal with potential multicollinearity problems, an array of methods 
is available (see Kutner et al , 2005 for a detailed discussion on the subject) , we 
believe that the most appropriate method would be the use of the principal 
component or factor analysis approaches consisting in identifying underlying latent 
factors between suspected independent variables and use, when required, the 
variable factor scores of these factors in our logistic regression madel instead of the 
original data. 
The second equation refers to the second madel depicted in the figure 5 
(dashed arrows) and aims to assess, for the successful acquirers , the impact of our 
variables on the post-merger performance measured by the continuous positive 
values computed as the difference between the ROApost i,t and the ROApre i,t as 
described in section 4.2.2 above. Thus, the dependent variable in this equation 
becomes the post-acquisition performance, L1 ROAi computed as follow: 
Li ROAi = [ROApost i,(t+1 to t+3)- ROApre i,(t-3 to t-1)}/ ROApre i,(t-3 to t-1) 
For the purpose of testing the madel in figure 5 (relations represented with 
dashing arrows) , and therefore the hypotheses H4, H6, Ha, H10, H13, H1a and H19, we 
consider the following potential equation : 
(2) Li ROAi = l3o + J31 Qualsnp; + l32 NEDowm + l33 SignShareho/den + 
l34 SignShareholderRep + l3s Bcomp + 136 NEDownvalue; + l31 Boarddiv; + 
l3a BoardCoi/Exp+ 139 Boardspec; + l31o BoardBus + l311 OverBoarded + l312 Auditcom; + 
l313 Compcom; + l314 FamilyControl + l31s Dua/Shares + l316 FamilyBoard + l311 CEO-Board 
dist; + l31a LoneFound + {319 LoneFoundChair + l32o Pdivest; + {321 Boardtem + l322 
ManagExp; + l323 PrevExp; + l324 Premium; + l32s A-TRelatedness; + l326 Tobin 'sqGap; + l321 
AcqSize; + l32a PaymentMode + Ui 
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The same procedure applied for the multicollinearity issues will be considered 
for the second equation. However, OLS regression should conform to the conditions 
of the linearity between the dependent and the independent variables, the constant 
variance of the error terms, the independence of the error terms and the normality of 
the error term distribution (Hair et al , 1997). Thus, equation (2) as presented above 
could be modified in arder to keep only variables that observe these conditions and 
those which will appear to be significant discriminators in equation (1 ). Given the 
endogeneity problems that hinder most of the corporate governance models, we will 
proceed with the necessary tests and remediais if such problems are encountered. 
Endogeneity and its treatment will be discussed in the next chapter along with the 
analysis of the OLS models. 
CHAPTER V 
ANAL YSIS AND RESUL TS 
ln this chapter, we will present our sample characteristics and the corresponding 
descriptive statistics, statistical models analysis along with their corresponding 
results and interpretations. 
5.1 Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics 
As described in chapter 4, we ended with a sample of 134 acquisitions that 
fulfilled ali the criteria discussed above. However, at the end of the data collection 
step on the adopted variables, only 133 acquisitions had complete observations on 
ali the variables of interest, which constituted our final sample for testing our 
empirical models. 
5.1.1 Sample characteristics 
Acquirers in our sample are ali Canadian public companies belonging to 
different industries and sectors. We note in Table 5.1 that the majority of the 
acquirers in the sample are mining or oil and gas extraction companies (42, 11 %) 
followed by manufacturing firms (18,80%), Support activities for the mining and oil 
industries and Information and cultural industries (including telecommunications 
firms such as BCE, Rogers communications and Telus) with (9,77%) each. Other 
represented sectors are Professional services, Finance and lnsurance, Construction, 
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Transportation, utilities, Forestry and logging, Management of companies, Arts and 
entertainment, Accommodation, Food services and Retail representing 15% of the 
sample. 
Firms in our sample with a significant shareholder controlling at least 10% of 
the company's voting shares represented about 56% against 44% without any 
significant shareholder (Table 5.2), while these significant shareholders were 
represented in 84% of the cases (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.1 
Distribution by lndustrial sectors in the sample 
lndustrial sectors Frequencies % Cumulative % 
Metal and Ore mining 29 21.80 21.80 
Oil and gas extraction 27 20.30 42.11 
Manufacturing 25 18.80 60.90 
Support activities for mining, oil and gas extraction 13 9.77 70.68 
Information and cultural industries 13 9.77 80.45 
Professional , scientific and technical services 06 4.51 84.96 
Finance and insurance 05 3.76 88.72 
Construction 03 2.26 90.98 
Transportation 03 2.26 93.23 
Utilities 02 1.50 94.74 
Forestry and Logging 02 1.50 96.24 
Management of companies and enterprises 02 1.50 97.74 
Arts , entertainment and recreation 01 0.75 98.50 
Accommodation and food services 01 0.75 99.25 
Retail trade 01 0.75 100.00 
Total 133 100.00 
Table 5.2 
Existence of a Significant Shareholder control ling 10% or more of the voting share (other th an an 
institutional Fund) 
Acquirers in the Sample 
With a Significant Shareholder 
Without 
Total 
Frequencies 
75 
58 
133 
% 
56.39 
43.61 
100.00 
Cumulative% 
56.39 
100.00 
~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 5.3 
Significant Shareholder represented on the Board of Directors 
Acquirers in the Sample Frequencies % Cumulative % 
Having 63 84.00 84.00 
Not Having 12 16.00 100.00 
Total 75 100.00 
Firms with a Nominating or Corporate Governance committee charged with 
directors' nomination , represented 56,39% of our sample (Table 5.4). As we have 
included in our sample acquisitions between 2000 and 2002, that is, before the 
Sarbanes-Oxley effect, we computed the proportions for both the 2000-2002 and 
2003-2006 periods to see if there is any evolution following the changes in corporate 
governance rules. 
Firms with a nominating committee represented almost 62% (42 out of 68) in 
the period 2000-2003, while this proportion was around 51% (33 out of 65) for the 
period 2003-2006. These proportions show that, at least in the case of the firms 
composing ou sample, the effect of the governance reform was not really noticeable 
after 2002. 
Table 5.4 
Acquirers with a Nominating or a Corporate Governance committee 
Acquirers in the Sample (2000-2006) Frequencies % Cumulative % 
With 75 56.39 56.39 
Without 58 43.61 100.00 
otal 133 100.00 
Acquirers in the sample (2000-2002) Frequencies % Cumulative % 
With 42 61.76 61 .76 
Without 26 38.24 100.00 
Total 68 100.00 
Acquires in the sample (2003-2006) Frequencies % Cumulative % 
With 33 50.77 50.77 
Without 32 49.23 100.00 
Total 65 100.00 
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Occupational background of Directors in our sample was distributed among 
12 categories, with about 37 ,5% being CEOs in exercise , while about 27% were 
occupying another executive function such as Vice-presidents or Chief officers 
(COOs, CFOs, CSOs ... etc.). About 8% of directors in the sample were Lawyers and 
about 8% were retired CEOs. lt is interesting to note that Academies were 
represented by only 1,75% in our sample (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 
Distribution of Directors' Occupational Functions during the acquisition year 
Occupations Frequencies % Cumulative % 
CEOs in exercise (other than the acquirer's CEO) 273 25. 18 25.18 
Sample Acquirer' s CEO 133 12.27 37.45 
Other Executive functions 291 26.85 64.30 
Lawyers 88 8. 12 72 .42 
Retired CEOs 84 7.75 80.1 7 
Other retired Executives 47 4.34 84.51 
Consultants 54 4.98 89.49 
Bankers 34 3. 14 92.63 
Former politicians 28 2.58 95.2 1 
Academie 19 1.75 96.96 
Professional Chartered Accountants 15 1.38 98 .34 
Former civil se rvants 09 0.83 99. 17 
Other 09 0.83 100.00 
Total 1084 100.00 
As for dominant functional backgrounds of Directors, based on their whole 
career (Table 5.6), Support functions categories comprising Finance, Accounting , 
Law, Human resources and other Administrative functions accounted for about 
68.5% of directors in our sample. Throughput funct ions that comprise operations, 
R&D and Engineering was represented by 29%, while Marketing and Sales 
represented only 2,6% of directors in our sample 
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Table 5.6 
Distribution of Directors' Functional Background 
Functions 
Output functions : marketing and sales 
Throughput functions: operations, R&D and 
engineering 
Support functions: Finance, accounting, law, 
human resources and other administrative 
functions 
Total 
Frequencies % Cumulative % 
28 2.58 2.58 
314 28 .97 31.55 
742 68.45 100.00 
1084 100.00 
Educational Level of directors was assessed along five categories: Less than 
a Bachelor degree; Bachelor degree; Less than a Master degree; Master degree but 
less than doctoral degree and Doctoral degree (Table 5.7) . About 53% of directors in 
our sample hold a Bachelor degree, followed by directors holding a Master degree in 
27.5% of the cases. Directors with less than a Bachelor degree represent about 8% 
of our directors' sample, while Directors with less than a Master degree and those 
with a doctoral degree accounted for about 12% (6% for each category) . 
Table 5.7 
Distribution of Directors' Educational Level 
Functions 
Less tha n a Bachelor degree 
Bachelor degree 
Less than a Master degree 
Master degree but less than a doctoral degree 
Doctoral degree 
Total 
5.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
Frequencies 
84 
571 
66 
298 
65 
1084 
% Cumulative 
% 
7.74 7.74 
52.68 60.42 
6.09 66 .51 
27 .49 94 .00 
6.00 100.00 
100.00 
Descriptive statistics of continuous predictor variables are presented in Table 
5.8, while frequencies of the remaining binary predictor could be found in Table 5.9. 
Variables' definition and summary description could be found in Table A.1 of 
Appendix A. 
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Acquirers with a majority of Directors sitting on at least three other Boards 
represented about 41% (Table 5.9) , while those having a Lone Founder accounted 
for 57% of the sample and those with the Lone Founder as a Chairman around 44% 
of the sample. Finally, 19,5% of the Acquirers in our Sample used Dual Shares as a 
control mechanism (Table 5.9) . 
Following the classification procedure explained in section 4.2.2, we ended 
with 51 successful Acquisitions and 81 unsuccessful ones. Frequencies for our 
dependent variable AcquSuccess are shawn in (Table 5.1 0). However, among the 
81 unsuccessful cases, 40 acquirers satisfied only conditions 1 and 2, that is: they 
did not divest the acquisition under study and they did not write dawn more th an 10% 
of the goodwill related to this acquisition in the two to five years after the acquisition 
date. Thus, 40 acquirers were classified as unsuccessful because the difference 
between their ROApost-acquisition and ROApre-acquisition was negative. 
Table 5.8 
Descriptive Statistics of continuous predictor variables 
Variables Mean SD Median Min Max 
BoardComp 0,7173 0,1417 0,7500 0.3000 0,9300 
NedGwn 0,0505 0,1133 0,0052 0,0000 0.7812 
NedGwnValue 0,8097 0,2512 0,9477 0,0121 1,0000 
Qualsnp 2,3700 2,4350 2,0000 0,0000 8,0000 
Board div 1,6423 0.4054 0,7070 0,0000 2,0500 
BoardSpec 1,0582 1,0369 0,8154 0,0000 9,5000 
AuditCom 0,6454 0,2453 0,6667 0,0000 1,0000 
GverBoarded 0,1947 0,1939 0,1818 0,0000 0,8000 
CompCom 3.7400 2,1270 4,0000 0,0000 7,0000 
Boardten 0,6654 1 ,0518 0,6262 0,0000 12,1037 
PremiumPaid 0,2535 0,2748 0,2317 -0,5455 1,2452 
A-T Relatedness 5,0080 3,6003 5,0000 0,0000 16,0000 
Tobin's Q-Gap 1,5269 0,9544 1,2597 0,0862 5,9991 
Acqusize 0,5000 0.5447 0,3030 0,0011 2,5463 
PaymentMode 0,5825 0,4025 0,6329 0,0000 1,0000 
CEG-Board FuncDistance 0,6287 0,3074 0,7500 0,0000 1,0000 
CEG-Board EducSim 0,2727 0,2619 0,2130 0,0000 1,0000 
CEG-Board Age distance 11 ,1421 4,7999 10,5400 1,2900 24,9000 
N Valid cases 133 
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Table 5.9 
Frequencies of predictor binary variables 
Variables Frequencies % Cumulative % 
Si~nShareholder 
1 75 56,39 56,39 
0 58 43,61 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
Si~nShareholderRep 
63 47,37 47,37 
0 70 52,63 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
Board Bus 
54 40,60 40 ,60 
0 79 59,40 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
FamilyControl 
57 42,90 42,90 
0 76 57,10 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
FamilyBoard 
55 41,40 41 ,40 
0 78 58,60 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
DuaiShare 
26 19,50 19,50 
0 107 80,50 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
LoneFounder 
1 76 57,10 57,10 
0 57 42,90 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
LoneFounderChair 
59 44,44 42,90 
0 74 57,1 0 100,00 
Total 133 100,00 
Total 
Table 5.10 
Frequencies of the dependent variable AcquSuccess 
1 
0 
Frequencies 
51 
82 
133 
% 
38,35 
61,65 
100.00 
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Cumulative % 
38,35 
100.00 
Acquirers that satisfied Ali the conditions 51 
Acquirers with a negative ROApostA-ROApreA 40 
Acquirers that satisfied only conditions 1 and 2 91 
5.1.3 Correlations among variables and Factor analysis 
5.1.3.1 Correlations among variables 
We address in this section the correlations among variables in our Sample. 
The examination of Table 8.1 (see Appendix B) reveals that: 
AcquSize variable is negatively and significantly correlated to NedOwn%, 
SignShareholder and SignShareholderRep while it is positively and 
significantly correlated with Qua/snp, BoardDiv and A-T Relatedness; 
BoardComp variable is positively and significantly correlated with Qua/snp, 
while it is negatively and significantly correlated with LoneFounderChair, 
NedOwn variable is positively and significantly correlated to NedOwn%, 
SignShareholder, SignShareho/erRep, LoneFounder, while it is negatively 
correlated to Boardten and PremiumPaid; 
NedOwn% variable is also positively and significantly corre lated with 
Fami/yControl and FamilyBoard , but negatively and significantly correlated to 
Qualsnp and LoneFounderChair; 
Qua/snp variable is also positively and significantly correlated to BoardDiv, 
OverBoarded, A-T Relatedness and EducSim, but negatively and significantly 
correlated with FamilyControl, Dua/Share and LoneFounder, 
186 
SignShareholder variable is also positively and significantly correlated with 
SignShareholderRep and as expected , the correlation is a strong one 
(0,834) , which indicate a colinearity issue. We will address this problem in the 
next section by using Factor Analysis in order to detect underlying factors 
among our variables set. Furthermore, SignShareholder is also positively and 
significantly correlated with FamilyBoard and negatively correlated with 
PremuimPaid; 
SignShareholderRep variable is also positively and significantly highly 
correlated to Familycontrol (0,761) and FamilyBoard (0.763) but moderately 
with Boardten. Once again , we suspect that there is a multicollinearity issue 
involving the Shareholder, ShareholderRep, FamilyBoard and FamilyControl 
variables. We will address this problem in the next section 
BoardDiv variable is also positively and significantly correlated with 
FamilyControl, while it is negatively and significantly correlated to 
LoneFounderChair and PaymentMode ; 
BordCoi/Exp variable is positively and significantly correlated with EducSim, 
but negatively and significantly correlated to BoardBus, AuditCom and Age 
Distance; 
BoardSpecExp variable is positively and significantly correlated to 
OverBoarded and CompCom, but negatively and significantly to EducSim; 
BoardBus variable is positively and significantly correlated to OverBoarded, 
AuditCom, Tobin 'Sq-Gap, FuncDist and Age Distance variables. The 
Correlation degree (0.52) between BoardBus and OverBoarded could reveal 
a common underlying factor, we will check this eventuality in the next section ; 
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OverBoarded variable is also positively and significantly correlated with 
LoneFounder and PaymentMode, while it is negatively correlated with 
AcquSize and FuncDist; 
AuditCom variable is positively and significantly correlated with Tobin 'sQ-Gap 
and negatively with FuncDist; 
CompCom variable is also negatively and significantly correlated with 
AcquSize; 
FamilyContro/ variable is also positively and significantly correlated with 
FamilyBoard. These two variables are strongly correlated (0,97) and suggest 
a potentially serious problem of colinearity . This problem will be handled in 
the next section . ln addition , FamilyControl is positively and significantly 
correlated with Boardten , while it is negatively and significantly correlated 
with LoneFounder, LoneFounderChair, PremiumPaid and AcquSize 
variables; 
Oua/Share variable is positively and significantly correlated with Boardten, 
PremiumPaid, FuncDist, while it is negatively and significantly correlated to 
AcquSize; 
FamilyBoard variable is also negatively and significantly correlated with 
LoneFounder, LoneFounderChair, PremiumPaid and AcquSize, while it is 
positively and significantly correlated with Boardten; 
LoneFounder variable is also positively and significantly correlated with 
LoneFounderChair and as expected this corre lation was also strong (0,77), 
wh ich suggest again some colinearity problems. We wi ll once again address 
this issue is the next section . Furthermore, LoneFounder is also positively 
and significantly correlated with PaymentMode; 
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LoneFounderChair is also correlated in a positive and a significant way with 
FuncDist; 
A-T Relatedness was fou nd to be positively and significantly correlated with 
Age Distance. 
As mentioned above, several colinearities and multicolinearities among 
variables were detected , which lead us to perform a factor analysis in order to find a 
solution , if any, that could help us eliminates the effect of colinearity on our final 
logistic model results. 
5.1.3.2 Factor Analysis 
As a multivariate method, Factor analysis is suitable for our purpose, that is, 
to identify latent dimensions represented in the original variables in arder to identify 
representative variables that could help us eliminate the multicollinearity issue 
identified in the previous section, by investigating how the involved variables relate to 
each other, and how they load in a particular factor and if they could be replaced by 
their factor scores. 
Although the different extraction methods tend to generate similar solutions, 
we chose to perform Principal Axis Factoring with Unweighted Least Square (ULS) 
factoring and varimax orthogonal rotation to keep the factors independent of each 
other during the rotation process. The choice of Principal Axis Factoring method was 
based on the exploratory nature of our investigation and the fact that we have at this 
stage a little knowledge about the amount of specifie and error variance, which will 
be eliminated to account only on the common variance, that is, the variance in each 
variable that is shared with ali the other variables in our analysis. 
Results of Factor analysis are shown in Tables 5.11 , 5.12 and 5.13. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, which indicates the 
appropriateness of using Factor Analysis for a particular set of data should genera lly 
be comprised between 0,5 and 1 for the analysis to be considered appropriate. As 
-------------------------------------------, 
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shown in Table 5.11 , the KMO measure is 0.607, which indicates that the sample 
correlations are adequate for the purpose of Factor Analysis . 
Table 5.11 
Factor anal sis- KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 
Of 
Si . 
,607 
1303,192 
351 
,000 
As for the Barttlet's test of Sphericity, it provides an assessment of the null 
hypothesis consisting in that none of the variables are significantly correlated. The 
Barttlet's test resulted in Chi-Square of 1303,19 and is significant (0,000), which lead 
us to reject the null hypothesis and confirm that the matrix correlation has significant 
correlations among at least some of the variables. These results indicate that our 
data were suitable and that we can further proceed with the Factor Analysis and 
consider the extracted factors as potentially valid solutions. 
The extracted factors from ali the variables are shown in Table 5.12 , while the 
retained factors are presented in table 5.13. The Analysis of the results leads as to 
cons id er 5 factors for analysis by using the Cattell's seree (Figure 5.1) test in order to 
consider only factors with eigenvalues superior to 1. From these five factors , 3 were 
meaningful and interpretable (Table 5.13) . The first factor was Named Acquirer's 
Ownership and control characteristics where we find ali the variables in relation with 
firm ownership and control loading on this factor. lndeed , SignShareho/der, 
SignShareholderRep, FamilyBoard, Fami/yControl and Dua/shares are ali variables 
related to firm Ownership structure . These variables were previously identified as 
potentially suspects for multicolinearity, and replacing them by this factor scores will 
mitigate the potential of mulyicollinearity as discussed previously. The second factor 
in our analysis was named LoneFounder Leadreship given that clearly two variables 
related to the existence and the Chairman position of the Lone Founder were loading 
on it. 
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190 
Thus, the Factor scores of the Lone Founder Leadership Factor will replace 
the original data on the two involved variables in our subsequent models . Finally, the 
third factor was named Director's Busyness and once again , the two variables 
loading on it describe clearly the degree of Director's busyness for a particular 
Board. Here again, we will use this Factor's scores to replace the two involved 
variables. We note that the three factors explain 29% of the total variance (see Table 
5.12) . 
SignShareholderRep 
FamilyBoard 
SignShareholder 
FamilyControl 
DuaiShare 
LoneFounder 
LoneFounderChair 
Board Bus 
OverBoarded 
Auditcom 
AcquSize 
Tobin'sQ-Gap 
Board Div 
Qualsnp 
Educational Similarity 
NedOwnValue 
BoardSpecExp 
CompCom 
Age distance 
A-T Relatedness 
Boardten 
Boardcomp 
NedOwn 
PremiumPaid 
PaymentMode 
Functional distance 
Table 5.12 
Principal Axis Factor Analysis (ULS)- Ail the variables 
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix• 
Factor 
1 2 3 
,932 -,023 ,008 
,870 -,016 ,046 
,860 ,030 -,105 
,859 -,015 ,056 
,509 -,005 ,233 
-,012 ,976 -,058 
-,004 ,821 , 167 
,039 ,055 ,736 
-,066 ,039 ,679 
,129 ,027 ,280 
-,102 -,060 -,176 
,048 ,136 , 113 
,062 -,049 ,166 
-,129 -,089 , 113 
,018 -,012 ,092 
, 114 ,097 ,137 
-,142 , 118 ,137 
-,143 -,184 ,100 
-,082 -,048 -,084 
-,089 ,052 ,026 
,096 -,058 -,059 
,027 -,094 ,019 
,269 ,045 -,016 
-,017 ,039 -,084 
-,033 ,213 ,069 
,014 ,095 -,039 
Eigenvalue (before rotation) 3,938 2,121 1,783 
Cumulative % of variance 14,584 22,439 29,044 
•Rotation Method : Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; N= 133. 
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4 5 
-,059 ,088 
,077 -,160 
-,064 ,060 
,058 -, 153 
-,095 -, 188 
,120 -,132 
-,019 ,002 
-,066 -,008 
-,013 ,209 
,120 -,036 
,841 -,053 
,212 -,047 
-,102 , 152 
-,096 ,847 
-,061 ,040 
-,108 -,083 
-,008 -,140 
-,138 -,003 
-,091 -,067 
,010 ,079 
-,050 ,086 
-,207 ,275 
-,003 -,119 
-,050 ,041 
, 193 ,098 
,068 -,077 
1,299 0,943 
33,856 37,346 
Table 5.13 
Principal Axis Factor Analysis (ULS)- Retained meaningful factors 
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix~ 
Acquirer's Ownership and Lone Founder 
Control Characteristics Leadership 
(OwnChar) 
(LoneFounderLead) 
SignShareholderRep ,932 -,023 
FamilyBoard ,870 -,016 
SignShareholder ,860 ,030 
FamilyContro l ,859 -,015 
DuaiShare ,509 -,005 
LoneFounder -,012 ,976 
LoneFounderChair -,004 ,821 
Board Bus ,039 ,055 
OverBoarded -,066 ,039 
~ Rotation Method : Varimax with Kaiser Norma lizat ion; N= 133. 
5.2. Analysis of the Logistic Regression Models 
5.2.1 Logistic Regression Models Testing and Refitting 
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Director's 
Busyness 
(DirectBus) 
,008 
,046 
-,105 
,056 
,233 
-,058 
,167 
,736 
,679 
ln the present section we will first redefine our initial model discussed and 
presented in section 4.3 in order to replace the original variables that presented 
potential multicolinearity problems identified and treated in the previous sections. 
Thus, the variables SignShareholder, SignShareholderRep, FamilyBoard, 
FamilyControl and Oua/Share will be replaced by the scores of the Acquirer's 
Ownership and Control Characteristic Factor (OwnChar) and will be representative 
of the Board Monitoring capabilities dimension. This redefinition means that 
Hypothesis H5 will be a Iso tested through the OwnChar variable. As for the variables 
Lone Founder and Lone FounderChair, we will replace them by the scores of the 
LoneFounder Leadership factor (LoneFoundLead) and will remain representative of 
the Board Strategie capabilities dimension. Finally, the BoardBus and OverBoarded 
variables will be replacd by the scores of the Directors' Busyness factor (OirectBus) 
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and will remain as a measure of the Credibility dimension. Our empirical madel (1) 
defined previously becomes as follow: 
(1) Ln [p(AcqSuccess;,t}/(1- p(AcqSuccess;,t)} = J3o + (31 Qualsnp;+ (32 NEDown; + (33 
OwnChar+ (34 Bcomp+ J3s NEDownva/ue; + J3s BÔarddiv; + (31 BoardCoi/Exp + J3a 
Boardspec; + J3s DirectBus + (31oAuditcom; + (311 Compcom; + (31 2 CEO-Board 
functional distance + (31 3 CEO-Board educational similarity + (314 CEO-Board age 
distance + (31s LoneFoundLead + (31 s Boardten; + (311 Premium; + J31 a A-TRefatedness; + 
(31s Tobin'sqGap; + (32oAcqSize; + (321 PaymentMode 
As we included numerous variables in our empirical madel , it is 
recommend~d to proceed with a strategy that will help us to select the variables that 
will result in the best madel within the scientific context of the problem , in our case 
the prediction of successful acquisitions. Such a strategy aims to seek a 
parsimonious madel that still explains the Data and help to generate a numerically 
stable solution that is less dependent of the data and with minimized standard errors 
(Hosmer and Lameshaw, 2000) . 
Following Hosmer and Lameshaw (2000) , we will fit a univariable logistic 
regression madel for each independent variables with our dependent variable and 
examine the estimated coefficients, the standard errors, the likelihood ratio test for 
significance and the Wald statistic. Although the authors suggest to include in the 
final madel only vari ables that showed a p-value inferior to 0,25 with the univariable 
logistic regression, we will extend this criterion to include ali the variables that 
showed at least 0,50 as p-value. By choosing to retain variables with p-values of at 
least 0,50 we will minimize the elimination of variables that when taken separately 
show a weak association with the acquisition success but when taken with the other 
variables wi ll become important predictors. 
When the candidate variables are ali entered together, the same procedure of 
verifying those variables that are not contributing to the overall madel will be 
performed and the madel will be refitted by eliminati ng these variables unti l the best 
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one is reached . After proceeding with the univariable regression step the following 
model was retained for the first test: 
(1a) Ln [p(AcqSuccess;,t)/(1- p(AcqSuccess;,t)] = l3o + l31 Boardcomp + l32 NEDowm + 
l33 Qualsnp; + l34 NEDownvalue; + l3s Boarddiv; + l3s BoardspecExp; + I31DirectBus; + 
13aAuditCom; + l39 Compcom; + l31o OwnChar + l311 CEO-Board FuncDist; + I31 2CEO-Board 
EducSim; + l313 CEO-Board age distance; + 1314 LoneFoundLead; + l31s Boardtem + l31s 
PremiuPaidm; + l311 A-TRelatedness; + l31s Tobin 'sqGap; + l319 AcquSize; + l32o PaymentMode; 
The redefined model (1 a) imply that the Legitimacy dimension is measured 
through BoardComp, NedOwn, Qualsnp and NedOwnValue variables, while the 
Credibi/ity dimension is measured through BoardDiv, BoarsSpecExp, and DirectBus 
variables . 
Board Monitoring capabilities dimension is measured by AuditCom, 
CompCom and OwnChar, while the Board Strategie capabilities dimension is 
measured by CEO-Board FuncDist, CEO-Board EducSim, CEO-Board Age distance, 
LonefoundLead and Boardten variables. Retained Control variables are 
PremiumPaid, A-T Relatedness, Tobin 's q Gap, AcquSize and PaymentMode. 
Hypotheses remain identical to those proposed in Chapter 3. 
Table 5.14 
Logistic Model (1a) Classification Table 
Observations Predicted 
AcquSuccess Percentage 
0 1 correct 
0 67 15 81 ,7 
AcquSuccess 
Step 1 1 24 27 52,9 
Pourcentage global 70,7 
---------- ----------- ---
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Table 5.15 
Logistic regression results- Model (1 a) 
Dependent Variable: AcquSuccess 
Initial Model (1a) 8 S.E Wald df Si9 Exp (8) H:tP· Status 
lntercept 
-3,228 2,370 1,856 0,173 0,040 
BoardComp 
-2,916 1,704 2,929 0,087 0,054 
NedOwn 
-2 ,078 2,161 0,925 0,436 0,125 
Quais np 0,241 0,102 5,613 0,018 1,273 
NedOwnValue 
-0,973 0,949 1,051 0,305 0,378 
Board div 1,525 0,752 4,120 0,042 4,597 
Boa rdSpec Exp 0,609 0,285 4,557 0,033 1,839 
DirectBus 
-0,388 0,293 1,758 0,185 0,678 
AuditCom 0,726 1,000 0,527 0,468 2,067 H12 Rejected 
CompCom 0,078 0,111 0,503 0,478 1,082 H12 Rejected 
OwnChar 0,114 0,240 0,228 0,633 1 '121 H14; H5 Rejected 
CEO-Board FuncDist 0,723 0,720 1,010 0,315 2,061 
CEO-Board EducSim 2,010 0,979 4,216 0,040 7,463 
CEO-Board Age dist 0,041 0,045 0,822 0,365 1,042 
LoneFounderlead 
-0,224 0,230 0,947 0,331 0,799 
Boardten 
-0,043 0,241 0,032 0,858 0,958 H21 Rejected 
PremiumPaid 
-0,620 0,808 0,590 0,442 0,538 
A-T Relatedness 0,091 0,065 1,957 0,162 1,095 
Tobin's Q-Gap 
-0,138 0,261 0,277 0,599 0,871 
Acq uS ize 
-0,145 ,516 0,079 0,779 ,865 
PaymentMode 
-0,650 0,596 1 '192 0,275 0,522 
N 133 
-21og Likelihood 141.84 
Chi-Square 35.245 (p-value) (. 027) 
Hosmer-Lameshaw 4.599 (p-value) (.799) 
Nagelkerke R2 .316 
The results of model (1a) are shown in Tables 5.14 and 5.15. Classification of 
successful acquisitions based on a eut-off of 0.5 predicted only 52% of successful 
acquisition against almost 82% of unsuccessful ones, while the overall classification 
rate was around 71% (Table 5.14). The model is acceptable with a significant Chi-
Square (35.245, p=0.027) and with a non significant test for Goodness of Fit 
measured by the Hosmer-Lameshaw test of (4.599, p= .799) , leading to the non 
rejection of the null hypothesis consisting in that the predictions and the observed 
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values do not differ. Finally, the Nagelkerke W indicates that the madel accounted 
for approximately 32% of the total variance (Table 5.15) . 
Although these results are somewhat acceptable , we decided to follow the 
strategy of removing variables that have more than a p-value of 0,40 to see if the 
remaining variables will empower our final madel. Furthermore, the examination of 
the standardized residuals and the Cook's distances (not reported) showed several 
cases with a value superior to 2 for the Standardized residuals and superior to 1 for 
the Cook's distances. Thus, and before starting the interpretation of our coefficients 
and odds ratios , we will proceed with the elimination of these outlier cases , if any, 
then check the effect on the madel to finally discard ali the variables with a p-values 
superior than 0,40. 
The results after these changes are presented in Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18. 
The final madel contained only 125 cases as 8 outliers were removed after the 
examination of the Standardized errors and the Cook's distances. The improved 
madel seems to be more fitted with noticeable improvements of ali its parameters. 
The ove rail success rate raised from 70% in the previous madel (1 a) to al most 78% 
in the final madel (1 b), while the prediction of successful acquisition improved 
dramatically from 52,9% to 71% in the final madel. 
As for the other statistics (see Table 5.17), we notice a strongly significant 
Chi-Square (60.95, p-value= 0,000) indicating a robust overall degree of similarity 
between the observed probabilities and those predicted by madel (1 b) . 
Furthermore, the Hosmer-Lameshaw goodness of fit test is not significant 
(7,49, p-va/ue=0,529) and the Nagelkerke-R2 indicates now that madel (1 b) is 
accounting of al most 53% of the variance instead of 32% in the previous madel (1 a). 
The examination of the Standardized Residuals and the Cook's distances for madel 
1 b reveal no effect of outliers and we notice that the standard errors reported in 
Table 5.17 are ali inferior to 2, indicating that there is no sign of a significant 
multicolinearity effect or other numerical problems detected in the madel. Finally the 
ratio of the independent variables to the number of observations is now 1:10, which 
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is the recommended ratio for the Logistic regression method as reported by many 
authors. 
Table 5.16 
Logistic Madel_ (1 b Classification Table 
Observations Predicted 
AcquSuccess Percentage 
0 1 correct 
0 65 15 81,3 
AcquSuccess 
Step 1 1 13 32 71 '1 
Pourcentage global 77,6 
Following our efforts to improve the initial madel (1 ), the final one to be 
interpreted for hypotheses testing is: 
(1b) Ln [p(AcqSuccess;,t)l(1- p(AcqSuccess;,t)} = l3o + l31 Boardcomp + 
l32 Qualsnp; + l33 NEDownvalue; + l34 Boarddiv; + l3s BoardspecExp; + 
l3s DirectBus; + l31 CEO-Board FuncDist; + l3a CEO-Board EducSim; + 
l39 CEO-Board Agedist; + l31o LoneFoundLead; + l311 A-TRelatedness; + 
l312 PaymentMode; 
According to these results , our madel is now simplified as follow: Legitimacy 
dimension is measured by BoardComp, Qualsnp and NedOwnValue variables, while 
the Credibility dimension remains measured by BoardDiv, BoarSpecExp and 
DirectBus. 
As for the Monitoring capabilities'dimension, ali the measures were not 
significant in our previous madel, and the hypotheses related to this dimension will 
be therefore tested through the resu lts of madel (1 a) presented in Table 5.15. The 
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Board strategie capabilities dimension is measured by CEO-Board FuncOist, CEG-
Board EducSim, CEO-Board Age dist and LoneFounderLead variables .Finally, 
control variables are A-T Relatedness and PaymentMode 
Table 5.17 
Logistic regression results- Model (1 b) 
Dependent Variable : AcquSuccess 
Refitted Model (1 b) B S.E Wald df Sig Exp (B) Hyp. 
lntercept 
-8 ,360 2,961 7,969 0,005 0,000 
BoardComp 
-4,581 1,994 5,276 0,022 0,010 (H1) 
Qualsnp 0,546 0,143 14,508 0,000 1,726 (H3) 
NedGwnValue 
-0,758 1,009 0,565 0,452 0,468 (H2) 
Board div 2,989 1,068 7,830 0,005 19,865 (Hl) 
BoardSpec Exp 1,362 0,412 10,932 0,001 3,903 (H9) 
DirectBus 
-0,242 0,305 0,628 0,428 0,785 (H11) 
CEO-Board FuncDist 2,079 0,953 4,759 0,029 7,993 (H15) 
CEG-Board EducSim 4,160 1,271 10,713 0,001 64,047 (H16) 
CEG-Board Age dist 0,101 0,056 3,274 0,070 1,106 (H17) 
LoneFounderlead 
-0,488 0,265 3,399 0,065 0,614 (H20) 
A-T Relatedness 0,189 0,084 5,091 0,024 1,209 
PaymentMode 
-1 ,794 0,750 5,719 0,017 0,166 
N 125 
-21og Likelihood 102.405 
Chi-Square (p-value) 60.95 (0.000) 
Hosmer-Lameshaw (p- 7.491 (0.485) 
value) 
Nagelkerke R2 52 ,9% 
5.2.2 Results Interpretation and Formai Hypothesis Testing with the Logistic 
Regression Model 
Status 
Supported 
Supported 
Rejected 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Rejected 
Results from model (1 b) in Table 5.17 indicate that the variable Boardcomp is 
a significant negative predictor of Acquisition success (p<0.05) suggesting that 
acquirers in our sample were more likely to have selected a successful acquisition 
when their score on the Boardcomp is high. These results allow us to accept 
hypothesis (H 1 ), and could be added to previous studies' results th at reported a 
negative relationship of board composition and firm performance (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994). 
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The probability of the Wald statistic for the variable Qualsnp is significant 
(p<0.001) with a positive relationship with acquisition success suggesting that 
acquirers in our sample were more likely to have selected a successful acquisition 
when their score on the Qua/snp is high. Our Hypothesis (H3) is therefore accepted. 
As for the NedOwnVa/ue, our results suggest the absence of any significant 
relationship with the monetary value of non executive directors ' shareholdings 
relatively to their total pay and the probability of selecting successful acquisitions, 
which lead us to accept Hypothesis (H2). 
BoardDiv variable, measuring the heterogeneity of board members 
professional backgrounds seems to hold a positive and significant (p= 0.005) 
relationship with acquisition success, which allow us to accept Hypothesis (H7) . 
Results in Table 5.17 show also a significant (p=0.001) and positive 
relationship between the BoardSpecExpvariable and the probability of selecting a 
successful acquisition. Thus, Boards with Non-executive members with an average 
of experiences related to the acquirer industries higher than the top management 
team's experiences is associated with an increase in the likelihood of making a 
successful acquisition , which lead us to accept hypothesis (H9). 
While DirectBus variable is not a significant predictor, it tends to hold a 
negative relationship with the probability of making a successful acquisition . This 
result supports partially our Hypothesis (H11) . 
ln relation with board demographie attributes, the CEO-BoardFuncOist 
variable, which measures the distance between the CEO's functional background 
and the average functional background of the board members, is positively and 
significantly (p<0.05) related to the probability of making successful acquisitions, 
supporting therefore our hypothesis (H 15). 
As to the CEO-Board EducSimvariable, which measure the similarity in the 
education level between the CEO and the average of Board members, our results 
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show a Iso a positive and significant (p=O. 001) relationship with the probability of 
making a successful acquisitions, suggesting that firms with a CEO and board 
members having the similar education level were more likely to select successful 
acquisition , which le ad us to accept hypothesis (H 16). 
Results for Age distance between the CEO and the Board Members, 
measured by the CEO-Board Age dist, indicate that this variable is positively and 
significantly (p<0.10) associated with the probability of making a successful 
acquisitions, suggesting that firms with a CEO and the average board members 
belonging to different groups of age were more likely to select successful acquisition , 
and th at our hypothesis (H 17) should be accepted. 
Our results show also a negative and significant (p<0.10) association 
between the LoneFounderLead variable and the probability of selecting a successful 
acquisition , indicating that the presence of a LoneFounder in the board or as a 
chairman decreases the likelihood of making a successful acquisition , which lead us 
to reject hypothesis (H20) . 
Regarding the control variables, and in line with previous results reported in 
the literature (Healy et al ; 1990; Datta and Puia , 1995; Weech-Maldonado, 2002; 
Lubatkin and O'Neill , 1987; Flanagan, 1996; Scanlon et al , 1989; Chatterjee and 
Lubatkin , 1990), the degree of the Acquirer and Target relatedness, measured by the 
variable A-T Relatedness, is positively and significantly (p<O. 05) related to the 
probability of making a successful acquisition. 
As for PaymentMode variable, it was negatively and significantly (p<0.05) 
related with the probability of making a successful acquisition. Th is resu lt is in line 
with the findings reported by Myers and Majlouf, 1984. 
To finalize our interpretation, we will know return to our results from (Table 
5.15) to assess the hypotheses related with the Board monitoring capabilities 
involving the Auditcom and Compcom variables. We notice that Auditcom and 
CompCom were not significant predictors of successful acquisition, which lead us to 
reject hypothesis (H 12). As for OwnChar and Boardten, no significant relationship 
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was found with the probability of making a successful acquisition which implies that 
hypothesis (H14) is accepted , while hypotheses (H5) and (H21) should be rejected. 
Finally, the slope coefficients of CEO-Board FuncDistand CEO-Board 
EducSim in addition to be significant were higher (in both models 1 a and 1 b) than 
those of the AuditCom and the CompCom variables (which in mode! (1 a) were not 
significant predictors of successful acquisitions) . Hypothesis H22 is therefore 
supported by our results. 
At this stage, our findings support Hypotheses H1 , H2, H3, H7 , H9, H14, H15, 
H16, H17, H22 and partially H11 , while hypotheses H5, H12, H20, H21 are rejected. 
lnvestigating the misclassified cases 
ln order to make a more informed assessment of our variables contribution in 
the classification of successful versus unsuccessful acquisitions; we have analysed 
the cases that were misclassified by the mode! to look at their characteristics and to 
find out the possible causes for being not correctly classified by the mode!. To do so, 
we computed first the predicted probability of a hypothetical case when ali the 
variables are at their sample mean value. 
Next, we identified the 15 false positive cases (i .e. cases that were initially 
coded as unsuccessful but the mode! has classified as successful-see Table 5.16 
and the 13 false negative cases (i.e. cases that were initially classified as success 
but the mode! has considered them as unsuccessful- see Table 5.16) . We then , 
computed the mean values of each group and the predicted probabilities associated 
with each of them to end with the average predicted probability for each group. 
Finall y, we computed for each variable the marginal impact of the departure 
from the mean for the two groups. The results of these computations are separately 
showed in Tables 5.17a and 5.17b for the group of the False Positives (FP) and in 
Tables 20c and 20d for the group of False Negatives (FN). 
202 
We note that the average predicted probabilities of the FP group is around 
0,61 , while the predicted probability associated with the sample mean values for ali 
the variables was 0,24. The latter predicted probability was obtained by taking the 
mean values of ali the variables (see Table 5.8) and use them in model 1 b to extract 
the Log of the odds, and then compute the antilog (ea/1 +ea, where a =Log odds) of 
the latter to obtain the corresponding predicted probability. The total variation 
between the average predicted probabilities of the FP group and the predicted 
probability using the mean values was 0,37 point (0,61-0,24) or 154%. 
Table 5.17a 
False Positives (FP) Classification and predicted probabilities 
Predictedprob Mode! 
Init ial ab lity (mode! Classif icat io 
Case# Classification lb) n 
5 0 
17 
30 
40 
46 
49 
54 
63 
64 
68 
88 
101 
122 
130 
133 
Groupe FP Average (pl) 
Sample variab les Mean va lues (p2) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Odds associated with Group FP average (pl/(1-pl) 
Odds associated mean va lues 
(p2/(1-p2) 
Variation% in predictedprobabi lities 
Variation in Odds 
N= 15 
0,51 1 
0,66 1 
0,67 1 
0,55 1 
0,81 1 
0,52 1 
0,67 1 
0,51 1 
0,50 1 
0,51 1 
0,77 1 
0,70 1 
0,58 1 
0,61 1 
0,61 1 
0,61 
0,24 
1,58 
0,32 
155% 
560% 
We can conclude from Table 5.17b that for a positive departure of 1 ,43 in its 
score, the contribution of the Qualsnp variable (while holding constant ali the other 
variables at their mean values) accounted for 47% (0,17/0,37) of the total variation 
and raised the predicted probability from 0,27 to 0,44 with an increase of 0,17 point, 
that is, a 63% increase in the predicted probability for the FP group when compared 
to the probability predicted by the Qualsnp mean value. 
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Table 5.17b 
Variables' contribution in the pred icted probabi lity of Fa lse Positives (FP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)* (6) (7) (8) 
% 
Sample FP Departure Departuref Logg FP M arginal Weight 
Mean Group romSampl odds Predicted Net 
Values Mean (2)-(1) eMean probabilit y Effect (7)/0,37 
Values (a) 
[(2)-(1)]/(1) e"/(1+e") 
Constant -8,36 -8,36 -8,36 0,00 0,00 0% 
Variables 
BoardComp 0,717 0,689 -0,0280 -3,90% -1,018 0,27 0,03 8% 
Qua lsnp 2,37 3,80 1,4300 60,34% -0,238 0,44 0,17 47% 
NedOwnValue 0,810 0,731 -0,0785 -9,70% -0,178 0,46 0,01 4% 
Board Div 1,640 1,819 0,1793 10,93% 0,350 0,59 0,13 35% 
BoardSpecExp 1,058 1,039 -0,0190 -1,80% 0,324 0,58 -0,01 -2% 
DirectBus 0,000 -0,091 -0,0908 0,346 0,59 0,01 1% 
CEO-B FuncDist 0,629 0,699 0,0701 11,15% 0,492 0,62 0,03 9% 
CEO-B EducSim 0,273 0,331 0,0579 21,24% 0,735 0,68 0,06 15% 
CEO-B Age Dist 11,142 10,454 -0,6881 -6,18% 0,665 0,66 -0,02 -4% 
LoneFounderlead 0,000 -0,076 -0,0764 0,702 0,67 0,01 2% 
A-T Re latedness 5,008 5,067 0,0587 1,17% 0,714 0,67 0,00 0% 
Payment Mode 0,583 0,724 0,1417 24,33% 0,460 0,61 -0,06 -16% 
N= 15 Tota l Var: 0,37 100% 
*Logistic regression model1b in Table 5.17 w ith average FN group values through ma nua i stepwise 
procedure 
Regarding the contribution of the BoardDiv Variable in the classificat ion of the 
FP cases, we could also notice a significant association with the improvement of the 
predicted probabil ity of this group when compared to the probabil ity predicted by the 
mean va lues. lndeed, a positive departure of 11% in the BoardDiv score was 
associated with an increase from 0,46 to 0,59 or 28% in the average predicted 
probabi lities of the FP cases when compared to the predicted probability with the 
mean value (Table 5.17b). The total contribution in the variance between the 
predicted probabilities of the FP group and the the predicted probability by the the 
mean value was about 35% (0, 13/0,37). 
Results in Table 5.17b confirm our conclusion , by showing us that a positive 
departure from the mean of about 21% in the CEO-Board EducSim variable was 
associated with an increase from 0,62 to 0,68 or about 10% in the average predicted 
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probability of the FP group when compared to the probability obtained with the mean 
value. Contribution to total variance in the average predicted probability was also 
about 15% (0,06/0 ,37). lt seems therefore that the most significant variables 
associated with the classification of FP were the Qua/snp, BoardDiv and CEO-
EducSim variables. 
Other results show that predicting the success probability for the FP Group, 
was a Iso related with a positive departure of about 11% from the mean value for the 
variable CE-Board FuncDistthat was associated with an increase of the average 
predicted probability from 0,59 to 0,62 or about 5% when compared to the predicted 
probability obtained with the mean value. 
We will turn know to the analysis of False Negatives (FN) results presented in 
Tables 5.17c and 5.17d. The variation in the predicted probability was somewhat 
trivial with an average of group predicted probability of making a successful 
acquisition of 0,26 compared to 0,24 (Table 5.17c) when we use the mean values. 
Table 5.17c 
False Negatives (FN) Classification and predicted probabilities 
Initial Predictedproba blity Model 
Case# Classification (modellb} Classification 
11 1 0,38 0 
58 1 0,34 0 
61 1 0,24 0 
69 1 0,20 0 
77 1 0,23 0 
78 1 0,37 0 
81 1 0,20 0 
82 1 0,22 0 
89 1 0,33 0 
96 1 0,31 0 
106 1 0,19 0 
119 1 0,16 0 
132 1 0,26 1 
Groupe FN Average (pl} 0,26 
Sa mple variables Mean values (p2} 0,24 
N= 13 
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ln the light of these results , we examined more closely the characteristics of 
the cases that were classified as False Positive in arder to investigate the possible 
causes of this misclassification. First, we looked at the acquisition dates to see if 
these cases were related to a specifie year or period with extraordinary economie 
conditions that could have affected the ROA of these acquirers . The involved 
acquisitions were conducted at different moments between 2000 and 2001 and no 
pattern in relation to acquisition date was identified. 
Next, we looked at the arguments of our initial classification of these cases as 
a failure . We found that ali the False Positives satisfied conditions 1 and 2 for our 
dependent variable, that is, no divestment in the acquisition under study was made 
du ring the 2 to 5 years after the event and no goodwill write-offs of more than 1 0% 
were reported in the 2 to 5 years following the acquisition. However, we found that 6 
cases out of 15 were firms that satisfied the two first conditions but were themselves 
acquired by other firms in takeover deals, which led us to classify them as a failure . 
Thus, the remaining suspect of this misclassification becomes the positive 
improvement in ROA which was the main cause for initially classifying the 9 
remaining cases as unsuccessful acquisitions. For 6 cases out of 9 the negative 
improvements of the ROA was not very important (around 3 percentage points) 
which could shed sorne doubt about our initial judgement on classifying them as 
failures . 
Given the limitations associated with the ROA measures (risk of 
manipulation , accounting methods for acquisitions , industry and general economie 
factors ... etc.) we notice th at our initial judgement cou Id have been affected by other 
factors that we have not controlled for. Initial failure classification concerned 80 
cases, for which ROA improvements were responsible for 41 initial classifications, 
while Goodwill write-offs were associated with 4 cases and divestment for 24 cases. 
As for the remaining cases, 5 acquirers went bankrupt in the following year of the 
acquisition under study and 6 were themselves taken over. 
To investigate further the contribution of our variables we used the same 
procedures as explained above for the indicators of the FN group. 
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We observe in Table 5.17d that ali the significant variables are again in play 
with significant individual contributions, but they're largely offsetting one another. 
Thus, the positive effect of the BoardDiv variable was offset by a decrease in the 
BoarSpecExp and CEO-Board Age distance , while an increase in the Qualsnp effect 
was offset by an increase in the BoardComp, the A-T re/atedness and the 
PaymentMode. 
As for the FP cases, we push further our analysis in arder to find out why are 
these cases scoring close to the mean were initially classified as successful 
acquisitions. Recalling our classification rules , ali these cases should have respected 
the three conditions. Here again , we think that the principal suspect of these 
misclassification is probably the improvements in ROA rule. lndeed, 10 out the 13 
misclassified cases showed a slight improvement in the ROA that was around 1 
percentage point. The remaining three cases were positive improvements but 
associated with negative post and pre acquisition ROAs. 
Table 5.17d 
Variables' contribution in the predicte d probability of False Negatives (FN) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)* (6) (7) 
% 
Sample FN Departure Oeparturefr Logg FN Marginal 
Mean Group omSample odds Predicted Net 
Values Mean (2)-(1) Mean probability Effect 
Values [(2)-(1)]/(1) (a) e"/(1+e") 
Constant -8,36 -8,36 -8,36 0,00 0,00 
Variables 
BoardComp 0,717 0,725 0,0073 1,02% -1,181 0,23 -0,01 
Quais np 2,37 2,846 0,4762 20,09% -0,921 0,28 0,05 
NedOwnValue 0,810 0,842 0,0326 4,03% -0,946 0,28 0,00 
Board Div 1,640 1,771 0,1308 7,97% -0,562 0,36 0.08 
Boa rdSpecExp 1,058 0,837 -0,2217 -20,95% -0,864 0,30 -0,06 
DirectBus 0,000 -0,036 -0,0359 -0,855 0,30 0,00 
CEO-B FuncDist 0,629 0,681 0,0527 8,38% -0,746 0,32 0,02 
CEO- B EducSim 0,273 0,293 0,0206 7,54% -0,660 0,34 0,02 
CEO- BAge Dist 11,142 10,314 -0,8283 -7,43% -0,744 0,32 -0,02 
LoneFounderlead 0,000 0,127 0,1270 -0,806 0,31 -0,01 
A-T Relatedness 5,008 4,769 -0,2388 -4,77% -0,851 0,30 -0,01 
Payment Mode 0,583 0,683 0,1002 17,20% -1,030 0,26 -0,04 
N= 13 Tota l Var: 0,02 
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We can conclude that the significant variables as reported in Table 5.17 were 
the main variables that affected the classification of the cases in our sample. The 
false positives and the false negatives were thus mainly classified by the mode! on 
the basis of the score obtained for the Qua!snp, BoadDiv, BoardSpecExp, CEG-
Board FuncDist, CEO-Board EduSim, BoardComp and PaymentMode. 
5.2.3 Additional analysis of the Logistic Mode! Robustness and Accuracy 
Testing Through Bootstrapping and ROC Analysis 
ln order to test the Robustness of mode! (1 b) a Bootstrap procedure, along 
with a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis were employed to validate 
the predictive accuracy of our mode!. 
Internai validation of predictive models could be achieved by spl itting the 
sample population into tra ining and a validation samples in order to measure mode! 
performance on similar but independent data (Picard and Berk, 1990). ln order to 
test our mode! , we opted for the bootstrapping method given the small size of our 
sample and the superiority of the Bootstrap procedure to other cross-validation 
methods as confirmed by various statisticians (Gude et al , 2009; Steyerberg et al , 
2001 ; Harre!, 2001 ; Harre! et al , 1996; Efron and Tibshirani , 1993). 
Bootstrapping consists in replicating the process of sample generation on the 
same population by drawing random samples with replacement from the original 
data (Harre! et al , 1996). The Bootstrapping option in SPSS 21 with 1000 sam pies 
was used to test our mode! and the results (Table 5.18) validate our findings with the 
original sample. 
To test further the accuracy of our logistic mode! we decided to use the 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis to assess the classification 
performance of mode! (1 b) . ROC Analysis consists in generating a ROC Curve 
assessing how weil group membership (in our case, successful acquisitions Vs 
unsuccessful ones) is predicted through the combination of true-positive rates (cases 
who have been correctly predicted as having a positive outcome) and false-positive 
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rates (cases with a negative outcome incorrectly predicted as having a positive 
outcome). Thus, the true-positive rate , also designated as the Sensitivity rate is 
considered as the Y axis, while the false-positive rate, designated as (1-Specificity) 
is considered as the X axis (Fawcett, 2006; Meyers et al , 2012). 
Table 5.18 
Logistic regression results- Model (1 b) with the Bootstrapping method 
Refitted Model (1 b) 8 Bias S.E Sig (2- tai led) Hlpoth. 
lntercept 
-8,360 -2,421 3,985 0,005 
BoardComp 
-4,581 -1 ,002 3,035 0,028 (H1) 
Qualsnp 0,546 0,121 0,195 0,001 (H3) 
NedOwnValue 
-0,758 -0,159 1,632 0,538 (H2) 
Board div 2,989 0,999 1,422 0,002 (Hl) 
BoardSpec Exp 1,362 0,336 0,543 0,001 (H9) 
DirectBus 
-0,242 -0,082 0,464 0,489 (H11) 
CEO-Board FuncDist 2,079 0,356 1,224 0,021 (H15) 
CEO-Board EducSim 4,160 0,941 1,81 3 0,001 (H16) 
CEO-Board Age dist 0,101 0,019 0,074 0,077 (H17) 
LoneFounderlead 
-0,488 -0,100 0,387 0,098 (H20) 
A-T Relatedness 0,189 0,048 0,125 0,032 
PaymentMode 
-1,794 0,750 0,017 
Using the ROC procedure in SPSS 21 , we first saved the predicted values 
generated by our logistic regression model (1 b) for ali the cases included in the 
analysis (these are the predicted probabilities of a case belonging to the target group 
given the threshold of 0,5) , then we introduce this values as a Test variable , while 
the AcquSuccess as the State variable specifying that success is designated by 
cases showing a value of 1 and unsuccess is represented by the cases with the 
value of O. 
The area under the ROC curve shown in Figure 5.2, which range from 0 to 
one, provides the ability of our logistic model (1 b) to discriminate between the cases 
experiencing an acquisition success versus those who experienced an unsuccessful 
one. This ability of discrimination, measured by the Area under the Curve (AUC) 
------
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parameter is about 0,84 (Table 5.19), which means that our logistic madel have an 
excellent discrimination ability (Hosmer and Lameshaw, 2000). 
Table 5.19 
Logistic Model (1 b)- Area Under the Curve 
Test Result Variables : Predicted Probabili_ty_ 
A rea Std.Error a asymptoticb Asymptotic 95% Confidence lnterval 
Sig . Lower Bond Upper Bond 
,840 ,034 ,000 ,774 ,907 
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 
b. Null hypothesis: !rue area = 0.5 
1 ,o'T-----------;:===:::::r--------:71 
0,8 
0 ,4 
0 ,2 
0 ,0~-~--------.---------,.---------.---------.c---------; 
0 ,0 0 ,2 0,4 0 ,6 
1 -Spécificité 
Figure 5.2: Logistic Madel (1 b)- ROC Curve 
0 ,8 1 ,0 
Ali in ali , our tests in addition to the parameters of the goodness of fit 
presented in section 5.2.2 allow us to conclude with confidence that our logistic 
madel is robust and that its ability to discriminate between successful and 
unsuccessful acquisitions ranges from good to excellent if we consider the standard 
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error of 0,034, which implies that with a 95% confidence interval the AUC is still 
situated between 0,774 and 0,907 (Table 5.19). 
5.3 Analysis , Results ' interpretation and formai hypotheses testing with the 
OLS regression madel 
As discussed in chapter V, OLS regression was used to test our hypotheses 
H4, H6, H8, H10, H18 and H19. Using a continuous variable L1 ROAicomputed as the 
difference between ROAposti and ROAprei of ali the cases that were classified as 
successful acquisitions. 
Our objective is to measure which variables contribute to create more 
economie value in the context of successful acquisitions , however the OLS 
procedures require a more rigorous analysis in arder to comply with its main 
underlying assumptions. Thus, in addition to the multicolinearity problems treated in 
the precedent sections , OLS regression should conform to the conditions of the 
linearity between the dependent and the independent variables, the constant 
variance of the error terms, the independence of the error terms and the normality of 
the error terms' distribution (Hair et al , 1997). 
We started by analyzing ali the variables' distribution histograms, Kurtosis 
and Skewness values along with Shapiro-Wilk test to identify any departure from 
normality and proceed to any eventual transformations. For linearity we will examine 
the residuals plot after running the initial madel. 
The fi rst issue was in relation to L1 ROAi with a Skewness value of -0,905 but a 
Kurtosis value of 1 ,942. To correct th is problem, we transformed L1 ROAi into Log (Ll 
ROAi) which after verification, corrected the initial departure from normality. After 
proceeding in the same way as explained above with ali our independent variables , 
we ended with the following ones as the predictors for our OLS madel : Qua/snp, 
Board Div, BoardSpecExp, CEO-Board FuncDist, CEO-Board EducSim and the A-T 
Relatedness as a control variable. Initial Equation (2) presented in chapter 4 was 
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therefore adjusted according to this procedure, ending with the following final 
equation: 
(2a) Log (Ll ROAi) = l3o + I31Qualsnpi + l32 SignShareholderRepi + l33 Boarddivi + 
l34 BoardSpecExpi + 8 5 Auditcomi + l3sCEO-Board FuncDisfi + 
I31 CEO-Board EducSim + l3a A-TRelatednessi + Ui 
The final sample that satisfied the conditions of acquisition success and the 
computation of Log (L1 ROA) was constituted by 32 cases to be used for the 
assessment of equation (2a). Although we ended with 51 cases that were successful 
acquisitions (See Table 5.1 0), 19 cases were improvements of negative ROAs (for 
example the ROApre-acquisition was -12% and the ROApost-acquisition was -6%) 
which is a positive improvement of 6 percent points) but the Delta ROA is not 
meaningful (with a decrease rate of -5%) given the presence of negative values. 
Thus, to eliminate the effect of magnitude in the difference between 
ROApost-acquisitions and ROApre-acquisitions (given the fact that the acquirers in 
our sample come from different industries and sectors) , the f1 ROA makes it possible 
to assess better the improvements of ROA for successful acquirers. The (ROApost-
acquisition-ROApre-acquisition) average of the 40 unsuccessful acquirers that 
satisfied only conditions 1 and 2 (see Table 5.1 0) was -11,77 percentage point, wh ile 
the average of this difference was 9,2 percentage points for the 51 successful 
acquirers that satisfied ali the conditions. As for the 32 cases out of 51 , for which it 
was possible to compute the tJ.ROA, the average of the improvement rate was 67%. 
The prediction model of ROA improvements for successful acquirers was 
statistically significant F(8, 23)=2,574, p<0 ,05 and accounted fro approximately 47% 
(29% when adjusted) of the variance of Log (L1 ROA) (see Table 5.20) . The 
regression coefficients of ali the predictors are shown in Table 5.20. BoardDiv was 
positively and significantly (p<O, 1 0) related to the improvements of ROA for 
successful acqu irers , which leads us to accept Hypothesis H8. 
Table 5.20 
OLS regression results 
Dependent variable: Log (Ll ROAi) 
Model (2a) Coeff. VIF Hypoth. 
lntercept 
-3 ,952** 
Qualsnp 0,031 2,010 (H4) 
SignShareholderRep 
-0,455 1,608 (H6) 
Board Div 3,204** 1,247 (H8) 
BoardSpec Exp 0 ,329*** 1,556 (H1 0) 
Auditcom 0,545 1,419 (H1 3) 
CEO-Board FuncDist 0,068 1,360 (H18) 
CEO-Board EducSim 1 ,505** 1,266 (H19) 
A-T Relatedness 0,049 1 '158 
N 32 
R> 47,2% 
R2 Adjusted 29% 
Reg.Model df 8 
Res.Model df 23 
Model F 2,574 
Model Sig. 0,036** 
* p<0. 01 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.10 
Status 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
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Another interesting and original find ing is the positive and significant 
relationship (p<0,05) of BoardSpecExp and the improvements of ROA for successful 
acquirers. As defined previously, the BoardSpecExp measures the relative 
experience of the board members relatively to the top management team, 
accounting therefore for the problem of information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent. Our results suggest that boards with more industry experience 
relatievely to managers will suffer less from information asymmetry, which is 
positively and significantly associated with firm performance in the context of M&A 
operations. Hypothesis H10 is therefore accepted. 
ln relation to the level of education , the similarity between the CEO and the 
Board members, as measured by the CEO-Board EducSim variable, holds a positive 
and significant (p<0.05) relationship with the improvements of ROA in the context of 
successful acquisitions , which lead us to accept Hypothesis H19. 
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Hypotheses H4, H6, H13 and H18 should be rejected as the Qua/snp , 
SignShareholderRep, Auditcom and CEO-BoardFuncOist variables were 
respectively not significantly related to the lmprovement of the ROA as measured by 
Log (L1 ROA) . 
ln arder to assess the linearity assumption , we first analysed the residuals 
regression plots (Figure 5.3). The analysis of this figure does not show any 
significant departure from linearity, ensuring that the overall equation is linear. As we 
have 8 independent variables, we have performed the same analysis as in Figure 
5.3, but with the partial regression plots of each one of our predictors (not reported). 
Like in the case of residuals , no pattern of nonlinearity was observed which indicates 
that the assumption of linearity for each independent variable in our madel is met. 
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Finally, and given the endogeneity problem encountered in the models used 
in the corporate governance studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weisbach and 
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Hermalin , 2000; Bhagat and Black, 2002) , further analysis should be conducted to 
ensure that our results are not biased. The endogeneity problem may for example be 
illustrated by the fact that firm performance could be, at the same time , the results of 
board diversity and a factor that will influence the degree of diversity in subsequent 
board composition . Put simply, a variable is considered as endogenous when it is 
correlated with the error term in a regression madel. ln the case that an endogoneity 
issue is detected, the standard OLS could not be performed as the coefficients would 
be biased and a two-stage (2SLS) least squares regression is therefore needed. 
ln arder to assess this phenomenon, we used instrumental variables to 
perform the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) for the detection of any endogeneity 
problem. To assess the endogeneity for our 8 indepent variables in equation 2a , we 
performed 16 OLS regressions as follow: 
1- 1 n the first step we considered separately each independent variable in 
equation 2a (e.g. BoardDiv) as a dependent variable using a set of 
instrumental predictors, choosen among our variables, to run an OLS 
regression and save the unstandardized regression errors from this step as 
a new variable (e.g . UEBoardDiv) ; 
2- We performed an OLS on equation 2a adding the unstandadized regression 
errors' variable (e.g. UEBoardDiv) obtained in step 1 along with the 
independent variable of interest (e.g. BoardDiv) and ali the other 7 variables ; 
3- We verified that the coefficient of the unstandardized regression errors' 
variable (e.g. UEBoardDiv) is not significant. Thus, when this term is not 
significant, we can conclude that the variable is not affected by an 
endogeneity issue. 
When applied to our predictors in madel 2a, The Hausman test (as described 
above) yielded no endogeneity problems, ensuring that our coefficients were not 
biased and that there was no need for the use of any simultaneous equations. 
Although not reported, the details of these analyses are available under request. 
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ln summary, our findings from the OLS regression model support hypotheses 
H8, H10 and H19, while hypotheses H4, H6, H13 and H18 should be rejected. 
5.4 Findings and discussion 
ln this section we will discuss our findings in relation to the dimensions of our 
theoretical model presented in chapter 3, as weil as to corporate governance 
literature and board of directors' role in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 
5.4 .1 Discussion of findings in relation to Pi/far 1: Board Legitimacy 
When Board legitimacy is based on the outsider or the independent status of 
directors, measured by the BoardComp Variable our findings suggest a statistically 
negative relationship with the firm ability to select successful acquisitions. This 
finding could be explained by the flawless of the directors' independency concept 
when measured by the proportion of Non executive directors based on the absence 
of a material relationship between the firm and the director. The tenants of the 
Agency perspective (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) have 
probably overestimated the theoretical positive effect expected from the presence on 
the board of a large majority constituted by outside members, which could be 
reversed by an exacerbated information asymmetry when these directors are lacking 
specifie information, expertise and knowledge about the company and its businesses 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990; Allai re and Fi rsi rotu , 2003; Van den Bergh and Levrau , 
2004) . 
Hence, severe information asymmetries suffered by the so cal led 
independent directors will imply, therefore, a passive implication of the board in the 
fi rm decision making processes, in addition to an awkward accomplishment of its 
decision control role, as prescribed and expected by agency theory. 
However, when Board legitimacy is based on the quality of the directors ' 
selection processes, measured by the Qualsnp variable, we found a positive and 
significant relationship with the probability of making a successful acquisition . Thus, 
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boards with a high quality selection and nomination processes are associated with a 
noticeable increase in the likelihood of selecting successful acquisitions, that is, 
Boards of directors (1) having a nominating committee; (2) providing a clear 
description of their selection process; (3) having a majority of the committee 
members seating in other firm 's nomination committees; (3) having and/or 
divulgating updated long-term plans for the composition of the board that take into 
consideration the strategie direction of the corporation ; (4) defining diligently the ideal 
mix of director's qualifications; (5) having a majority of independent directors seating 
in the nomination committee and (6) using the service of external advisers . 
This finding raise the critical importance of board selection processes and 
given that our measure is a composite index of various aspects, it will be interesting 
to further investigate which components among those used in our index are most 
important in improving the quality of board selection processes in order to make a 
more accurate evaluation. Eventhough our tests identified no multicolinearity or 
endogeneity problems, severa! authors have indicated that Board selection could be 
endogenously determined (Hermalin and Weisbach , 2003, Bhagat and Black, 2002) 
and that firm anterior performance could have affected the selection process and 
vice versa. Here again, our finding opens the door for further investigation in order to 
understand better how the board selection processes could be improved in order to 
nominate truly legitimate directors who will contribute significantly in firm 's strategie 
decisions. Nevertheless, our results support the statement that nomination 
committees with established working procedures and relevant resources will 
constitute an important institutional mechanism that improve directors' selection and 
independence as suggested by Ruigrok et al (2006) and that independence could 
contribute significantly in making sound strategie decisions such as in the case of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
As expected, Board /egitimacy based on directors' ownership is not 
statistically significant when related to the firm probability of making successful 
acquisitions. This finding does not support the agency theory view claiming that 
director's compensation plays a significant role in improving firms' strategie decisions 
and consequently firm performance (Bothwell , 1981 ; Kesner, 1987; Kren and Kerr, 
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1997; Bhagat et al, 1999; Zajac and Westphal , 1995; Morck et al, 1988), and is 
rather in line with the findings of Hayes et al (2004) . As in the case of insiders, we 
may explain this result by considering that outsiders, when possessing a significant 
portion of firm 's shares, could be induced to exert insufficient effort, tolerate that 
managers maximize private benefits or adopt entrenchment behaviour (Morck et al , 
1988, Short and Keasey, 1999). 
5.4.2 Discussion of findings in relation to Pif/ar 1: Board Credibility 
Board Credibility based on the diversity of occupational backgrounds , 
measured as the heterogeneity of director's occupational backgrounds, is positively 
and statistically related to the probability of making successful acquisitions. ln 
addition, Board diversity is also positively and significantly related to acquisition 
performance measured as the improvement of firm's ROA. 
Occupational backgrounds diversity tends to conjointly capture experience, 
information, and perspectives relevant to cognitive tasks performed by the Board 
members (Simons et al , 1999 p. 663) and Directors with different backgrounds bring 
different perspectives and opinions , complementary skills and knowledge (Forbes 
and Mill iken, 1999), which may facilitate advice and counsel (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Hillman and Dalziel , 2003) . This finding is in line with those reported by 
previous studies linking Top team management diversity and firm performance 
(Cannella et al , 2008; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Norburn and Birley, 
1988). 
Our results show that what most matter in the board composition is not the 
mix of outsiders/insiders but rather the diversity of their occupational backgrounds 
which makes boards more effective as stated by Allaire and Firsirotu, (2009): "white 
it is legitimacy that gives a board the right and the authority to impose its will on 
management, it is credibility that makes a board effective and va/ue-creating (2009, 
p. 254) . Finally, directors' occupational background diversity could constitute a hard 
to imitate governance resource that provides the firm with an essential ingredient of 
value creation . These findings support therefore the Value Creating Governance 
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perspective, the resource dependence theory, the socicognitive branch of the 
institutional theory and the Resource Based view. 
Another source of Board Credibility is the reduction of the information 
asymmetries that stem from the lack, by Directors, of firm 's industry specifie 
experience and knowledge. The BoardSpecExp variable that captures the relative 
degree of industry specifie experiences between board members and the three top 
managers was a positive and significant predictor of the probability of making 
successful acquisitions. ln addition , BoardSpecExp is also positively and signficantly 
related to the improvements of ROA in the context of successful acquisitions. These 
findings fill the gap in the literature of corporate governance by introducing an 
original measure of Information asymmetry which was not considered in previous 
research. While eliminating the management information asymmetry advantage 
(generally stemming from various sources such as the access to privileged strategie, 
financial or operational information) is practically impossible, the significant reduction 
of its negative effects could be achieved when the average board members have 
superior and extensive knowledge about firm industries and businesses 
comparatively to the firm top managers' average industry specifie experiences. 
Thus, credible boards with a relatively lesser information asymmetry 
disadvantage due to outside directors' industry knowledge will increase their ability to 
challenge management proposais , to bring a critical view on management decisions 
and to contribute effectively in firm decision making processes, which , as our results 
suggest, is found to be positively and sign ificantly related with the probability of 
selecting successful acqu isitions that create higher economie value. 
As expected , Board Busyness is not necessarily a source of Board credibility 
as supported by the tenets of the resource dependence theory. Our results tend to 
be in line with those reported by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) holding the view that 
busiest directors holding more than three directorships at the same time do not 
significantly contribute to firm value creation and are likely to lack sufficient time and 
energy to involve their selves actively in firm key strategie decisions such as in the 
case of mergers and acquisitions. 
- ---·--- --------------- ---
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While other researchers have reported a positive relationship between Board 
busyness and firm performance (Ferris et al , 2003; Perry and Peyer, 2005; DiPietra 
et al 2008), our results suggest that, although not statistically sigficant, Boards with a 
majority of directors holding multiple directorships at the same time are negatively 
related to the probability of making successful acquisitions, which supports partially 
the view that the positive effects of directors' busysiness such as complementing 
inside directors with knowledge on M&A issues and obstacles or helping in the 
reduction of decision making biases (Harris and Shimizu, 2004) are likely to be 
reversed by the negative ones, such as the lack of time and energy to participate 
actively in the firm acquisition processes. 
5.4.3 Discussion of findings in relation to Pillar Il : Strategie Processes, 
Dialogue and Board Strategie Capabilities 
While Board Legitimacy and Credibility reflect the quality of governance 
resources (Directors' nomination, diversity of valuable occupational diversity and 
industry specifie knowledge and experiences), Board strategie capabilities refer to 
the firm specifie, and difficult to imitate, corporate governance processes and board 
capacity to use the acquired governance resources and competences available to 
the firm in arder to achieve a competitive advantage by, at least, lowering effectively 
the agency costs, and ideally by contributing to generate superior economie rents 
through directors' active and effective involvement in firm strategie decision making 
processes (Bouzinab, 2005; 2006). ln arder to test Allaire and Firsirotu 's (1993 ; 
2003, 2004; 2009) second pillar, namely strategy processes and dialogue as one of 
the essential pillars for governance to create value, we used the concept of Board 
strategie capabilities to assess the quality of fi rm strategie processes and dialogue 
between board members and fi rm's managers. 
Thus , Functional distance between the CEO and the Board was used as the 
first proxy for Board strategie capabilities and our findings show a significant and 
positive re lationship of this measure with the probabi lity of making successful 
acquisitions. This result is in line with those reported by Korn et al , (1992) in the 
context of Top Management Team divers ity and could indicate that boards having a 
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different functional background from the CEO will experience better strategie 
decision processes and debate (Simons, 1995), which in turn contribute to firm 
performance, in our case through making successful acquisitions. 
The second variable used to proxy the Board strategie eapabilities is the 
similarity of the educational level between the CEO and the Board of directors' 
members. Our results show a strong significant and positive relationship with both 
the probability of making successful acquisitions and with the improvement of the 
acquirers' ROA. As reported by Westphal and Zajac (1995), Educational level was 
previously found to be related with the capacity of information processing (Schroder 
et al , 1967 drawn from Westphal and Zajac, 1995), a higher rate of innovation and 
higher rate of strategie change (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992). Thus, we could argue that Board strategie eapabilities are enhanced when 
board members and the CEO have similar educational levels which will contribute , 
through the facilitation of strategie information processing and strategie dialogue (i.e. 
Pillar Il of the Value Creating Governance perspective), to increase the probability of 
making successful acquisitions. 
Furthermore, our results show that Age Euclidian distance between the CEO 
and the Board of directors' average age was also significantly and positively related 
to the probability of making a successful acquisition . However, this positive 
relationship, although significant, is relatively marginal when compared to the 
magnitude of the relationship of functional background distance, educational 
similarity between the CEO and the Board members and the probability of making a 
successful acquisition. Moreover, this result points out the importance of age 
distance between the Board members and the CEO and its effect on their respective 
attitudes toward risk taking for instance. 
lndeed, previous studies show that young executives are generally more 
likely to take risks than their older colleagues (Vroom and Pahl , 1971; Rhodes, 1983; 
Hitt and Tyler, 1991 drawed from Westphal and Jazac 1995) which lead them to 
differently evaluate acquisitions' proposais and make different selections as reported 
by Hitt and Tyler (1991 ). Furthermore, older executives seem to seek more 
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information and to take more time before making their decisions than their younger 
counterparts (Taylor, 1975 in Westphal and Zajac, 1995). On the light of these 
arguments, we could explain our results by arguing that the age distance between 
the CEO and the Board members will act as a balancing mechanism. Thus, in the 
case of a young CEO, a Board with a majority of old members will prevent him from 
higher risk taking attitudes and faster decisions making without extensive 
information, while in the case of an older CEO, a relatively younger Board will push 
him to consider more risky options and to proceed more quickly with the acquisition 
deals. 
ln relation to the Lone founder effect, our results do not support the 
proposition that the existence of a Lone Founder or occupying the Chair position by 
a Lone Founder are related to the firm probability of making successful acquisitions. 
While th is proposition was theoretically hypothesized but never tested by Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller (2006) , our results do not support this claim . However, this variable 
was entered as a factor score, which leads us to consider with caution a formai 
rejection of the ir hypothesis. 
Finally, Board Heterogeneous tenure seems to not hold a significant 
relationship with the probability of making successful acquisitions, which is line with 
previous results reported by Bantel and Jackson, (1989) ; Wiersema and Bantel 
(1992) , Smith et al , (1994) . 
5.4.4 Discussion of findings in relation to Pi/lars Ill and IV: Information 
Processing , Compensation Setting and Board Monitoring 
Capabilities 
Board Monitoring Capabilities was measured by using three variables 
AuditCom, CompCom and OwnChar. The Auditcom- representing the proportion of 
the audit committee members possessing financial literacy, accounting skills and 
previous acquisition experiences as board members or as executives- was positively 
but not significantly related to the probability of acquisition success nor ta the 
improvement of ROA in the context of successful acquisitions. Th is result could 
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appear, at first sight, as being surprising given the importance of the audit committee 
as a monitoring mechanism, but we could argue that while the audit committee will 
have members with financial and acquisition experiences, their real contribution will 
intervene to ensure proper methods of accounting for acquisition in the reporting 
stage and not necessarily during the pre-acquisition process. While due diligence 
could play an important role in selecting a successful acquisition , audit committees 
with higher proportion of members with financial and accounting expertise generally 
intervene in the review of financial statements once the acquisition is done and not 
necessarily during the acquisition process. Another possible explanation of this 
result is that variations among audit committees composition in the sample are 
limited by the legal requirements in regard of audit committee structure and 
composition. 
As for the CompCom we found no significant relationship with the probability 
of making successful acquisitions or with the improvements of the ROA in the case 
of successful acquisitions. As our variable is a composite score of several 
components such as the experience and ownership of the committee members or 
the nature of the CEO pay package, it could hide important variations between the 
individual components and therefore affect its relationship with the dependent 
variable. However, and due to the limited size of our sample, the adoption of these 
components separately would weaken the prediction power of our madel by 
decreasing dramatically the ratio of observation to the independent predictors. Our 
results suggest however that the adoption of a composite score for th is measure as 
proposed by Sun and Cahan (2009) yield no significant effects on firm acquisition 
success. Further investigation could be done in the future by analysing the different 
components and by considering new independent variables that would measure 
better the relationsh ip between the monitoring effect of compensation committee and 
acquisition performance. 
The final measure of Board monitoring capabilities was the OwnChar variable 
which was also not a significant predictor of successful acquisitions. Although 
OwnChar was not conceptualized during the initial theoretical development of our 
variables, it was adopted following the factor analysis step which generated a factor 
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component that comprised the SignShareholder, SignSharelholderRep, the 
FamilyBoard, the FamilyControl and Oualshare variables. To avoid multicolinearity 
problems we decided to consider the variable factor score that we labelled OwnChar 
given that ali these variables reflected the ownership characteristics of the firm . Our 
results are difficult to interpret given the implication of several variables, but we could 
conclude that family firms with significant shareholding represented in the board of 
directors, and using dual shares seem to be not a significant predictor of firm 
acquisition success. Furthermore, we ran several logistic models by including one of 
these variables without the others to identify if there is any significant effect that an 
individual variable could exert on the probability of the acquisit ion process, but no 
one of these models generated a different result from that obtained by the variable 
factor score. 
ln line with the previous studies discussed through the literature review in 
chapter 2, our two control variables were also significantly related to the acquisition 
success. The relatedness between the acquirer and the target A-T Relatedness was 
positively associated with acquisition success, while the proportion of shares to cash 
for acqu isition payment, measured by the PaymentMode variable was negatively and 
significantly related with the probability of making a successful acquisition . 
5.5 Chapter conclusion 
ln this chapter we have presented the results of the factor analysis, the 
logistic and the OLS regression models. The factor analysis led us to adopt three 
variable factor scores to avoid multicol inearity issues and to reformulate our 
measurement madel by reconsidering our initial equations on bath the logistic and 
the OLS regressions steps. 
Our logistic madel exhibited a robust prediction power with an overall 77% 
classification rate , classifying correctly successful acquisitions in 71% of the cases 
and unsuccessful acquisitions in 81% of the cases at the 0,5 eut-off. The logistic 
madel accounted for 53% of the variance. The ROC Analysis showed an Area Under 
the Curve (AUC) rate of 0,84 which is considered by Hosmer and Lamshaw (2000) 
224 
as an indication that the discrimination ability of the model could be considered as 
ranging between good to excellent. 
To further test the robustness and the stability of our log istic model we have 
conducted an internai cross validation test using the Bootstrap procedure that 
assessed the model on 1000 random replacement sam pies drawn from our original 
data. Bootstrap results were compatible with those obtained with our original sample. 
Outliers' effect was eliminated by testing for the Standardized residuals and 
the Cook's distances generated by our model, which reduced our sample to 125 
cases instead of 133. Multicolineraity was also controlled by examining the 
correlation matrix and Standard-Errors of the Wald statistics. 
As for the OLS regression model, we ensured that our model was compliant 
with the linearity and the normality assumptions by examining the residual plots , the 
distribution histograms and the Kurtosis and Skewness indicators of each of our 
variables. When it was possible, we transformed our variables to comply with these 
assumptions; otherwise, we eliminated the variable from our final model. As a result 
of this step, we transformed the ..d ROAi into Log (..d ROAi) in order to attain a 
dependent variable with a normal distribution. 
We ended with a sample of 32 successful acquirers. VIF indexes were ali 
largely under 1 0, which indicate that our mode! is not affected by multicolinearity 
problems. We also, opted for the Hausman test of endogeneity by running 16 
regressions to test if any of our independent variables was endogenously 
determined. No endogeneity effect in relation to our predictor variables was 
identified. The OLS prediction model was statistically significant and accounted for 
approximately 47% of the Log (..d ROAi} variance. 
The Board Legitimacy dimension was measured by the BoardComp, the 
Qualsnp, the NedOwn, and the NedOwnValue variables. Our results show that board 
legitimacy when based on the quality of the selection processes (Qualsnp) 
constitutes a significant positive predictor of acquisition success, while Board 
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legitimacy based on the directors' financial participation or a majority of outsider and 
materially independent directors are associated with a decrease in the probability of 
making a successful acquisitions. ln relation to the Board legitimacy dimension, our 
results supported hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, while hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 were 
rejected . 
Board Credibilty was measured by the BoardDiv, the BoardSpecExp and 
DirectBus variables. Our findings show that Board Credibilty based on the Board 
occupational diversity (BoardDiv) constitutes a significant and positive predictor of 
acquisition success and is positively and significantly related with the improvements 
of firm economie performance in the case of acquisition success. 
Also, Board Credibility based on the higher industry specifie experience of 
Board members relatively to the industry specifie experience of the firm top mangers 
(BoardSpecExp) constitutes a significant and positive predictor of acquisition 
success and is positively and significantly related to the improvement of firm 
economie performance in the case of successful acquisitions. This finding points out 
the importance of industry experience and knowledge of the board members and 
supports our hypotheses H7, H8, H9 and H 1 O. 
Board credibility when measured by the Directors' number of directorships 
(DirectBus) shows that boards with higher proportions of Busy directors (those 
holding more than 3 directorships at the same time) are negatively related to 
acquisition success, implying that the benefits of sitting on other boards is likely to be 
outweighed by the lack of time and involvement of busiest directors in the incumbent 
firm's acquisition processes, which supported our hypothesis (H11 ). 
Board Strategie Capabilities dimension, which underlies the effectiveness of 
strategy processes and dialogue between the board and management, was 
measured by the functional distance between the CEO and the board members 
(CEO-Board FuncDist), the educational level similarity between the CEO and the 
Board members (CEO-Board EducSim) , the age distance between the CEO the 
Board members (CEO-Board Age dist) , the presence of a Lone founder as a leader 
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(LoneFounderLead) and the heterogeneity of directors' tenure (Boardten) variables. 
Our results show that CEO-Board functional distance, Educational level similarity 
and age distance are ali significant and positive predictors of acquisition success , 
while the presence of a lone founder as a leader and the Board tenure heterogeneity 
were not significantly related to acquisitions success. 
These results suggest that strategie dialogue and firm strategie processes 
could be enhanced by Board strategie eapabilities when based on distant functional 
backgrounds , greater age distance, and similar educational level between the CEO 
and the Board members. Furthermore, Educational similarity between the CEO and 
the Board members is also positively and significantly related to the improvements of 
firm 's ROA in the case of successful acquisitions. These findings supported our 
hypotheses H15, H16, H17 and H19, while hypotheses H18, H20 and H21 were 
rejected. 
Board Monitoring Capabilities dimension was measured by Auditeom, 
CompCom and Ownehar variables. Although ali of them were positively related to 
acquisition success, no one of these variables was a significant predictor of 
successful acquisitions. Monitoring eapabilities measured through the AuditCom and 
the CompCom variables hold no significant relationship with the probability of making 
acquisition success. These committees, while continue to be important fiduciary 
mechanisms that ensure proper financial reporting and adequate compensating 
programs, appear to not directly contribute to the firm ability to select successful 
acquisitions. As for the presence on the board of a significant shareholder, including 
Family owners and the use of Dual shares, our results show no significant 
relationship of these variables with the probability of ma king a successful acquisition 
when measured by the variable factor score OwnChar. Hypothesis H14 was 
therefore accepted, while hypotheses H12 and H13 were rejected. 
Finaliy, our results support hypothesis H22, and our findings show that in the 
context of strategie decision making such as in the case of M&A operations, Board 
strategie and not monitoring capabilities are the most important factors in predicting 
successful acqu isitions, wh ich should induce future research and governance 
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reforms to consider more seriously the strategie role of the Board of directors in 
creating value through an effective contribution in the firm allocation processes, 
specifically in the context M&A operations. 
CONCLUSION 
The present thesis primary objective was to investigate how corporate 
governance should be extended in arder for boards to play a more strategie role in 
the firm 's value creation processes, rather than sticking to a monitoring and 
disciplining function rooted in the traditional agency perspective. Given that board of 
directors, while may have some direct effect on firms' critical decisions, such as 
acquisitions, and only an indirect effect on firm financial performance in normal 
circumstances (Deutsch, 2005) , this dissertation studied the role of board of directors 
in the area of Merger and Acquisition decisions to assess their contribution to firm 
performance. Our study of governance with respect to the M&A phenomenon is 
sensitive to the main frameworks proposed in the literature on governance, including 
the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling , 1976), stewardship theory (Donaldson , 
1990), the Resource Dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the Resource 
Based View (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and the Value Creating Perspective 
(Allaire and Firsirotu , 2003) . 
Through logistic and OLS regressions, we assessed how Board Legitimacy, 
Board Credibility, Board Strategie and Monitoring Capabilities predict successful 
acquisitions, and how they contribute to the improvements of fi rm post- acquisition 
performance. 
From a theoretical perspective, the key contribution of our thesis consists in 
integrati ng the Agency theory, the demographie concepts of group dynamics drawn 
from the Top Management Team tradition of the Upper Echelon Theory, the 
Resource Based View with the four pillars of the Value Governance perspective 
(Allaire and Firsirotu , 1993; 2003; 2004; 2009) through the concepts of Board 
229 
Strategie and Monitoring eapabilities to show how together Board Legitimaey, 
Credibility, Strategie and Monitoring Capabi/ities contribute to enhance the 
probability of making successful acquisitions and create economie value through 
M&A operations. Our findings show the great future potential for developing further 
the Value Creating Governance perspective as a significant theoretical frame to 
explain how Board of directors may contribute actively and effectively in firms ' 
strategie decision making processes and firm economie value creation. Our findings 
bring , therefore, more evidence and more support to the stream of research related 
to the active school of board role in strategy, (Hendry and Kiel , 2004; Pearce and 
Zahra , 1991 ; Stiles and Taylor, 2001 , Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, Donaldson, 1990). 
From a Methodological perspective , one of the key contributions of our thesis 
is to introduce various original variables used for the fi rst time in the context of 
governance and M&A Studies. The first of these original variables is the measure of 
acquisition success construct (our main dependent variable) by adopting a rigorous 
assessment process that starts with ensuring that the acquisition was not divested in 
the three to five years following the acquisition date, that no goodwill write-offs 
related to the acquisition under study of more than 10% were reported in the two to 
five following years and finally, that the average adjusted ROA post acquisition of the 
three years following the acquisition year is higher than the pro forma average 
adjusted ROA of the three years preceding the acquisition year. 
To measure the quality of the selection process, we used also for the first 
time the Qua/snp variable by constructing a multidimensional score that takes in 
consideration various elements reflecting the nomination committee structure and 
practices. This measure contributes to the scarce literature that studies the effect of 
the nomination committee and its pract ices on firm performance and points out the 
critical role of the selection and nomination processes as a primary source of Boards 
and directors' leg itimacy. 
Another original measure is the BoardSpeeExp which served to 
operationalize the Credibility dimension through the average degree of industry 
specifie experiences of the board members relatively to the average experience of 
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the three top managers in the firm. To our knowledge, this measure is an original 
one and constitutes a new way of assessing the advantage or disadvantage of the 
critical phenomenon of Information Asymmetry that underpin ali the agency 
relationships between the principals and the agents and which will remain as one of 
the main issues in the corporate governance field . 
Finally, in terms of corporate governance practice, our findings shed light on 
the critical aspects of board selection and nomination processes. Having legitimate 
and credible directors sitting on the board starts with a clear definition of the specifie 
needs of the firm , and these needs have to be rigorously tied to the strategie 
direction of the corporation , to its risks and to its opportunities in order to define the 
ideal mix of directors' qualifications. This exercise should not be seen as a formai 
fiduciary duty to add into the board checklist of routine tasks, but rather as a critical 
component of the firm strategie planning processes. Nomination of new board 
members should not be merely assimilated with fiduciary obligation , it should rather 
be considered as a strategie decision that aims the acquisition of valuable resources 
to be embedded in firm governance processes to build governance strategie 
capabilities that will contribute in creating sustainable economie value. 
Furthermore, nomination committee with members having experiences in 
other firms' committees is also a differentiating attribute that would reinforce the 
quality of the firm's nominating practices. 
As to board composition, director's independence based on the materiality 
concept as the principal aspect of directors' nomination should also be questioned. 
Our findings show that occupational diversity and industry specifie experience of 
directors are more likely to add value for the board than the mere compliance with 
the relational materiality condition. Furthermore, our findings showed that higher 
functional distance between the board members and the CEO are more likely to 
induce dynamic and strategically active Boards. 
ln addition, when board members have a similar educational level as the 
CEO, the strategie dialogue is likely to be facilitated, while age distance between the 
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board and the CEO may balance the weaknesses that characterize the management 
style of aider and younger CEOs. Finally, ensuring that directors' industry specifie 
experience is at least equivalent or ideally superior to the average experience of the 
top firms ' manager could also be considered as an important attribute for board 
credibility. 
Regarding Board multiple directorships, our findings suggest that boards 
should rather limit the proportion of busiest directors. lndeed, while the firm could 
take some advantage from the access to these directors' external networks , their 
active contribution in the firm strategie processes remains uncertain and their 
negative contribution could offset the benefits obtained in terms of the access to 
external resources if that is the objective behind their nomination on the firm 's Board 
of directors. 
Our findings invite therefore corporate governance practitioners and 
legislators to reconsider the priority given to the fiduciary aspects and to shift 
towards a more strategie oriented reforms and practices that would enable the Board 
of directors' strategie capabilities and to integrate them as significant components of 
the firm competitive advantage. 
Several limitations are associated with our research project. The first 
limitation of the present study is the sample size used for bath the logistic and the 
OLS regression models. The choice to proceed with only significant acquisitions that 
meet ali our requirements , while it may ensure the strategie character and the 
magnitude of the acquisitions under study, has severely limited the size of our 
sample which also constra ined the number of variables to include in the analysis. 
The period of analysis could also affect our results , as acquisitions made in 2000, 
were not necessarily conducted in the same economie conditions as those made in 
the late 2006. The data collected for the period prior to 2002 were not yet affected by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms, which could disadvantage firms having made their 
acquisitions before 2002. 
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Finally, the study is restricted to the Canadian context and any generalisation 
of our findings to other institutional contexts is therefore limited. 
Future research could extend the context of our study to other countries and 
compare how our findings are replicable in other settings such the US, the Asian or 
the European contexts. The US context of M&A may offer the opportunity to select a 
more sizable sample, which may reduce the Type Il error of rejecting exiting effects 
by considering them statistically insignificant. 
Another limitation of our study is the composite nature of some variables, 
specifically those related with the monitoring capability dimension , such as the 
CompCom variable. Splitting this measure in several variables could capture better 
the variance among the sample population and could point out specifie aspects that 
are significant but was not captured given the weaker ratings on the other items 
composing the aggregate score. 
While ROA is widely used in strategie management research (Bettis, 1981 , 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991 ; Allaire and Firsirotu , 
1993; 2004), particularly in assessing post acquisitions performance (Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1990; Cash et al , 2006) and is highly correlated with other return measures 
(Bettis, 1981 ; Sarton and Gordon , 1988), it remains an accounting based indicator, 
which could be biased or manipulated by management. The accounting methods for 
acquisitions also vary from a firm to another which could also introduce some bias. 
Our results suggest that the initial classification based on the improvements of the 
ROA was not infaillible. An interesting research avenue will be to compelemen the 
our conditions in relation to the absence of goodwill write-offs and divestiments with 
other indicators such as the EVA, the free cash flows or some market based 
indicators, such as the abnormal returns used in the event studies to identify which 
of our findings will be still supported. 
Another avenue for future research is the use of structural equations with 
survey data drawn from larger samples to measure more accurately the relationship 
between the latent dimensions such as Legitimacy, Credibility, Board strategie and 
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monitoring capabilities and other measurable variables such as demographie 
attributes (occupational , functional , educational , ... etc.) board members and 
managers' perceptions of their role, board dynamics and its involvement in strategie 
processes, directors' selection and nominating 
compensation setting practices. 
processes along with firm 
While our results remain constrained by severa! limitations discussed above, 
they constitute , in our opinion , a significant contribution in the governance and 
strategy research as they add more evidence on the strategy role of Board of 
directors that goes beyond the fiduciary monitoring and disciplining functions rooted 
in the traditional agency perspective. The Value Creating Governance perspective 
when used in the context of a single strategie decision's outcome, such as the M&A 
context , opens the door to detect various critical relationships between the dynamic, 
multifaceted and strategie role of Boards and the probability of making sound 
strategie decisions and allows to capture better the elusive link between corporate 
governance and firm performance. 
From an academie perspective, and as discussed previously, our thesis 
makes severa! contributions which , we believe , will establish many promising 
avenues for future governance research , especially for those interested in the 
importance of the role that boards are increasingly called to play in firm strategie 
decision making and their contribution to value creation and rent generation 
pro cesses. 
ln relation to Board Legitimacy, our study sheds light on the critical 
importance of directors' selection and nomination processes and its effect on 
selecting successful acquisitions. Relying on the hypothesis that outside directors 
are more independent from management than insiders , Board composition role and 
effect on firm performance were extensively investigated under the agency 
perspective by using the outsiders/insiders proportion as a proxy for board 
effectiveness. The lndependence of directors with regard to the CEO constitutes, 
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therefore, the corner stone of the fiduciary control role that board members should 
fulfill in arder to achieve monitoring effectiveness. 
Conversely, our results show that highly outsider dominated Boards are 
rather negatively related with the probability of making strategie critical decisions 
such as selecting a successful acquisition. This finding reinforces the doubt about 
the elusive link between outside directors (i.e. independent and effective) and firm 
performance as reported by many previous studies based on the agency theory 
prescriptions. ln practice, the supposed independence of outside directors (with no 
material relationship with the incumbent firm) is still associated with the best 
governance practices and represents the foundation of many governance standards 
around the world . 
Our results show however, that the independence concept, based solely on 
the outside status of directors and the material relationship rules is not, by itself, a 
sufficient condition for board effectiveness. What most matter according to our 
findings , is how directors are nominated and not their outsider or insider status. We 
believe therefore that firms with qualitative nomination and selection processes will 
enhance board legitimacy and will contribute significantly to the probability of making 
successful strategie decisions. Nomination and governance committees are, 
therefore, invited to begin their nomination processes by asking questions about 
whom the director represent and how he/she would fit the strategie needs of the firm , 
and not by considering only his/her outsider or insider status. 
Consequently, Firms should ensure that their Nomination committees define 
and establish reliable working procedures to be used as important institutional 
mechanisms that improve directors' selection and independence. 
On the basis of our findings, qualitative nominating processes were 
associated with Nominating committees composed by a majority of members sitting 
on other firms' nomination committees, having a clear mandate and a specifie 
charter that describes in details the selection process, along with the existence and 
divulgation of an annually updated long-term plan for the composition of the board 
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that take into consideration the strategie direction of the corporation , its risks and its 
opportunities and define the ideal mix of director's qualifications. The use of external 
advisers in the course of a nomination process will also contribute to ensure its 
quality. Put together, these attributes will enhance the overall quality of the 
nomination and selection processes, raising therefore the level of board legitimacy 
and ultimately contribute to the probability of making successful strategie decisions. 
While our results are based on a composite index that aggregate ali these 
dimensions, we suggest for future research , to assess them separately, in order to 
evaluate more accurately their relative effect on the probability of making successful 
acquisitions when taken individually. 
While several studies pointed out the positive impact of director's 
shareholding or the presence on the board of a significant shareholder or the founder 
in the case of family controlled firms, our results show no relationship between the 
presence of a significant shareholder or a founder and the probability of making a 
successful acquisition . However, we should recall that we used score factors 
variables aggregating several aspects- Significant shareholder presence, family 
board , the use of dual shares and the presence of a lonely founder on the board- to 
proxy the firm ownership characteristics, given the multicolinearity problems 
encountered in the course of our data analysis process. We believe, however, that 
these attributes may play a significant role in the enhancement of board legitimacy 
and invite future research to consider them in other research contexts and designs 
with no severe multicolinearity issues. 
ln relation to the Board Credibility, our results support the proposition that 
boards with highly diversified occupational backgrounds are more likely to make 
sound strategie decisions than boards with directors having simi lar profi les (Cannella 
et al, 2008; Eisen hardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Norburn and Birley, 1988). Wh ile 
several researchers from the Top Management Team (TMT) field argue that highly 
diversified groups may lead to higher levels of conflicts , interaction difficulties and 
lower levels of social integration (Hi liman and Dalziel , 2003, p.497 -498), we 
consider, as many other scholars, that heterogeneous groups will also provide broad 
consideration of alternatives, widespread information gathering, constructive conflicts 
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and effective dispute resolution (Cannella and Holcomb, 2005; Pitcher and Smith , 
2001 ; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). 
lndeed, in the context of critical strategie decisions, such as significant M&A 
operations, and particularly at the step of selecting a target, efficient generation and 
evaluation of alternatives are essential in making sound strategie choices 
(Finkelstein et al , 2009) and boards composed by directors with heterogeneous 
occupational backgrounds will , therefore, be able to gather more information from 
different internai and external contacts (Jackson, 1992) and will possess greater 
problem-solving skills along with the ability to mobilize multiple perspectives (Bantel 
and Jackson, 1989). Heterogeneous boards will also proceed with a more 
comprehensive evaluation of alternatives given the propensity and willingness of 
directors to challenge and debate each other (Giadstein , 1984; Schweiger et al , 
1989) and as noted by Finckelstein et al , (2009) , the decision quality may prove 
superior given that heterogeneous groups tend to have more analytical effectiveness 
(Amason, 1996; McGrath, 1984). 
Furthermore, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) noted that a balanced 
combination between control and collaboration components is needed to create self-
correcting cycles that replace the self-reinforcing ones and enable trust to cohabit 
with constructive cognitive and task-oriented conflicts. Finally, they concluded that 
for this integration to be successful , governance structures should, however, 
encourage diversity of board members' background as weil as outsider-insider mix 
within the boardroom , board-management formai and informai interactions 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) . Considering ali these arguments, we recommend 
for firms will ing to enhance their Board credibility to ensure a certain degree of 
occupational background heterogeneity among their directors, which may enhance, 
as supported by our results , board strategie decision making outcomes. 
Another interesting and original finding that contribute to Board Credibility, is 
related with the relative leve! of specifie industry experiences between board 
members and firm's top Managers. Power dynamics at the top of the firm was 
extensively investigated in the TMT tradition (F inckelstein et al, 2009) and research 
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in this field highlighted the influence of power on strategie decision making 
processes (Finkelstein, 1992; Mintzberg, 1992; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). 
According to Finckelstein (1992), Power cames generally from structural , prestige, 
ownership and expertise sources. From these sources, expertise will have the most 
predictive power among TMT members, which was previously assessed by matching 
functional experiences and strategie contingencies (Carpenter and Wade , 2002; 
Ham brick, 1981 ; Bunderson, 2003) . 
We could therefore argue that Credibi/ity, when based on directors' expertise 
and knowledge about the acquirer industries and businesses , may be considered as 
a source of Power that help directors to significantly influence firm strategie decision 
making processes. 
By comparing the degree of industry expertise and knowledge between 
Board members and the firm top managers (measured by our BoardSpecExp 
variable) , we could infer some considerations about Power dynamics between Board 
members and firm managers, which lead us to propose that in the case of a higher 
relative level of industry expertise and knowledge of Executive directors, the board 
may exert some power in the strategie decision making processes, and contribute 
more positively in the selection of sound acquisitions, than boards with a lower level 
of industry expertise and knowledge relatively to the top managers team. 
As for the Board Strategie Capabilities , here again we used demographie 
variables based on the functional and educational backgrounds of Board members 
relatively to the CEO, along with thei r respective age distance. These Board 
characteristics affect board vigilance and behaviour, especially in terms of its 
involvement in firm strategie making decisions (Finkelstein et al , 2009). 
Our results show that functional distance between the Board and the CEO 
was significantly and positively related to the probability of selecting successfu l 
acquisitions, suggesting that beyond the diversity of occupational backgrounds 
among directors, the functional distance between the Board members and the CEO 
may prevent the negative aspects of social integration and cohesiveness, such as 
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the concern with conformity to norms or the propensity to preserve cordial relations 
ahead of any other considerations, which may limit the quality of both strategie 
alternatives generation and evaluation capabilities by board members (Finckelstein 
et al , 2009). 
Furthermore, functional background sim ilarity between Board members and 
the CEO may signal that the board is dominated by a powerful CEO (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995) which will limit the Board members in their ability to curb and to 
challenge the strategie decision discretion of individual top managers (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Board-CEO functional distance will therefore enhance the capability 
of the Board to set and to effectively participate in the strategie dialogue and decision 
making processes, as directors will behave in a less cohesive way and will adopt a 
more challenging and independent postures. 
Another interesting finding is the positive and significant effect of the similarity 
between the Board 's and the CEO's educational level on the probability of making 
successful acquisitions. Previous studies on demographies in the TMT field 
investigated the educational background rather than the educational level distance 
between the Board and the CEO. Our findings suggest that educational level 
similarity will provide a favourable context for the board to participate in the firm 
strategie decision making by facilitating the discussion conditions with management 
about their proposais, which may contribute to the quality and depth of the strategie 
dialogue. 
Finally, age distance between the Board and the CEO appear to be also 
related with the probability of making successful acquisitions. Age distance between 
the CEO and the Board members may act as a balancing mechanism. Thus, in the 
case of a young CEO, a Board with a majority of older members may steer him/her 
away from overly risky ventures. On the other hand, in the case of an older CEO, a 
relatively younger Board may urge him to consider some more risky strategie options 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995), particularly in the context of a strategie acquisition. 
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Considering corporate governance in terms of Board Legitimacy, Credibility 
and Strategie Capabilities should shift the attention of future research and practice 
toward governance specifie and hard to imitate resources and competencies. 
lndeed, governance resources and capabilities- as those provided by firm selection 
and nominating processes, by the fit between directors' industry specifie experience 
and firm strategie needs, by a careful dosage of Directors' occupational and age 
diversity or their level of education similarity- when combined with efficient 
governance processes, will enhance firm's strategie governance capabilities and 
contribute to create sustainable competitive advantage by making the Board of 
directors value-creating for the company and for society at large rather than a mere 
agency cast reduction one, as prescribed by the fiduciary role with which it has been 
historically associated. 
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ui
si
tio
n 
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
(T
he
 l
at
te
r 
w
ill 
be
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 b
y 
e
xa
m
in
in
g 
e
a
ch
 d
ire
ct
or
's
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
o
cc
u
pa
tio
ns
 a
nd
 if
 h
e 
w
a
s 
in 
fu
nc
tio
n 
w
he
n 
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e 
fir
m
 i
nv
ol
ve
d 
m
a
de
 a
t 
le
as
t 
o
n
e
 a
cq
ui
si
tio
n) 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 t
he
 n
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
di
re
ct
or
s 
fo
rm
in
g 
th
e 
e
n
tir
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
.
 
Co
m
pu
te
d 
fo
r e
a
ch
 a
cq
ui
re
r a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Q
ue
st
io
n:
 
Q 
2.
1 
H
yp
ot
he
se
s:
 
H
12
; H
13
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Q
ue
st
io
n:
 
Q 
3.
1;
 Q
 3
.2
 
a
n
d 
0
5
 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s:
 
1-
A 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 
1 
w
ill 
be
 
a
ss
ig
ne
d 
if 
th
e 
1 H
12
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
di
re
ct
or
s 
a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
1 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
in
cu
m
be
nt
 C
EO
 p
er
io
d 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 
th
e 
Q
ue
st
io
n:
 
to
ta
l c
o
m
m
itt
ee
 m
e
m
be
rs
 is
 le
ss
 th
an
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
e
di
an
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
th
is
 
m
e
a
su
re
,
 
1 
Q 
3.
1 
a
n
d 
Q 
5 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 O
. 
2-
A 
sc
o
re
 o
f 1
 w
ill 
be
 a
ss
ig
ne
d 
if 
th
e 
v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
th
e 
L T
IP
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 l
in
ke
d 
to
 
lo
ng
 
te
rm
 
a
cc
o
u
n
tin
g 
an
d 
e
co
n
o
m
ie
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
m
e
a
su
re
s 
su
ch
 
as
 
R
O
A,
 
R
O
E
,
 
EV
A
,
 
Sa
le
s 
G
ro
wt
h,
 .
.
.
 
e
tc
.
 
~ o-. 
(E
xc
lud
ing
 s
ho
rt 
te
rm
 
bo
nu
se
s,
 
sa
la
ry
,
 
st
oc
k 
o
pt
io
ns
,
 
re
st
ric
te
d 
sh
ar
es
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 
sh
ar
e 
pr
ie
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
) 
di
vid
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
CE
O
 t
ot
al
 
pa
y 
is 
gr
ea
te
r 
th
an
 t
he
 s
a
m
pl
e 
m
e
di
an
 
va
lu
e 
o
f 
th
at
 
m
e
a
su
re
,
 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 0
; 
3-
A 
sc
o
re
 o
f 
1 
w
ill 
be
 a
ss
ig
ne
d 
if 
th
e 
CE
O
 
pa
y 
pa
ck
ag
e 
o
f 
th
e 
a
cq
ui
rin
g 
co
m
pa
ny
 
co
n
ta
in
s 
a
t 
le
as
t 
o
n
e
 
o
f 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s:
 
se
ve
ra
n
ce
 
pr
ov
isi
on
(s)
, 
e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
a
gr
ee
m
en
t(s
) 
o
r 
go
ld
en
 
pa
ra
ch
ut
es
 
cl
au
se
 
(s)
 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 O
.
 
If 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
u
se
 
at
 !
ea
st
 o
n
e
 
o
f 
th
e 
a
fo
re
m
en
tio
ne
d 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
w
hi
le
 
ha
vi
ng
 
a
 
sc
o
re
 o
f 0
 in
 #
2 
a
bo
ve
,
 
th
en
 th
e 
sc
o
re
 fo
r 
th
e 
pr
es
en
t v
a
ria
bl
e 
w
ill 
be
 O
.
 
4-
A 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 
3 
w
ill 
be
 
a
ss
ig
ne
d 
if 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f s
ha
re
s 
a
ct
ua
lly
 p
ur
ch
as
ed
 a
nd
 
he
ld
 b
y 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
e
m
be
rs
 d
iv
id
ed
 
by
 t
he
 t
ot
al
 s
ha
re
s 
a
ct
ua
lly
 p
ur
ch
as
ed
 
an
d 
he
ld
 b
y 
th
e 
e
n
tir
e 
bo
ar
d 
m
e
m
be
rs
 is
 
gr
ea
te
r t
ha
n 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
e
di
an
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
th
at
 m
e
a
su
re
,
 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 is
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; 
5-
A 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 
3 
w
ill 
be
 
a
ss
ig
ne
d 
if 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f c
o
m
m
itt
ee
 m
e
m
be
rs
 s
itt
in
g 
on
 
o
th
er
 f
irm
s'
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
e
m
be
rs
 is
 g
re
at
er
 th
an
 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
e
di
an
 
va
lu
e 
o
f 
th
is
 
m
e
a
su
re
,
 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 0
; 
~ 
Fa
m
ily
C
on
tra
l 
D
ua
/S
ha
re
s 
Fa
m
ily
B
o
a
rd
 
Ex
is
te
n
ce
 o
f a
 f
am
ily
 c
o
n
tra
/lin
g 
m
o
re
 t
ha
n 
10
%
 o
f f
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 v
o
tin
g 
sh
ar
es
.
 
Bi
n
a
ry
.
 
Co
n
tra
/lin
g 
Fa
m
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 u
si
ng
 d
ua
l s
ha
re
s.
 
Bi
n
a
ry
 
Co
n
tra
/lin
g 
Fa
m
ily
 w
ith
 a
 r
e
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
on
 
th
e 
bo
a
rd
.
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n
a
ry
 
6-
A 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 
1 
w
ill 
be
 
a
ss
ig
ne
d 
if 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r o
f c
o
m
m
itt
ee
 m
e
m
be
rs
 h
av
in
g 
a
t 
le
as
t 1
0 
ye
ar
s'
 
e
x
pe
rie
nc
e 
a
s 
di
re
ct
or
s 
in 
ge
ne
ra
l 
is 
gr
ea
te
r 
th
an
 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
e
di
an
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f t
hi
s 
m
e
a
su
re
,
 
o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
sc
o
re
 is
 O
.
 
Th
e 
fin
al
 c
o
m
po
si
te
 m
e
a
su
re
 
o
f 
th
e 
Co
m
pC
om
 
va
ria
bl
e 
w
ill 
be
 c
o
m
pu
te
d 
as
 t
he
 s
u
m
 o
f 
th
e 
si
x 
in
di
vi
du
al
 s
co
re
s
.
 
D
ic
ho
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m
ou
s 
va
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bl
e 
th
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 t
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 1
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is 
a
 c
o
n
tro
llin
g 
fa
m
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 h
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di
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 m
o
re
 th
an
 1
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 o
f t
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vo
tin
g 
sh
ar
es
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a
n
d 
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o
th
er
w
is
e.
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D
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ho
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m
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w
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1 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s:
 
co
n
tro
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ng
 
fa
m
ily
 
u
se
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Sh
ar
es
 
a
n
d 
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o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
1 
H
 14
 
D
ic
ho
to
m
ou
s 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
at
 
ta
ke
s 
1 
if 
th
e 
co
n
tro
llin
g 
fa
m
ily
 h
as
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
n
e
 o
f i
ts
 m
e
m
be
rs
 
si
tti
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 b
oa
rd
 o
f 
di
re
ct
or
s 
a
n
d 
ze
ro
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Q
ue
st
io
n:
 
Q 
3.
1 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s:
 
H1
4 
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O
wn
Ch
ar
 
CE
O
-B
oa
rd
 F
u
n
cD
is
t 
O
wn
er
sh
ip
 c
ha
ra
te
ris
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s.
 
Fa
ct
or
 s
co
re
 v
a
ria
bl
e.
 
Fa
ct
or
 s
co
re
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
fa
ct
or
 A
na
ly
si
s 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
 
R
ep
la
ce
s 
th
e 
Si
gn
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r, 
Si
gn
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rR
ep
, F
am
ily
Co
nt
ro
l, 
Fa
m
ily
Bo
ar
d 
an
d 
D
ua
/S
ha
re
s 
v
a
ria
bl
es
 to
 a
vo
id
 
m
u
lti
co
lin
ea
rit
y 
pr
ob
le
m
s.
 
Fu
nc
tio
na
l d
is
ta
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
CE
O
 a
n
d 
1 
Co
m
pu
te
d 
a
s 
Fo
llo
w
s:
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
o
f d
ire
ct
or
s.
 
St
ep
 1
: 
In
de
x.
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Qu
es
tio
n:
 
Q 
3.
1 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s:
 
H
14
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Qu
es
tio
n:
 
Q 
3.
1 
H
yp
ot
he
se
s:
 
H
15
; 1
8 
cr
e
a
tio
n 
o
f 
th
re
e 
ca
te
go
ric
al
 
fu
nc
tio
na
l b
ac
kg
ro
un
ds
: 
m
e
a
su
re
s 
o
f 
1 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Qu
es
tio
n:
 
(1)
 o
u
tp
ut
 f
un
ct
io
ns
: 
m
a
rk
et
in
g 
a
n
d 
sa
le
s;
 (2
) 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 f
un
ct
io
ns
: 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
,
 
R&
D 
a
n
d 
e
n
gi
ne
er
in
g;
 (3
) 
su
pp
or
t 
fu
nc
tio
ns
: 
fin
an
ce
,
 
a
cc
o
u
n
tin
g,
 
pr
im
ar
ily
 l
aw
,
 
hu
m
an
 r
e
so
u
rc
e
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
 
A 
ca
te
go
ric
al
 
m
e
a
su
re
 
o
f 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
s 
o
f e
a
ch
 d
ire
ct
or
 is
 c
re
a
te
d 
a
n
d 
co
de
d 
1 
if 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
 
ha
d 
pr
im
ar
y 
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in 
m
a
rk
et
in
g 
a
n
d 
sa
le
s,
 
2 
if 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
 
ha
d 
pr
im
ar
y 
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in 
o
pe
ra
tio
ns
,
 
R
&D
 o
r 
e
n
gi
ne
er
in
g 
an
d 
3 
if 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
 
pr
im
ar
y 
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
is 
in 
fin
an
ce
,
 
a
cc
o
u
n
tin
g,
 l
aw
, 
hu
m
an
 r
e
so
u
rc
e
s 
o
r 
o
th
er
 
a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
fu
nc
tio
ns
. W
he
n 
a
 d
ire
ct
or
 h
as
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4.
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a
n
d 
0
5
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e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in 
tw
o 
fu
nc
tio
ns
 fa
llin
g 
in 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
ca
te
go
rie
s,
 h
e 
w
a
s 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
in 
th
e 
o
n
e
 
in 
w
hi
ch
 
he
 
ha
d 
th
e 
m
o
st
 
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e.
 
Th
e 
sa
m
e
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
is 
a
pp
lie
d 
to
 t
he
 C
EO
 o
f 
e
a
ch
 a
cq
ui
re
r; 
St
ep
 2
: 
Cr
ea
te
 
a
 
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s 
m
e
a
su
re
 
fo
r 
e
a
ch
 
(D
ire
cto
r-C
EO
) 
dy
ad
 
ba
se
d 
on
 
th
e 
co
di
ng
 
re
a
liz
ed
 
in 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 s
te
p.
 
Th
us
,
 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 s
im
ila
rit
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
a
 d
ire
ct
or
 a
nd
 t
he
 
CE
O
,
 
(C
EO
-D
ire
cto
r) 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
si
m
ila
rit
y,
 
w
a
s 
co
de
d 
1 
if 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
 
an
d 
th
e 
CE
O
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d 
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in 
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e 
sa
m
e
 f
un
ct
io
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l 
a
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de
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a
bo
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 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
St
ep
 3
: 
Co
m
pu
te
 
th
e 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 
si
m
ila
rit
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
CE
O
 
a
n
d 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 
bo
ar
d 
o
f 
di
re
ct
or
s 
(C
EO
-B
oa
rd)
 f
un
ct
io
na
l 
si
m
ila
rit
y,
 
a
s 
fo
llo
w
: (1)
 fo
r 
ea
ch
 
ca
te
go
ry
 
o
f 
th
e 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 i
 (i
= 
O
ut
pu
t, 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 o
r 
su
pp
or
t f
un
ct
io
ns
), 
a
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f (
CE
O-
D
ire
ct
or
) d
ya
ds
 s
ha
rin
g 
th
e 
ith
 c
a
te
go
ry
 
w
ill 
be
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 (i
.e 
Pf
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 (C
EO
-D
ir)=
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(C
EO
-D
ire
cto
r) 
dy
ad
s 
sh
ar
in
g 
th
e 
ith
 
Ca
te
go
ry
)/ 
to
ta
l o
f d
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ds
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(2)
 a
 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
 
in
de
x 
si
m
ila
r 
to
 
th
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H
er
fin
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al
 m
e
a
su
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 w
ill 
be
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o
m
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te
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a
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uc
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m
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o
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m
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O
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un
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io
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e
m
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o
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w
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a
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o
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ai
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u
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ra
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na
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l d
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m
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